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ABSTRACT
Carr, Cheri Lynne. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August 2012. Deleuze’s
Critical Philosophy: The Differential Theory of the Faculties. Major Professor: Dr. Mary
Beth Mader.
This dissertation argues that a sustained treatment of Gilles Deleuze’s relationship
to Immanuel Kant is essential to a refined understanding of Deleuze’s thought in his
seminal work, Difference and Repetition (1968). Five years before writing Difference and
Repetition Deleuze published Kant’s Critical Philosophy (1963), a short but
comprehensive survey of Kant’s work that introduced within the general triadic structure
of Kant’s critiques a more finely-grained structure oriented around the concept of
faculties or capacities of thought. Kant’s Critical Philosophy sees Deleuze using Kant’s
recurrent descriptions of the relationships between the faculties of thought as an
organizing principle to reveal the unity of Kant’s practice of critique as it developed
toward realizing its own standard of immanence. Deleuze’s charge that Kant ultimately
betrays this standard due his unwillingness to question the claims of morality itself is the
catalyst for Deleuze’s thinking in Difference and Repetition. There, Deleuze produces a
differential theory of faculties through a revision and recuperation of Kant’s doctrine of
faculties, but without explicitly linking it to a new critical practice. This dissertation
brings to light the new critical practice implicit in Deleuze’s thought by comparing the
doctrine of faculties from Kant’s Critical Philosophy with the differential theory of
faculties from Difference and Repetition. What it shows is that in Difference and
Repetition Deleuze carries out his own “critique of reason”, an immanent critique that is
not satisfied to remain at the level of the a priori conditions of experience but seeks to
account for experience’s genesis. Deleuze’s critique contests the claims of morality at the
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heart of Kant’s conservatism by developing a non-psychologistic theory of faculties as
relations of power, by exposing the non-rational basis of rationality through a genetic
analysis of “common sense”, and by forcing thought to internalize how powerless it is to
attain absolute moral insight. The methodological correlations drawn between Kant’s
Critical Philosophy and Difference and Repetition allow the dissertation to conclude by
raising important questions about the extent to which Deleuze’s critique breaks with its
Kantian antecedent, particularly as regards its practical commitments.
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1. Introduction
We will begin with a discussion of the overall project of the dissertation, its
philosophical motivation in the problems of the neutrality of method and relative priority
of the practical and theoretical, and its unique contribution to Deleuze scholarship as both
a corrective to misconceptions about Deleuze’s relationship to Kant and as a challenge to
readers who understand Deleuze’s work as pure ontology stripped of an ethic. We
conclude with a concise thesis statement, a map of the chapter divisions and outline of
their guiding questions.
a. General Problems and Rationale of this Study
Ontology asks the basic question of existence. It is life that is at stake in ontology.
One very prevalent way of reading Immanuel Kant’s work is that after him, ontology can
be done away with. For widely recognized Logical Positivists like A.J. Ayer, Moritz
Schlick and Rudolf Carnap, when Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” moved reflection to
the conditions of possible experience and deflected questions of existence to questions of
experience, Kant both overcame skepticism and displaced ontology. The Logical
Positivists took the point of view that while they agreed with Kant that experience is the
measure of truth, they disagreed when Kant tried to suggest that there could still be nontautological truths that we could know prior to experience and that would ground
knowledge. For Kant, these synthetic a priori truths were accessible through a critique of
the conditions of experience. For the Logical Positivists, they were nonsense. Within the
Analytic tradition, this attitude of the Logical Positivists gave rise to the pre-eminence of
epistemology and for many, a disregard for questions of ontology.
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This is not to say that epistemology has entirely dominated philosophical
reflection since Kant. For example, much of 19th century German philosophy is occupied
by the attempt to pursue and expand Kant’s critique in view of its ontological
implications. Hegel, Nietzsche, and Schopenhauer are all examples. In the Analytic
tradition outside of Logical Positivism, there has long been interest in ontology and it is
generally agreed that philosophy can make substantial discoveries about what kinds of
things exist, their essence, and their constituency in reality. Strawson's descriptive
metaphysics, Kripke's realist semantics, Quine's naturalistic conception of ontology, and
Hilary Putnam’s “direct realism” are all examples. Charles Taylor develops a particularly
influential ontology of what he calls the “authentic self” by arguing for the inevitability
of the phenomenological perspective after Kant. Though Taylor’s way of connecting
ontology with ethics is suggestive, it is Taylor’s use of phenomenology to determine his
ontology and his widely accepted interpretation of Kant that our work questions.
In “Overcoming Epistemology,” Taylor describes the weakness of the
epistemological frame of reference as having not essentially moved beyond Descartes
and thus guilty of the same kinds of reductive claims as Cartesian foundationalism.1
Taylor argues that even epistemological attempts to criticize foundationalism end up
reinforcing and repeating it. This is because for Taylor the pre-eminence accorded to
epistemology is ineliminably bound to the foundationalist project. In turn, the
foundationalist project is itself dependent on what Taylor calls “representationalism.”
The formula Taylor offers to understand representationalism is this: “knowledge is to be
seen as correct representation of an independent reality. In its original form, it saw
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
1

Charles Taylor, “Overcoming Epistemology,” Philosophical Arguments, (Cambridge:
Harvard UP, 1995): 1-19.
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knowledge as the inner depiction of an outer reality.” “Representationalism,” according
to Taylor, is the belief that knowledge consists of having an accurate representation of
external reality. Ultimately, Taylor thinks it is the “representational” theory of knowledge
that needs to be opposed if we are to move beyond foundationalism. What is at stake,
Taylor suggests, is that those who seek to overcome epistemology are interested in more
than challenging the faith in foundationalism. They are interested in undermining the
representational view of knowledge underlying it because representationalism is “bound
up with very influential and often not fully articulated notions about science and about
the nature of human agency. Through these it connects with certain central moral and
spiritual ideas of the modern age” (66). Representationalism, in other words, leads to
particular ideas of the proper way of living, or proper ethos, that we should adopt.
Taylor’s conclusion is that the phenomenological tradition, with its substitution of
“intentionality” for “representation”, is the only viable option for developing ontological
reflection after Kant – both because it undermines representationalism and because it
presents a new ethos based on the notion of the “authentic self”.
Without going into too much detail, Taylor attempts to develop a nonrepresentational theory of knowledge based on a phenomenological conception of the
subject as intentional. Taylor argues that there is a full understanding of meaning in our
lived experience: that everything is taking place against the background of your life and
situation, your horizon of meaning. This leads him to present an ontology of the
“authentic self” that is teleological. He supports his reading by suggesting that those
thinkers he calls “Neo-Nietzschean” (Foucault and Derrida primarily) who might resist
his ontology of the “authentic self” as presenting a foundational anthropology that would
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limit possibilities of life2 are really just working out the implications of the
phenomenological interpretation of Kantian subjectivity and critique rather than
fundamentally breaking with phenomenology and its interpretation of Kant. For Taylor,
while neo-Nietzscheans like Foucault and Derrida may believe they are contesting
phenomenology, they are committed to the phenomenological perspective insofar as they
interpret Kant’s critique as primarily an epistemological method.
But perhaps Taylor is too quick when he puts Kant into an epistemological
register. The cost of doing that is that he is unable to sufficiently appreciate the Kantian
dimension of a whole series of non-phenomenological attempts to resist the privilege of
epistemology in favor of ontology throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. The problem
with Taylor’s ontology of the “authentic self” is that Taylor’s conception of the subject is
based on a certain interpretation of what critical practice is. In short, Taylor’s
phenomenological conception of the subject depends on understanding Kantian critical
practice as purely epistemological so that it is necessarily the case that the only way to
proceed from Kant is to phenomenology. For Taylor’s argument to work, he needs to be
able to connect Kant’s transcendental conditions with conditions of intentionality. Yet,
what Taylor does not appreciate is that Kant’s critique has an ontological dimension. And
what Taylor does not anticipate is another “neo-Nietzschean” thinker whose work on
Kant can be read as a challenge to subjectivist conceptions of Kant’s theory of faculties
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
2

In particular, Foucault might criticize Taylor’s ontology of the authentic self for raising
the empirical to the level of the transcendental. Foucault calls this an anthropology in which “a
mode of thought in which the rightful limitations of acquired knowledge (and consequently of all
empirical knowledge) are at the same time the concrete forms of existence, precisely as they are
given in that same empirical knowledge” (see: Michel Foucault, Order of Things, (New York:
Vintage, 1994), 248.) In other words, it takes our present experiences, which are content, as
foundational forms.
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and to epistemological readings of critique. Gilles Deleuze’s 1963 book on Kant, Kant’s
Critical Philosophy, offers precisely such a reading.3 In it, Deleuze suggests
understanding Kant’s practice of critique as immanent and Kant’s recurrent descriptions
of the relationships between the faculties of thought as proposing a theory of relations of
forces that underlie the genesis of the subject. Our argument is that by bringing to light
Kant’s demand for an immanent critique and the hitherto underappreciated unity of
Kant’s account of pre-subjective faculties, Deleuze connects Kantian critique with an
ontology that is inseparable from an ethos and that Deleuze uses this immanent critical
ethos as the implicit practical “method” of Difference and Repetition (1968).4 In contrast
to Taylor’s ontology of the “authentic self”, Deleuze’s critique, understood as an ethos of
evaluation, does not presuppose a foundational anthropology that would limit
possibilities of life. Rather, Deleuze’s critique is built on the evaluation of all
presuppositions and arouses life to expand to the very limits of its power.
b. Statement of the Thesis
Our work poses the question of Deleuze’s reading of Kant, particularly as it is
relevant to understanding Deleuze’s critical practice and differential theory of faculties in
Difference & Repetition. It is a difficult relationship to describe in view of how deeply
ambivalent Deleuze is toward Kant. Deleuze’s discussions of Kant in Difference &
Repetition are critical of what he sees as Kant’s unspoken and compromising refusal to
renounce the representational model of thought (DR 136). Moreover, the near
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
3

Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara
Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
4

Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1994).
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impenetrability of Deleuze’s earlier book, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, can be read as an
act of sabotage, especially since the book presents itself as an introduction to Kant.
Indeed, a decade after the publication of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, Deleuze described
this work as “a book on an enemy.”5 This, in combination with Kant’s not being very
fashionable in France during the 1960s has lead many Deleuze scholars to the conclusion
that Deleuze and Kant have nothing in common6 and that the question of their
relationship can be ignored. Scholars interested in Deleuze’s historical works tend to
focus on his friendlier and more obviously philosophically familial relationships to
Bergson, Spinoza, and Nietzsche.7 Other scholars dismiss Deleuze’s early history books
entirely. Yet Deleuze’s book on Kant is both deeply insightful and fundamentally
important to understanding Deleuze’s ontology and ethics.
Deleuze takes seriously Kant’s claim that the Critique of Judgment was the
capstone of the critical enterprise, and that the other Critiques could only be understood
in light of it.8 It is from this perspective that he develops the idea of a “doctrine of
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
5

Gilles Deleuze, “Letter to a harsh critic”, in Deleuze, ed. Michael Cressole (Paris:
Psychothèque Éditions Universitaires, 1973) 1-5.
6

Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam also draw attention to this dissimilarity in
their Introduction to the English translation of Kant’s Critical Philosophy when they write “It is
difficult to think of two philosophers more apparently opposite than old Immanuel Kant, ‘the
great Chinaman of Königsberg’, and Gilles Deleuze, the Parisian artist of nomadic intensities”
(xv).
7

We do not wish to suggest that Deleuze’s relationship to Kant is more fundamental than
his relationship to these other thinkers – or even that it is more important to understanding
Deleuze’s work. Rather, we propose that Deleuze’s reading of Kant is more important for
Deleuze’s ontology than scholars have hitherto appreciated and that Deleuze’s reading of Kant
may offer some interesting new resources for work on the relationship between ethics and
ontology, and even for Kant scholarship. The latter project, however, is a hope for future research
rather than the subject of research here.
8

Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, Ed. Paul Guyer. Trans. Paul Guyer
and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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faculties” operating in the background of Kant’s entire critical philosophy. Not all
scholars are resistant to the suggestion that Deleuze’s debt to Kant is profound and
important. In 1979 Vincent Descombes characterized Deleuze as “above all a postKantian.”9 But what does calling Deleuze a post-Kantian mean? This designation is
usually reserved for the German idealists – thinkers such as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel
– who developed Kant’s insights during the 19th century. However, more loosely, “postKantian” might be taken to mean anyone in whose philosophical project the development
of Kantian insights is deeply embedded. And indeed, many of Deleuze’s criticisms of
Kant also function as opportunities for Deleuze to extract what he calls the “furtive and
explosive” moments latent within Kant’s thought (DR 58). For example, the “fractured I”
(DR 87), “discordant harmony” of faculties (DR 146), and “‘problematic’” Ideas (DR
168) are all moments Deleuze explicitly extracts from his readings of Kant in the course
of applying them to the articulation of his own ontology. Of particular interest for us,
Deleuze claims that Kant failed to realize the immanent potential of his own ideal of
critique. For a true critique, everything must be put into question, but while Kant
questioned all claims to knowledge, truth, and morality, he renounced the immanent
critical project when he failed to put knowledge, truth, and morality themselves into
question.10 It is our contention that in these moments – the moments of the “fractured-I”,
the “discordant harmony” of faculties, “problematic Ideas”, and most importantly
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
9

Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University
Press: 1980) 152.
10

For Kant, Deleuze writes, “saw critique as a force which should be brought to bear on
all claims to knowledge and truth, but not on knowledge and truth themselves; a force which
should be brought to bear on all claims to morality, but not on morality itself” (Nietzsche and
Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983) 89.)
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“critique” – Deleuze is continuing the initiative he claimed Kant began but did not pursue
(DR 87).
It may be surprising to many Deleuze scholars that our reading of Difference and
Repetition emphasizes its practical dimension. For many, the suggestion that there is a
practical dimension to Difference and Repetition is wrong-headed insofar as Deleuze’s
work, like many French philosophers in the 1960s, resists ethics. But this attitude is
predicated on a limited conception of ethics. Rather than think of ethics in the sense of a
theory that grounds a set of rules in a conception of the Good or a theory of human
nature, we consider ethics to be the practical attitude that is the agent of ontology. In
other words, ethics is an ethos or way of living that expresses an ontological disposition.
Ethics and ontology are intrinsically connected. Michel Foucault’s ontology of actuality
is an example of this conception of ethics. While Foucault is recuperating a broadly
Heideggerian ontology, he is still connecting it to an ethos or attitude of critique that he
develops from Kant. In agreement with Foucault, on our understanding ontology must be
understood more as a form of discourse or as a discursive practice about modes of being.
Thus our analyses aim at the immanent level of forms of existence or modes of being,
what we talk about as “faculties” and conceptual or practical “personae”. Ultimately, our
belief is that one cannot have ontology without the dimension of ethics as ethos – that is,
without an actual practical attitude that is not a theory but a choice about oneself that has
the potential to be transformative.
In summary, we argue that Deleuze’s charge in Kant’s Critical Philosophy that
Kant betrays the standard of immanence required by the critical perspective is the catalyst
for Deleuze’s thinking in Difference and Repetition. In Difference and Repetition
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Deleuze produces a differential theory of faculties through a revision and recuperation of
Kant’s doctrine of faculties, but without explicitly linking it to a new critical practice. We
attempt to bring to light the new critical practice implicit in Deleuze’s thought by
comparing the doctrine of faculties from Kant’s Critical Philosophy with the differential
theory of faculties from Difference and Repetition. What we show is that in Difference
and Repetition Deleuze carries out his own “critique of reason”, an immanent critique
that is not satisfied to remain at the level of the a priori conditions of experience but
seeks to account for experience’s genesis. What Deleuze develops from this critique is a
practical attitude or ethos based on his ideal of philosophy as a constantly renewed
evaluation of presuppositions. This ideal is shown to resist foundational anthropologies
and moral teleology, however the correlations drawn between Kant’s Critical Philosophy
and Difference and Repetition at the level of “culture” lead us to conclude by raising
important questions about the extent to which Deleuze’s critique breaks with Kantian
ethics and social theory, especially in its justification of violence.
It is important to note that what we are doing is a comparison between two of
Deleuze’s texts: Difference and Repetition and Kant’s Critical Philosophy. It is not a
comparison of Kant and Deleuze, nor a comparison of a standard reading of Kant found
in secondary literature with Deleuze’s reading. These would be valuable projects, and it
is only in their context that we could legitimately pose the question whether Deleuze’s is
a fair reading of Kant. Of course, saying that the dissertation is doing a comparison
between these Deleuze texts opens the problem (almost unique to Deleuze) of the relation
between Deleuze’s philosophy and his histories of philosophy. As Deleuze writes:
It seems to us that the history of philosophy should play a role roughly analogous
to that of collage in painting. The history of philosophy is the reproduction of
9

philosophy itself. In the history of philosophy a commentary should act as a
veritable double and bear the maximal modification appropriate to a double. (One
imagines a philosophically bearded Hegel, a philosophically clean-shaven Marx,
in the same way as a moustached Mona Lisa.) It should be possible to recount a
real book of past philosophy as if it were an imaginary and feigned book. (xxi)
The history of philosophy is no longer an attempt at finding a single, correct
interpretation of what a philosopher says. Rather, it is an attempt to present a
philosopher's way of grappling with problems in what that philosopher did not say but is
nonetheless present in what he did say. In other words, Deleuze’s histories of philosophy
are attempts to discover what is implicit in philosophical thought so as to develop an
appreciation of what was genuinely at stake in their perspective behind what they may
have explicitly recognized. Our project attempts to do something similar by excavating in
Deleuze’s works the implicit structures and stakes of his thought – ultimately so that we
might find in his thought connections and resources for continuing philosophy today.
c. Plan of the Dissertation
We begin with a chapter on “Deleuze’s reading of Kant’s doctrine of faculties in
Kant’s Critical Philosophy”, which orients Deleuze’s interpretation of Kant’s critical
philosophy around the concept of faculties or capacities of thought. Deleuze sees Kant’s
recurrent descriptions of the relationships between the faculties as an organizing principle
that reveals the unity of Kant’s practice of critique as it developed toward realizing its
own standard of immanence. While Deleuze argues that Kant began his critical project
with the presupposition of various forms of “common sense” to explain the harmony
between faculties, he shows how the account Kant gives in the Critique of Judgment of
aesthetic common sense’s genesis from the experience of sublimity is an attempt to
ground the earlier moral and theoretical critiques by eradicating all presuppositions and
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external explanations. Deleuze suggests, however, that Kant was only partially
successful. In order for the experience of the sublime to reveal the moral destiny of man,
a particular form of cultivation is required. This form of cultivation is determined by the
ideal of the “civil state of reason” critique enacts. While Deleuze only makes
parenthetical reference to the correlation between the structure of the relation of faculties
and the structure of historical “progress,” our first main chapter identifies in this
correlation a fundamental and implicit value bias within Kant’s critical method as
Deleuze understands it.11
The first chapter on “Deleuze’s differential theory of faculties in Difference and
Repetition” orients Deleuze’s philosophy in Difference and Repetition around his
resistance to the “dogmatic Image of thought” he diagnoses in the history of philosophy.
The dogmatic Image of thought is the implicit, subjective presupposition that all thought
is recognition. Deleuze argues that this Image is insufficient for a variety of reasons, most
importantly because it legitimates moral, political and philosophical conformism by
tacitly presupposing “common sense” as the subjective principle of collaboration between
faculties. In response to this problem, Deleuze develops a revised version of Kantian
critique, what he calls “transcendental empiricism”, that describes the genesis of a
“thought without Image” out of the experience of “encounter”. However, Deleuze’s
revised critique and differential theory of faculties is not merely descriptive. We argue
that Difference and Repetition offers more than an ontology – it offers an ethos. In order
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
11

We do not wish to suggest that Deleuze’s reading of Kant is guilty of psychologism.
His reading does not come down to the claim that Kant the man was unwilling to give up the
moral standpoint for which he was attempting to lay the groundwork. Rather, Deleuze’s analysis
determines that there were “subjective presuppositions” operating within Kant’s philosophical
perspective that, despite the steps Kant took to uncover them, could not be perceived at Kant’s
time.
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for the faculties to transcend their limits up to the point of generating a thought without
Image, a particular form of cultivation is required. This form of cultivation is determined
by the Greek notion of paideia as a “violent training” in evaluating presuppositions (DR
165). While Deleuze does not make this argument himself, we suggest that the necessity
of cultivation for experiencing encounter implies a “critical ethos” at the heart of
Deleuze’s conception of philosophy.
Our next chapter, “A Comparison of Kant’s Critical Philosophy and Difference
and Repetition’s accounts of the faculties” makes three primary arguments. First, it
argues that by comparing the doctrine of faculties from Kant’s Critical Philosophy with
the differential theory of faculties from Difference and Repetition the similarities between
these accounts point to another similarity at the level of the immanent critical approach.
Second, this comparison is used to bring to light the new form of Kantian critical practice
implicit in Deleuze’s thought. The argument is that investigation bears out the claim that
the immanent critical approach defining Kant’s Critical Philosophy also features in
Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition. Third, it argues that Deleuze’s immanent critique in
Difference and Repetition has a practical dimension as an ethos of evaluation. This ethos
of evaluation breaks with foundational anthropologies and moral teleology but the
implication of the parallel conceptions of culture from Deleuze’s work in Difference and
Repetition and his reading of Kant in Kant’s Critical Philosophy lead us to conclude by
questioning the extent to which Deleuze breaks with Kant’s proposal of the necessity of
violence as the principle of “progress” within his ethical and social theories.

12

2. Deleuze’s reading of Kant’s doctrine of faculties in Kant’s Critical Philosophy (1963)
In this chapter we orient Deleuze’s interpretation of Kant’s critical philosophy
around the concept of faculties or capacities of thought. Deleuze sees Kant’s recurrent
descriptions of the relationships between the faculties as an organizing principle that
reveals the unity of Kant’s practice of critique as it developed toward realizing its own
standard of immanence. While Kant began his critical project with the presupposition of
various forms of “common sense” to explain the harmony between faculties, Deleuze
shows how the account Kant gives in the Critique of Judgment of aesthetic common
sense’s genesis from the experience of sublimity is an attempt to ground the earlier moral
and speculative theories by eradicating all presuppositions and external explanations.
Deleuze suggests, however, that Kant was only partially successful. In order for the
experience of the sublime to reveal the moral destiny of man, a particular form of
cultivation is required. This form of cultivation is determined by the ideal of the “civil
state of reason” critique produces. While Deleuze only makes parenthetical reference to
the correlation between the structure of the relation of faculties and the structure of
historical “progress,” this chapter identifies in this correlation a fundamental and implicit
value bias within Kant’s critical method as Deleuze understands it.
a. How faculties function in relation to the subject
Deleuze opens Kant’s Critical Philosophy with a pair of Kant’s definitions of
philosophy. Philosophy is: “‘the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential
ends of human Reason’” or “‘the love which the Reasonable being has for the supreme
ends of human Reason’ (CPR and Opus postumum, A839/B867)” (KCP 1). In the first
definition, what makes an end “essential” to human Reason is that it is an expression of
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Reason’s own nature. It is an end that Reason gives to itself. In the second, the
relationship is explicitly between the “Reasonable being” and the “ends of human
Reason”, in other words, between human Reason and the ends of human Reason. What
both definitions share is the idea that what defines philosophy is the search for knowledge
within the relationship between Reason and its own ends.
Deleuze claims that what these definitions of philosophy reveal is Kant’s struggle
against empiricism and dogmatic rationalism. While it may seem that empiricism and
dogmatic rationalism have little in common, Deleuze suggests that from Kant’s
perspective both are predicated on the assumption that Reason’s ends are not determined
by Reason itself but are determined externally. For empiricists, Deleuze claims, Reason’s
ends are given to it by Nature1, while for rationalists – despite the fact that they recognize
that Reason pursues purely rational ends – “what Reason recognizes as an end is still
something exterior and superior to it: a Being, a Good, or a Value, taken as a rule of will”
(KCP 2). Usually it is understood that the question at the heart of the empiricistrationalist debate is the extent to which knowledge depends on sense experience.
Dogmatic rationalists claim that Reason can attain knowledge of things beyond
experience – of God and the soul, for instance. Empiricists claim that all knowledge
arises from sense experience – thus they deny the possibility of attaining knowledge of
anything beyond experience. But what is really at stake according to Deleuze’s
understanding of Kant is that since dogmatic rationalism and empiricism both begin by
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
1

Strictly speaking, empiricism does not conceive of Reason as a faculty of ends. Deleuze
writes that for empiricism Reason’s ends “are referred back to a basic affectivity, to a ‘nature’
capable of positing them. Reason’s defining characteristic is rather a particular way of realizing
the ends shared by man and animals. Reason is the faculty of organizing indirect, oblique means;
culture is trick, calculation, detour” (KCP 1).
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assuming that Reason’s ends are determined externally, they must both explain
knowledge by resorting to the assumption of a pre-established harmony:
In dogmatic rationalism the theory of knowledge was founded on the idea of a
correspondence between subject and object, of an accord between the order of
ideas and the order of things. This accord had two aspects: in itself it implied a
finality; and it demanded a theological principle as source and guarantee of this
harmony, this finality. But it is curious that, from a completely different
perspective, Hume’s empiricism had a similar outcome: in order to explain how
the principles of Nature were in accord with those of human nature Hume was
forced to invoke explicitly a pre-established harmony. (KCP 13)
While their understandings of the sources of pre-established harmony differed (“custom”
for empiricism,2 the will of God for rationalism), Deleuze suggests that Kant saw both
dogmatic rationalism and (at least Humean) empiricism’s accounts of knowledge as
dependent on the assumption of it. In other words, both empiricism and dogmatic
rationalism require a final accord between subjects and objects to legitimate knowledge.
And for Deleuze’s Kant, all of the differences between these two perspectives amount to
little when both base the correspondence between subject and object on the assumption of
a pre-established harmony.
The aim of the current chapter is to offer an exegesis and interpretation of how
Deleuze understands Kant’s unique way of addressing the pre-established harmony
required by empiricism and dogmatic rationalism’s shared conception of the externality
of Reason’s ends. In brief, at the exegetical level the chapter emphasizes Deleuze’s
proposal that what structures Kant’s entire critical project is his re-conception of
Reason’s ends as self-given and his commitment to an immanent critique that would
identify the true nature and means of achieving Reason’s ends through an evaluation of
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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David Hume, “Sceptical Solution of these Doubts Part II” in An Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding, ed. Stephen Buckle (New York: Cambridge UP, 2007) ¶ 11-12.
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Reason’s limits. At the interpretive level, the chapter shows that Deleuze’s reading of
Kant is deeply ambivalent about Kant’s legacy. On the one hand Deleuze admires the
immanent perspective and what he considers its apotheosis in the account of the genesis
of aesthetic common sense from the experience of the sublime. On the other hand,
Deleuze’s subtle insinuation of the centrality of the notion of culture to the development
of one’s very ability to experience sublimity and his suggestion to connect what he calls
Kant’s “doctrine of faculties” to his account of “unsocial sociability” leads readers to
question whether Deleuze believed Kant truly freed his thought from the pre-established
harmony he criticized.
No such pre-established harmony or final accord between subject and object
appears required for Kant. Understanding that Reason’s ends are not determined
externally shifts the very terms of the problem. As Deleuze preliminarily explains it,
since for Kant Reason’s ends are determined by Reason itself, “in positing them, Reason
posits nothing other than itself” (KCP 2). In other words, if Reason’s ends are just
Reason itself, there is no external object with which Reason must correspond for the sake
of knowledge and thus no need for a pre-established harmony to guarantee that
correspondence. The primary object of philosophical inquiry becomes simply Reason and
its ends. But this introduces its own problem: since neither experience nor “any other
authority outside or above Reason” can justify Reason’s ends, there can be no other judge
of Reason’s ends than Reason (KCP 3). In other words, knowledge of Reason can only be
attained by Reason. This nearly paradoxical idea of the self-judging of Reason by Reason
is what Deleuze identifies as the “essential principle” of an “immanent critique” (KCP 3).
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But what does Deleuze mean by “immanent”? To call something “immanent” is
to say that it inheres or dwells within experience. The term is usually contrasted with
“transcendent”, which qualifies things that surpass or go beyond experience. The
distinction between immanence and transcendence originated in a theological debate
about the nature of God,3 but here Deleuze is using the term “immanent” to contrast with
the belief shared by empiricism and dogmatic rationalism that philosophy must
harmonize the inner experience of a subject with an object outside of or “transcendent” to
it. Deleuze suggests that while it is tempting to understand the “immanent” critique as
simply eliminating the transcendent object in order to focus fully on the subject’s inner
experience, as is the case for subjective idealism, this ignores an important feature of
Kant’s work. As Deleuze writes, “Empirical realism is a constant feature of the critical
philosophy” (KCP 14). The difference is that subjective idealism understands the
physical world as reducible to mental objects or processes while empirical realism holds
that the physical world is real and we have direct perceptual relations with it. With Kant,
the physical world is in no danger of being reduced to mental phenomena because the
critical philosophy does not operate at the level of subjects’ inner experience. Rather,
“immanent critique” operates at what Kant calls the “transcendental” level.
Deleuze introduces the idea of “immanent critique” as the “so-called
transcendental method” that seeks to determine “the true nature of Reason’s interests or
ends” and “the means of realizing these interests” (KCP 3). What makes critique
“transcendental” is that it aims at a level between transcendent objects and the subject’s
inner experience of those objects: the level that makes the relation between those two
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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“immanent, adj.”. OED Online. February 2012. Oxford University Press. 5 February
2012 <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/91798?redirectedFrom=immanent>.
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possible. Thus, although the most basic unit of experience for Kant is the representation,
it is not on representations themselves that the immanent critique bears. Against the
externalism of empiricism and dogmatic rationalism, which each claim that the
relationship between subject and object must be explained by a pre-established harmony,
Kant proposes the necessary submission of object to subject. This is the idea of what has
been called Kant’s “Copernican revolution”.4 Rather than imagining how subjects
conform to objects, Kant asks that we instead suppose that objects must conform to
subjects. That is to say, Kant asks that we rephrase the problem of the relationship
between subjects and objects in terms of subjects’ capacities of experiencing. Subjects do
have experience, but what they experience is conditioned by what they can experience.
Against empiricism and dogmatic rationalism, what Kant gains by identifying the
capacities or conditions within the subject that make experience possible is a new avenue
toward developing knowledge that neither arises from nor exceeds sensible experience
and does not demand the assumption of pre-established harmony between subject and
object to explain its possibility: namely, knowledge of the conditions of experience.
What Deleuze identifies as important in Kant’s “so-called transcendental”
reversal is that “The rational being thus discovers that he has new powers” (KCP 14). The
“powers” [Vermögen] to which Deleuze refers are the subject’s capacities for experience.
Kant calls these powers or capacities “faculties”. They are not experience, but the
conditions of experience. There are two definitions of faculty Deleuze attributes to Kant
in Kant’s Critical Philosophy: 1.) Faculties of mind express types of relations between
representations in general and their object or subject (faculty of knowledge, faculty of
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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desire, and faculty of the feeling of pleasure and pain), and 2.) Faculties express the
source of representations and number as many as there are kinds of representations (from
the point of view of knowledge he lists Sensibility, Imagination, Understanding, and
Reason – which are the sources of intuitions, reproductions, concepts, and Ideas,
respectively). Reason, Understanding and Imagination express active powers, while
Sensibility is the expression of a passive power. Immanent critique thus seeks to describe
both the source of representations and relations between representations and their objects
or subjects, not actual empirical representations themselves. Understood in this way,
“faculties” are not mental phenomena so much as they are expressions of the dynamic
forces underlying mental phenomena. The “subject” of the immanent perspective is best
understood not as the empirical subject, but as the “transcendental” subject (KCP 13).5
The “transcendental” subject is not the subject that says “I” – it is not equivalent with
Kant’s notion of the “unity of apperception” or with everyday empirical notions of
individual identity. The “transcendental” subject is simply a collection of changing
relations between faculties that operate beneath the unity of the empirical subject. This is
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
5

Kant agrees with Hume that knowledge goes beyond experience since it requires a
universality and necessity that is not found in experience: “I do not have knowledge when I
remark: ‘I have seen the sun rise a thousand times’, but I do when I assert: ‘The sun will rise
tomorrow’” (KCP 11). If experience never offers anything to justify the use of words like
“tomorrow”, “all”, “always”, or “necessarily”, going beyond experience requires principles that
are our own, immanent, necessarily subjective principles. After all, Deleuze stresses, “The given
cannot be the basis of the operation by which we go beyond the given” (KCP 12). But it is at this
point that Kant breaks with Hume. While Hume saw that knowledge implied subjective principles
by means of which we go beyond the given, he interpreted these principles as merely principles
of human nature, “psychological principles of association concerning our own representations”
(KCP 12). On Deleuze’s reading, however, Kant argues that what is presented to us in such a way
that it is capable of forming a unity such as actual experience offers must necessarily obey the
very same principles as those which govern the course of our subjective representations. Thus the
same conclusion reached above is found again from another perspective: for Kant, the principles
required for knowledge are not “subjective” but “transcendental”: they exist at a level between
the subject and the object. Deleuze’s reading substitutes for the idea of “transcendental
principles” that of “faculties,” which define the mode of our knowledge of objects (A295/B352).
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why immanent critique is not a subjective idealism but rather a “so-called” transcendental
idealism.
b. The doctrine of faculties
As we see, Deleuze’s reading of Kant’s immanent critique does not simply
bracket the external world in order to turn toward the subject’s inner experience. It seeks
to identify the conditions of that experience, conditions that bear little resemblance to
experience itself and which Kant expresses with the term “faculties”. Deleuze’s claim is
that Kant’s many and disparate uses of the term “faculty” can be systematized into a
“doctrine of faculties” and that this doctrine operates as the “real network which
constitutes the transcendental method” (KCP 10). Since “transcendental method” is one
of Deleuze’s ways of describing immanent critique, it should now be clear that it is by
describing the doctrine of faculties that Deleuze argues Kant believes immanent critique
can achieve its primary function of determining “the true nature of Reason’s interests or
ends” and “the means of realizing these interests” (KCP 3).
To understand the true nature of Reason’s ends, Deleuze begins by claiming that
an interest or end is “a representation which determines the will” (KCP 2) and that
representations are always related to something other than themselves: “both to an object
and to a subject” (KCP 3). The faculties of mind (the first sense in which Deleuze uses
the word “faculty”) express the three types of relationships possible between
representations and their object or subject: 1. conformity with the object (faculty of
knowledge), 2. cause of the object (faculty of desire), and 3. affecting the subject “by
intensifying or weakening its vital force” (faculty of the feeling of pleasure and pain)
(KCP 3-4). These faculties of mind are capable of both a higher and a lower form. In
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their lower form, the relation expressed by the faculties is one of dependency. In their
higher form, however, the faculties of mind become autonomous. For Kant, something is
autonomous when it “finds in itself the law of its own exercise” rather than taking it from
something external (KCP 4). For example, the faculty of desire remains in its lower form
as long as the representation that determines the will is the representation of an object.
This is because in the case of objects, even a priori ones, the will is determined by a
pleasure associated with the representation of that object. The higher form of the faculty
of desire is achieved when the representation that determines the will becomes that of the
mere form of the law (KCP 6), which is generated internally. It is only then that the
faculty of desire finds its law within itself. It is only then that it becomes autonomous.
Deleuze uses this description to show that each of the faculty of mind’s higher forms
corresponds to an end of Reason. When the faculty of knowledge achieves its higher
form, it expresses the speculative end of Reason, which is to legislate over phenomena.
Likewise, when the faculty of desire achieves its higher form, it expresses the practical
end of Reason, which is to realize moral good in the world.6 And when the faculty of the
feeling of pleasure and pain achieves its higher form it corresponds to the teleological end
of Reason, which is to realize meaning in the agreement of Nature with our faculties
(KCP 54). These three ends correspond to the three questions Kant poses to “answer all
the interests of my Reason” in the “Canon of Pure Reason”: “What can I know?”, “What
ought I to do?”, and “What may I hope?” (A805/B833). The higher, autonomous, forms
of the faculties of mind are thus the true nature of Reason’s ends.
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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“Things which are good are themselves independent of our physical power to realize
them and are merely determined (in conformity with the logical test) by the moral possibility of
willing the action which realizes them” (KCP 41).
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Once Reason’s ends’ true nature has been identified, critique still has the problem
of discovering the means of realizing these ends. The question is how each faculty of
mind “finds in itself the law of its own exercise” (KCP 4). Or, as Deleuze puts the
question: “What is really legislating in a given faculty?” (KCP 9). This is where Deleuze
introduces the second sense of the word “faculty” around which he hypothesizes Kant’s
work can be oriented. The first sense of the word “faculty” referred to relationships
between representations and their object or subject (faculties of mind). But the notion of
“representation” is not simple. In fact, Deleuze points out, there are a number of different
types of representations and each type is the expression of a unique source. The “simplest
list” of different types of representations “from the point of view of knowledge” consists
of intuitions, concepts, and Ideas (KCP 8). Intuitions are singular representations
immediately related to experience and have their source in Sensibility. Concepts are
general representations mediated in their relation to experience by other representations
and have their source in the Understanding. Ideas are concepts that go beyond the
possibility of experience and have their source in Reason. The second sense of the word
“faculty” refers to the various sources of representations: Sensibility, Understanding, and
Reason. Of course, since intuitions are not technically representations, Sensibility is not
technically a faculty. Deleuze thus distinguishes Sensibility, “a faculty of reception”,
from the “active faculties”, which, from the point of view of the synthesis of knowledge,
are: Imagination, Understanding, and Reason (KCP 9).7 What really legislates within a
given faculty of mind is one or other of these active faculties. As the source of
reproductions, concepts, and Ideas, they are the conditions of human experience,
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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In order to more easily distinguish the first and second senses of the word “faculty”, we
use “faculties of mind” for the first and “active faculties” for the second.

22

knowledge, and thought. Reason’s interests can only be achieved when the faculties that
create this network of conditions interact “in the interest” of achieving it.
What it means to say that the faculties’ relationships are determined by whichever
of the interests of Reason is in question is that “there is no guarantee that Reason itself
undertakes to realize its own interest” (KCP 9). Take the speculative interest or end of
Reason. It orients the Critique of Pure Reason and bears exclusively on phenomena
because it is phenomena that must be subjected in order for knowledge to be possible.8
The speculative end of Reason is realized when the faculty of knowledge achieves its
higher form. But it is not Reason or Imagination that legislates in the interest of this end –
it is the Understanding. “Thus Reason does not look after its own interest” (KCP 10). But
which active faculty legislates within the faculty of mind to ensure it expresses its higher
form will not be the same for each interest. In the practical or moral interest, for example,
Reason legislates (KCP 28). Of course, when an active faculty legislates it does not
thereby suppress all use of the other faculties. “When understanding legislates in the
interest of knowledge, imagination and reason still retain an entirely original role, but in
conformity with tasks determined by the understanding” (KCP 10). Likewise, when
Reason legislates in the moral interest, the Understanding is made use of “following an
interest and in a domain where [it] is no longer the legislator” (KCP 34) For both the
speculative and moral interest of Reason, one of the active faculties becomes legislative
while the others are determined by the legislative faculty to function in particular ways.
There are thus systematic variations in the relationship between faculties, depending on

""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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which interest of Reason is considered. As examples of this, take in more detail the cases
of the speculative and moral interests.
The speculative interest is to legislate over phenomena so as to substantiate
knowledge claims. Knowledge requires all three of the active faculties as well as the
passive faculty of Sensibility. It begins with Sensibility, which receives intuitions and
provides them as material to the Imagination. Imagination, in turn, synthesizes these
intuitions by alignment with Sensibility’s dual processes of apprehension and
reproduction (KCP 15). But the syntheses created by the Imagination are not sufficient to
constitute knowledge. Knowledge requires consciousness “or more precisely the
belonging of representations to a single consciousness within which they must be linked”
(KCP 15). However, in order for Imagination’s syntheses to be united within a single
consciousness, they must be related to the object in general or “object = x” (KCP 15).
The object in general is the correlate of the single consciousness or “cogito” – indeed, it
is the cogito’s formal reflection. In other words, Imagination’s syntheses are represented
as objects with the same power as they are united within a subject: the power of the
Understanding. The forms of subjectivity and objectivity are bound together as a priori
concepts created by the Understanding to unify Imagination’s representations for the
purpose of knowledge. These a priori concepts or “categories” are, Deleuze explains,
both “representations of the unity of consciousness and, as such, predicates of the object
in general” (KCP 16). Phenomena are necessarily subject to the concepts of the
understanding in the sense that the concepts unify the principles of consciousness with
the possibility of experiencing objects in general. Thus, understanding legislates over the
form of experience by subjecting the syntheses provided by Imagination to unification
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under a priori concepts (KCP 16-17 CPR A326/B383-4). Of course, if actual experience
were utterly chaotic, Understanding’s concepts would be impotent to unify it. After all,
Understanding legislates over phenomena only from the point of view of their form. The
content of experience cannot be legislated by any faculty. But though it cannot be
legislated, the content of experience can symbolically correspond to the Ideas of Reason.
So even though Reason is not legislative, it has two very important roles to play in the
interest of knowledge. First, while Deleuze notes that, strictly speaking, knowledge is
attained simply through the unifying power of the Understanding (recognition according
to concepts: this is a chair, this is an apple, this is a tulip poplar tree), “[w]ithout Reason
the Understanding would not reunite into a whole the set of its moves concerning an
object” (KCP 19). When Understanding legislates, Reason is directed to use its Ideas to
provide for the concepts of the Understanding a maximum of both unity and extension.
As Deleuze explains it, Kant conceives of Reason as syllogistic: a concept being given by
the Understanding (for instance the concept “mortal”), Reason looks for another concept
(say, “man”) that can condition the attribution of the first concept (“mortal”) to an object
(like “Caius”) (KCP 19). Caius is a man. Men are mortal. Therefore, Caius is mortal.
Connecting the concept “mortal” to the object “Caius” requires a mediating concept: that
of “man”. But without Reason’s power of unifying concepts according to Ideas that
exceed the possibility of experience (like the Idea of a “systematic unity of Nature”) this
connection would not be possible. Of course, Reason simply proposes Ideas like the
systematic unity of Nature as problems or limits – it does not claim that the totality and
unity of conditions are given in experience. But the fact that the content of experience
symbolically or analogically corresponds to the Ideas of Reason shows that objects
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themselves allow us to tend toward the very systematic unity Reason proposes (KCP 20).
This correspondence attests to “an indeterminate accord” that exists between the content
of experience and Ideas (KCP 21). Thus to summarize: in the speculative interest the
intuitions of Sensibility provide the experiential material for Imagination, Imagination
synthesizes these intuitions through the dual processes of apprehension and reproduction
(KCP 15), Understanding unifies these syntheses by providing them with a priori
concepts which legislate over their form (KCP 16-17 CPR A326/B383-4), and Reason
provides the maximum of unity and extension to these concepts while symbolizing the
content of experience by postulating problematic Ideas at the limit of possible human
knowledge (KCP 19-21).
When the practical or moral interest of Reason is considered, its attendant
organization of faculties is different from that of the speculative interest. Since the
practical interest of Reason is to realize moral good in the world, it is impossible for
understanding to legislate as it did in the speculative interest. After all, for something to
be moral, it must be free. The faculty of desire’s higher form is expressed when the will
becomes free, i.e. when it finds its law within itself rather than in an impure mixing with
external contents, feelings or sensible conditions. The understanding cannot legislate over
freedom because it is only able to legislate representations of objects restricted to the
conditions of Sensibility (as a priori concepts of the Understanding). But by definition
freedom defies the law of causality and thus the conditions of Sensibility. The only type
of representation independent of all feeling, all content, and any sensible condition is a
purely formal one. And there is only one representation that meets this criterion: the pure
form of universal legislation itself. This form could only come from Reason. As the
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source of Ideas that exceed the possibility of experience, the active faculty of Reason is
free from sensible conditions. The active faculty of Reason is thus the only active faculty
capable of legislating over freedom and therefore the only one capable of legislating
when its interest is moral.
When Reason legislates, it holds the free will to the purely formal standard of its
own possible universal legislation. More precisely, the will becomes free when it gives
itself a law in this way. This is why the pure form of universal legislation is also known
as the moral law: it is the only law capable of determining a free will because it is
through the self-giving of the law that the will becomes free. In other words, the “moral
good” realized by the practical end of Reason is the free will itself. But the moral law “is
not a comparative or psychological universal” – it simply orders us to think the maxim of
our will as the principle of a universal legislation (KCP 28). It is the active faculty of
Understanding that makes it possible to determine whether any particular maxim of the
will is really capable of taking the form of a universal law. The Understanding does this
by applying “the form of conformity to the law” of sensible nature to maxims as a test,
analogically moving from success or failure in sensible Nature to success or failure in a
symbolically projected suprasensible “Nature”, which has no real existence on its own
(KCP 33). Deleuze describes this process in Kant’s “universalizability test”:
the first thing one must ask is whether the proposed maxim can be thought
without contradiction as a law of the sensible world. For instance, if everyone
were to lie when making a false promise suited them, promises “would destroy
themselves” because no one would believe them. If this maxim were a law of
sensible nature, it would oblige everyone to tell the truth, so it could not be a law
of sensible nature. Thus, by analogy, it could not be a law of the suprasensible
world. (KCP 33)
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Thus the moral interest expresses a new form of harmony between the active faculties of
Reason and Understanding: Reason legislates while the Understanding judges (as in
simple comparison) and analogically extracts from a proposed maxim’s consistency as
universal law in sensible Nature to its lawfulness in a symbolic suprasensible “Nature”.
When the will determines itself according to this suprasensible moral law, it realizes its
own freedom.
These examples of the active faculties spontaneously and harmoniously
organizing themselves attest to an immanent characteristic of the active faculties that
Deleuze is keen to analyze: what he calls “common sense”. According to Deleuze’s
reading of Kant, the first two Critiques assume a “common sense” to ensure that faculties
harmonize. When Sensibility, Imagination, Understanding and Reason harmoniously
organize themselves in the speculative interest, they define what Deleuze calls the
“logical common sense” (KCP 66). When Reason and Understanding harmoniously
organize themselves according to the practical interest, they define what Deleuze calls the
“moral common sense” (KCP 23) Since each interest of Reason requires a different
organization of active faculties, there will also be an aesthetic common sense for the
teleological interest. When Deleuze designates the “doctrine of faculties” as the “real
network which constitutes the transcendental method” (KCP 10) he means these shifting
networks or organizations of common sense formed by the active faculties as they align
and realign themselves according to the various interests of Reason.
Although Kant does not explicitly introduce the “common sense” as a technical
term until the third Critique, Deleuze has reasons for taking “common sense” as the key
to interpreting of all of Kant’s Critiques. Deleuze’s reasoning begins in the “Preface” and
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“Introduction” of the Critique of Judgment, where Kant claims that despite not having
anticipated it in the previous Critiques, his critical project would be incomplete (and even
susceptible to “collapse”) without the third Critique (CJ 56, 64-5). Deleuze not only takes
this claim seriously, he uses the “system” of faculties Kant produces in the Critique of
Judgment as the structure of the critical project in general (explicitly in both
Introductions as well as the Preface) to generate the main features of the “doctrine of
faculties” in Kant’s Critical Philosophy: the “higher” and “lower” forms of faculties, the
subjective necessity of “common sense”, and the hierarchy of Critiques that privileges
the Practical. While Deleuze’s interpretation of Kant’s critical project hinges on the
tenability of reading the system of faculties into the structure of all three Critiques,
Deleuze’s first steps are well grounded in the Critique of Judgment.9
But clarifying the notion of common sense has at least one obstacle, which is
found in the first sentences with which it is introduced. Deleuze writes,
‘Common sense’ is a dangerous phrase, strongly tinged with empiricism. It must
not therefore be defined as a special ‘sense’ (a particular empirical faculty). It
designates, on the contrary, an a priori accord of faculties, or more precisely the
‘result’ of such an accord (CJ para. 40). From this point of view common sense
appears not as a psychological given but as the subjective condition of all
‘communicability.’ (KCP 33/21)
On the one hand, common sense is described here as if it were a “‘result’” of the
harmonious organization or accord of faculties, but on the other as if it operated as the
condition of “all ‘communicability.’” Since accord between faculties requires their
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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the “dogmatic image of thought” determining philosophical conformity throughout history would
likely have led him to identify the role of something like “common sense” in Kant’s Critiques
independently.
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communication, how can common sense be the result of that which it conditions? Perhaps
an answer will be closer if the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of
“‘communicability’” can be resolved. After all, it is not immediately clear from the
quoted passage whether “‘communicability’” refers to communication between faculties,
between rational beings, or to a sense of the possibility of objectivity and universality in
general. The two sentences that immediately follow the quoted passage only accentuate
this ambiguity. The first: “Knowledge implies a common sense, without which it would
not be communicable and could not claim universality,” suggests reading
“‘communicability’” as both the condition of communication between rational beings as
well as the condition of universal knowledge. However, the second: “Kant will never
give up the subjective principle of a common sense of this type, that is to say, the idea of
a good nature of the faculties, of a healthy and upright nature which allows them to
harmonize with one another and form harmonious proportions” suggests reading
“‘communicability’” as that between faculties. Perhaps common sense does indeed
condition “all ‘communicability’”. But then the problem remains: How can common
sense be both the condition of communication between faculties and the result of their
successful communication and accord? A different approach to the question would be to
follow Deleuze’s reference to section 40 of Kant’s Critique of Judgment. In that section,
Kant associates the common sense – or as he refers to it, the sensus communis – with the
“common understanding of men”: “the Ideal of a sense common to all, i.e. of a faculty of
judgment, which in its reflection takes account (a priori) of the mode of representation of
all other men in thought; in order as it were to compare its judgment with the collective
Reason of humanity” (§40). This passage establishes that sensus communis or common
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sense is an ideal of comparative rational evaluation operating at the a priori level. Thus it
does not arise from harmony amongst the faculties – it is the condition of that harmony
insofar as it makes communication between faculties possible by posing for itself the
ideal of a particular mode of representation gleaned from a hypothesized form of
collective human Reason. The confusion arises because common sense only becomes
evident through its own effects. Deleuze implies this reading when he writes, “any accord
of the faculties between themselves defines what can be called a common sense” (KCP
21). The particular use of the word “defines” (in French, défini) rather than “creates” or
“establishes” for the activity of the accord of faculties evokes the action of describing
some poorly understood but preexisting thing. This reading also explains why Deleuze
puts the word “‘result’” in quotation marks. After all, common sense is not a true result
of the accord between faculties, though the result of the accord is that common sense’s
nature is revealed. As an example, the sculpture of Nike pictured below “defines” the
breathless ecstasy of victory through its harmonious organization of marble.10 The ideal
of the feeling of victory captured by the sculpture is made manifest through it, but it was
the ideal itself that made the sculpture possible by informing the correct proportions and
organization of material for it to be able to define that particular ideal.
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The example of the statue of Nike is illustrative of another of common sense’s
characteristics – one that is crucial to Deleuze’s understanding of Kant. The ideal of the
feeling of victory gives a unique rule of harmonious proportion to the material of the
sculpture that allows it to express that ideal – that is, the ideal supplies a standard of what
is right, or what is appropriate, pleasing, even good in the interest of the material being
able to express it. And while there are no doubt many ways to evocatively sculpt Nike,
diverging too much from the standard set by the Idea of Nike leads to failure. Likewise,
common sense provides a standard for the harmonious proportion of the faculties: a
standard of what is right, reasonable, appropriate, pleasing, and good – all issued as an a
priori rule of representation itself. There may be innumerable ways of representing and
therefore thinking, but diverging too much from the way set by common sense leads to
nonsense. On Deleuze’s reading of Kant, faculties have a natural tendency to align with
common sense – but this is because common sense is a characteristic found within each
active faculty itself. This is what Deleuze means by associating common sense with “the
idea of a good nature of the faculties, of a healthy and upright nature which allows them
to harmonize with one another and form harmonious proportions” (KCP 21). Common
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sense is the good, healthy, and upright nature of the faculties, and it is this good nature
that does not just allow but bids them to interact with one another so as to produce
harmony.
At this point in his reading Deleuze notices a potential conflict. He has tried to
show that the faculties are by nature upright and good, but he has done so at the risk of
downplaying one of the most important themes of the Critique of Pure Reason: that the
faculties also tend toward internal illusions and illegitimate uses.11 What Deleuze must
account for within his reading of the good natured “common sense” of the faculties is the
seemingly incongruous but profoundly Kantian idea that “Understanding and Reason are
deeply tormented by the ambition to make things in themselves knowable to us” (KCP
24). The main problem, Deleuze clarifies, actually comes from Reason: while
Understanding is used illegitimately when it neglects its limits, it is Reason that
encourages this neglect when its Ideas give Understanding “the illusion of a positive
domain to conquer outside experience” (KCP 25). But how can Reason be both naturally
good and naturally dangerous?
Deleuze reconciles this conflict by returning to the idea of a hierarchy of different
perspectives expressed by the various interests of Reason. If taken simply from the
perspective of the speculative interest, Reason indeed appears untrustworthy and
dangerous. Kant laments “how little cause have we to place trust in our Reason if in one
of the most important parts of our desire for knowledge it does not merely forsake us but
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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Deleuze notes that one of Kant’s great contributions to philosophy was to have
substituted for the traditional concept of error that of false problems and internal illusions (DR
136). This is another expression of the commitment to immanence of Kant’s perspective. Unlike
errors, false problems and internal illusions do not come from the failure to correspond with some
external fact of the matter. They are internal problems.
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even entices us with delusions and in the end betrays us!” (CPR Bxv).12 That Reason is
capable of pushing the Understanding to take an interest in things in themselves
demonstrates, Deleuze argues, the subordination of the speculative to the practical
interest in the system of ends.
Deleuze points out at the very beginning of Kant’s Critical Philosophy that if
Reason were merely speculative, it is unlikely it would ever attempt to know things in
themselves (KCP 6). If it is supposed, however, that the moral interest is superior to the
speculative one, Reason’s interest in things in themselves begins to appear “legitimate
and natural” (KCP 27). As Deleuze writes, “it is inevitable that the shadow of the higher
interest should be projected on to the lower” (KCP 27). But why is the moral interest
superior to the speculative? According to Deleuze’s reading of Kant, it is because
morality is meant to be realized; the suprasensible is meant to influence the sensible
(KCP 39). Deleuze is emphatic on this point. He writes, “There is a single dangerous
misunderstanding regarding the whole of practical Reason: believing that Kantian
morality remains indifferent to its own realization” (KCP 39). As we have seen, moral
good is realized in the world at the moment the will holds itself to the purely formal
standard of its own possible universal legislation. When that happens, the moral good
realized is the free will. But Kantian morality goes further: the actions of the free will are
also meant to realize moral good among sensible objects and in community with other
human beings.
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This danger Reason poses to its own speculative interest explains Kant’s prioritization
of Reason’s relationship to its own ends (rather than understanding’s relationship to its ends, for
instance) in the definitions of philosophy with which Deleuze begins Kant’s Critical Philosophy.
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Deleuze points out that there is a ready example of such realization in Kant’s
work. Even though the moral law is independent of all conditions of Sensibility, it
nevertheless acts on Sensibility “considered as a feeling rather than an intuition” (KCP
39). It produces in Sensibility a negative feeling of respect for the moral law, which
presents morality itself as a motive to the will. Thus suprasensible freedom – via free will
– has sensible effects expressing the moral law. In other words, because the moral law
immediately determines the will, it also determines sensible representations in conformity
with free will. Deleuze describes this with precision: “when Reason legislates in the
faculty of desire, the faculty of desire itself legislates over objects” (KCP 40). The
“objects” of practical Reason “form what is called the moral Good” (KCP 40). So even
though, strictly speaking, moral good is realized in the world when the will determines
itself according to the purely formal moral law, free will becomes the medium through
which “moral Good” as a sensible object is realized.13 The problem is that the realization
of something suprasensible (such as freedom and its effects) within the sensible world
requires an accord between sensible and suprasensible nature.
A closer look at the negative feeling of respect for the moral law reveals the path
to distinguishing such an accord. The negative feeling (more accurately, an analogue of
feeling) of respect for the moral law is very easily and often confused with a positive
feeling of happiness. What this confusion establishes in practical Reason is belief in a
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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Of course, it would be absurd to say that morality gives the law to sensible Nature.
Even the effects of freedom cannot contradict mechanism as the law of nature. Deleuze is clear:
for Kant “Freedom never produces a miracle in the sensible world” (KCP 41). Yet, the concept of
freedom is meant to actualize in the sensible world “the end proposed by its laws” (KCP 39).
Because a rational being is both a sensible phenomenon and a free “thing in itself”, its causality
has sensible effects. Thus practical Reason has causality in relation to phenomena “and the
suprasensible nature that free beings form under the law of Reason must be realized in the
sensible world” (KCP 40).
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real proportion between happiness and virtue. But this belief leads practical Reason into
an antinomy, for the desire for happiness cannot be the motive of virtue (since the moral
law is the sole determining principle of the good will), and the maxim of virtue cannot be
the cause of happiness (“since the laws of the sensible world are not ordered in
accordance with the intentions of a good will” (KCP 37)). While it may seem that with
this confusion practical Reason sacrifices the purity of the moral law, Deleuze is quick to
explain that the problem is not impurity. “Pure practical Reason itself demands a link
between virtue and happiness” (KCP 37). This is really an internal illusion of pure
Reason – and moral common sense faces the same problem as logical common sense: it
expresses the harmony and good nature of the faculties, yet those same active faculties
generate internal illusions into which they cannot help but fall. This illusion is only
apparently contrary to the idea of a good nature of the faculties, however. As Deleuze
explains it, “the antinomy itself prepares a totalization which it is doubtless incapable of
bringing about but which it forces us to seek” (KCP 38).
Practical Reason cannot help setting up a link between virtue and happiness. But
the antimony into which this leads Reason “is in fact the most fortunate perplexity in
which human reason could ever have become involved” (CPrR Dialectic: “Of a dialectic
of pure practical reason in general” 107/111). It is fortunate because the confused belief
in a proportion between virtue and happiness is the condition of accord between sensible
and suprasensible nature. This is the case because the connection between happiness and
virtue is not immediately given in experience – it is made through the Idea of the infinite
progress of an immortal soul as determined by a Good Sovereign (God as moral author of
the world, or, as Deleuze puts it, the “totality of the object of pure practical Reason”)
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(KCP 42). While these Ideas are not known, they are hypothesized as “the necessary
conditions under which the object of practical Reason [moral good as sensible effect of
the free will] is itself posed as possible and realizable” (KCP 42). A virtuous life can
legitimately be understood to lead to happiness when it is hypothesized that acting
virtuously allows the immortal soul to progress closer to the moral Ideal authored by the
Good Sovereign.14
Just like the Idea of freedom, the Ideas of the soul and God receive an objective
reality from the moral law.15 But the problem is not entirely solved: there must also be
conditions that establish within sensible nature itself the capacity to express or symbolize
something suprasensible. Why, after all, would anyone think to posit a moral author of
the world without something in the world at least tending toward nurturing that Idea? In
Deleuze’s words, if the suprasensible is meant to influence the sensible, “there must still
be conditions immanent to sensible Nature itself, which must establish in it the capacity
to express or symbolize something suprasensible” (KCP 43). It is at this point that
Imagination takes on a role in the harmony of moral common sense. The conditions
Deleuze identifies within Sensibility are not beliefs or hypotheses, they are Imaginative
acts “through which sensible nature appears fit to receive the effect of the suprasensible”
(KCP 43).16 Deleuze identifies these conditions as “natural finality in the content of
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Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, in Practical Philosophy. Trans. and Ed.
Mary J. Gregor. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996).
15

To be more precise, freedom is a matter of fact while the soul and God are postulates
(conditions of the necessary object of a free will). “‘That is to say that their possibility is proved
by the fact that freedom is real’ (CPrR Introduction, CJ para. 91)” (KCP 42-43).
16

Imagination has two actions: it freely exercises itself without depending on a
determinate concept of the understanding in relation to the form of the finality of nature in

37

phenomena; the form of the finality of nature in beautiful objects; [and] the sublime in
the formless in nature, by means of which sensible nature itself testifies to the existence
of a higher finality” (KCP 43).
While these conditions are Imaginative acts that form a part of moral common
sense, an account of how they are produced in us does not belong to a critique of moral
common sense but to one of aesthetic common sense. This is because what is needed is
an account of “representations” immanent to sensibility that directly affect the subject.
Since it is the faculty of the feeling of pleasure and pain that expresses the affective
relationship between representations and the subject, it is to the aesthetic interest of
Reason that the critique must now turn. Before this critique can take place, however,
Deleuze insists on highlighting a subtle shift in the way Kant conceives of the critical
process itself. Thus far, critique has served to identify the conditions of representations;
that is, the faculties and their interrelations, including the logical and moral common
senses. But there is a common theme to the conditions Kant identifies. They are all a
priori assumptions hypothesized as necessary for the very possibility of the
representations they condition. But because the inquiry now turns to a feeling that is
produced in the subject, to try to give an account of it in terms of conditions assumed a
priori would be a mistake. What Kant is calling for here is a principle as source of the
accord of faculties he identifies in moral and logical common sense. Identifying
conditions is not enough; what Kant needs is an account of the genesis of aesthetic
common sense.

""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
beautiful objects, and it exceeds its own boundaries and feels itself to be unlimited when it
confronts the sublime in the formless in Nature.
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But there is another, perhaps more insidious Reason that Kantian critique must
become “genetic.” In the first pages of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, Deleuze shows how
from Kant’s perspective because both empiricism and dogmatic rationalism understand
Reason’s ends as determined externally, they both require a pre-established harmony as
intermediary to account for the relation of subject and object. Kant, of course, eschews
the solution offered by pre-established harmony, substituting for it the immanent
principle of a “necessary submission of object to subject” (KCP 23/14). In that move,
Kantian critique shifts the problem of the relation of subject and object to one of the
relation of the subjective faculties of Sensibility and Understanding, thus internalizing the
problem. But Deleuze points out that internalizing the problem does not entirely rid Kant
of it. The faculties of Sensibility and Understanding (like all the faculties) also differ in
nature. This being the case, the question of how passive Sensibility and active
Understanding achieve an accord remains. Kant’s preliminary answer is that the relation
is mediated by the Imagination – but of course this answer is not sufficient since it simply
shifts the problem again without really solving it (Imagination and Understanding are
different in kind as well). According to Deleuze’s reading, Kant’s next attempt to explain
this relation is an appeal to the “good nature of the faculties” – the “common sense” that
operates as an ideal of comparative rational evaluation at the a priori level. “Common
sense” makes relations between faculties possible by posing for the faculties the ideal of a
particular mode of representation gleaned from a hypothesized form of collective human
Reason. The problem is that positing “common sense” as the condition of the relation
between active faculties implicitly transposes the very pre-established harmony Kant’s
immanent critique was poised to reject (KCP 22). Deleuze suggests, though, that Kant
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realized this difficulty: “This problem of a harmony of faculties is so important that Kant
tends to reinterpret the history of philosophy in the light of it” (KCP 23). Unlike his
predecessors, however, Kant seems to have an original solution.
But each time we assume the perspective of a relationship or an accord that is
already determined, it is inevitable that common sense should seem to us a kind of
a priori fact beyond which we cannot go. This is to say that the first two Critiques
cannot resolve the original problem of the relation between the faculties, but can
only indicate it and refer us to it as a final task. Every determinate accord indeed
presupposes that the faculties are, at a deeper level, capable of a free and
indeterminate accord (CJ para. 21). It is only at the level of this free and
indeterminate accord (sensus communis aestheticus) that we will be able to pose
the problem of a ground of the accord or a genesis of common sense. This is why
we must not expect from the Critique of Pure Reason or from the Critique of
Practical Reason the answer to a question that will take on its true sense only in
the Critique of Judgment. As regards a ground for the harmony of the faculties,
the first two Critiques are completed only in the last. (KCP 23-24)
On Deleuze’s reading, Kant understood that unless he could provide a genetic (not just
conditioning) account of aesthetic common sense as principle of the accord of faculties in
logical and moral common sense, his entire critical philosophy would fail (KCP 23). The
critique described is insufficient. It finds conditions, but fails to uncover genesis.
The stakes are clear: if Kant cannot produce a genetic critique of aesthetic
common sense to explain the connection between subjective faculties that differ in
nature, his immanent critical perspective will fail. But what is the difference between a
conditioning critique and a genetic one? Identifying conditions means hypothesizing a
priori “facts” as necessary for the very possibility of the representations under
investigation. The objects of such a critique are thus not representations themselves, but
the sources and relations between representations, i.e. the faculties understood as
capacities or powers. Conditioning critique describes the interrelation of these faculties
and how they harmonize in the interest of realizing the higher, autonomous, forms of the
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faculties of mind. It explains how these harmonies form by hypothesizing a “common
sense” as the principle of their organization and communication. But Kant points out that
any organization of faculties determined by common sense presupposes that the faculties
are capable of a “free and indeterminate” organization that is not pre-established by
common sense but rather creates common sense (KCP 24; CJ §21-22). What this means
is that if the active faculties can be organized according to a pre-given principle of
common sense, they must also be capable of spontaneously organizing themselves when
no principle is given. Their spontaneous organization provides the ground and model for
those organizations determined by common senses in much the same way as Kant
suggests the beauty of Nature provides the ground and model for human art (CJ §46). A
truly immanent critique begins revealing the genesis of common sense by focusing on the
experience of beauty in Nature, the study of which Kant classifies as aesthetics.
The result of the spontaneous organization of faculties Kant seeks is aesthetic common
sense. Aesthetic common sense can provide a model for other forms of common sense
because the higher form of the faculty of the feeling of pleasure and pain is not
autonomous but heautonomous. It legislates over itself rather than over the other active
faculties or over either phenomena or noumena. “The faculty of feeling has no domain
(neither phenomena nor things in themselves); it does not express the conditions to which
a kind of objects must be subject, but solely the subjective conditions for the exercise of
the faculties” (KCP 48). When we look to Kant directly, he clarifies this connection when
he explains that it is aesthetic judgment that makes possible the “universal standpoint”
(CJ §40) defined by common sense because it is the faculty of judging “that which makes
universally communicable, without the mediation of a concept, our feeling in a given
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representation” (CJ §40). It is able to do this, Deleuze states, because the “higher form”
of feeling is the pure sensible expression of a disinterested judgment (KCP 46). For a
judgment of “this is beautiful” to be disinterested, it must be separate from the intuited,
material object. It must be a judgment about the form of the object as it is reflected in the
imagination – that is, design and composition rather than color or sound (KCP 47). This
is what allows our aesthetic judgments to have that peculiar “subjective universality”
Kant claims for them (CJ §6, §31), which Deleuze indirectly mentions when he writes
that for Kant, we assume our pleasure in imaginatively reflecting the form of the object
“is communicable to or valid for everyone; we assume that everyone must experience
this” (KCP 48). Of course, such an assumption requires the Understanding’s power of
conceptualizing. But in the case of free aesthetic judgments the concept provided by the
Understanding is indeterminate. So here Deleuze has again identified an accord between
active faculties at the basis of the higher form of a faculty of mind: the free Imagination
and the indeterminate Understanding. This “free and indeterminate accord between
faculties” defines aesthetic common sense (KCP 49). The pleasure we assumed was
communicable to and valid for everyone is a result of this accord. It cannot be known
intellectually – it can only be felt. “Our supposition of a ‘communicability of feeling’
(without the intervention of a concept) is therefore based on the idea of a subjective
accord of the faculties, insofar as this accord itself forms a common sense (CJ §39, 40)”
(KCP 49). This is a purely subjective harmony, the result of which is that aesthetic
common sense provides moral and logical common sense with a basis. The aesthetic
common sense makes them possible. At the end of section 40 in the Critique of
Judgment, Kant mentions that communication of thought requires a relation between
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Imagination and Understanding “in order to associate intuitions with concepts” but in that
case “the agreement of the two mental powers is according to law, under the constraint of
definite concepts. Only when the Imagination in its freedom awakens the Understanding,
and is put by it into regular play without the aid of concepts, does the representation
communicate itself not as a thought but as an internal feeling of a purposive state of the
mind” (CJ §40). Moreover, the feeling of pleasure in the representation of beauty
must necessarily depend for every one on the same conditions, for they are
subjective conditions of the possibility of a cognition in general; and the
proportion between these cognitive faculties requisite for Taste is also requisite
for that ordinary sound Understanding which we have to presuppose in everyone.
(CJ §39)
In this passage Kant claims that “ordinary sound Understanding” must be presupposed in
everyone and uses the connection he established between Taste and Understanding’s
dependence on harmony between the active faculties to subtly contend that the exercise
of Taste must be presupposed in everyone, too. Once it is presupposed that everyone has
ordinary sound Understanding and Taste, Kant assumes that the subjective conditions of
having Understanding and Taste must be the same for everyone, too. This leads to the
conclusion that Deleuze emphasizes by foregrounding the ideal of common sense: The
harmony of the active faculties that produces what is taken to be the expression of Taste
and “ordinary sound Understanding” is the right, appropriate and good proportion – for
everyone.
So far the investigation has remained at the level of conditioning. The free accord
of imagination and understanding has been assumed a priori just as the logical and moral
common senses were. But if the immanence of the critical perspective is to be preserved,
the aesthetic common sense cannot simply be assumed – it must be “produced in us”
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(KCP 50). The question is: What would a genetic critique of aesthetic common sense
look like? Deleuze deems it no less than the “essential thesis” of the critical method that
Reason’s ends “differ in nature” and “form an organic and hierarchical system” (KCP
7/13). What is implied in the claim that Reason’s ends differ in nature (that is, in kind
rather than merely in degree) is that attention to differences is fundamental to the
critically immanent perspective. A truly immanent account of Reason’s ends must
differentiate what is within Reason’s bounds from what is beyond them. Another way of
putting this would be to describe the critique through its function of identifying Reason’s
limits. What Deleuze points out is that immanent critique condemns not only Reason’s
attempts to exceed its limits but also its failures to reach its limits:
[T]he so-called transcendental method is always the determination of an
immanent employment of Reason, conforming to one of its interests. The Critique
of Pure Reason thus condemns the transcendent employment of a speculative
Reason which claims to legislate by itself; the Critique of Practical Reason
condemns the transcendent employment of a practical Reason which, instead of
legislating by itself, lets itself be empirically conditioned (CPrR Introduction).”
(KCP 36-7/54)
Critique attempts to identify Reason’s immanent or intrinsic power in relation to each of
its ends so as to enforce its legitimate employment. This means critique attempts to
ensure Reason reaches the limit of its power without going beyond that limit. This is a
subtle shift in the way Deleuze reads limitation: no longer in terms of merely imposing a
maximum by which to reign in Reason’s ambition, but in terms of identifying the full
extent of a faculty’s power. Of course, when Reason’s limit is exceeded in relation to its
speculative end, it believes the illusion that it possesses knowledge it could not possibly
have: knowledge of God, the soul, and freedom. And critique cannot prevent the
formation of these illusions but only their harmful consequences. If Reason is limited to
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its own realm and not allowed to attempt legislating over the phenomena of experience,
its danger is contained. The critical act of limitation then frees Reason to pursue its
legitimate employment to the fullest. For example, Reason is entirely justified in adopting
certain “regulative” principles concerning the ultimate basis of human experience. As
explained above, for the purposes of knowledge Reason’s legitimate use is to pose the
Idea of systematic unity in Nature “as a problem or a limit” (KCP 20), an ideal focal
point outside experience “towards which the concepts of the understanding converge”
(KCP 19). This Idea of systematic unity in Nature must be an a priori principle because it
is never given in experience, even many experiences taken together. Thus the Idea is
merely presupposed in order to confer on the concepts of the Understanding laws
ensuring their maximal completeness and systematicity. While it is unknown whether
nature actually is law-like, the principle that such unity is possible and thus worthy of
being sought forms a regulative principle of Reason. By contrast, the claim that such
unity does exist would represent a “constitutive” principle, which is the sort of
knowledge claim that cannot be critically justified.
What this description is meant to illustrate is that critique is not just interested in
disciplining the faculties when they exceed their limits – it is also interested in the
faculties realizing their power up to their limits. And while the higher form of pleasure in
judgments of beauty requires Imagination and Understanding, there is another type of
aesthetic experience – one that expresses a higher form of pain – that explicitly links
Reason’s power of limitation with the realization of Imagination’s full power. A critique
of the genesis of aesthetic common sense begins in that type of experience – the
experience of the sublime.
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While Imagination’s power of successive apprehension is unlimited, this is not so
of its power of simultaneous comprehension. When faced with formlessness or deformity
in nature (the immensity of “the wide ocean, enraged by storms” and the power of nature
“in its wildest and most unruly disorder and devastation” (CJ §23)), “it is as if the
imagination were confronted with its own limit, forced to strain to its utmost,
experiencing a violence which stretches it to the extremity of its power” (KCP 50).
Imagination cannot comprehend all at once such magnitude and chaos. But Deleuze is
careful to clarify that for Kant while it may seem at first that Imagination experiences the
inadequacy of its power when faced with Nature itself, it is actually Reason that forces
the Imagination to attempt comprehending the immensity and power of Nature. It is not
Nature itself, but Reason’s Ideas posed as problems or limits beyond the possibility of
experience that push Imagination to the limit of its power, “forcing it to admit that all its
power is nothing in comparison to an Idea” (KCP 51). Imagination is powerless to
reproduce Nature in its sublimity because of the Ideas Reason attaches to it (such as,
again, the Idea of systematic unity in Nature). The relationship between Reason and
Imagination in the experience of the sublime is thus “primarily a dissention” – a discord
rather than an accord. But this discord gives rise to an accord. As Deleuze puts it, “the
pain makes a pleasure possible” (KCP 51):
When imagination is confronted with its limit by something which goes beyond it
in all respects it goes beyond its own limit itself, admittedly in a negative fashion,
by representing to itself the inaccessibility of the rational Idea, and by making this
very inaccessibility something which is present in sensible nature. (KCP 51)
The experience of the sublime forces Imagination to internalize its powerlessness and this
internalization allows it to exceed the limits on its power “in a negative fashion”. This is
a difficult idea that can be more easily grasped with an example. Think of those times
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when you look into the night sky at the vast expanse of stars twinkling in the endless
emptiness of space – and it is so big and the stars are so many you feel overwhelmed –
like a tiny speck of dust – next to it all. But as a result of feeling so tiny and powerless –
indeed, because you represent to yourself that feeling (internalizing Imagination’s limits),
you begin to have an experience of something else. The feeling of powerlessness
becomes a self-reflection, and the self-reflection becomes present as something within
sensible nature yet inaccessible to you: something Deleuze, quoting Kant, calls “a
presentation of the infinite” (KCP 51/CJ §29 “General remark on the exposition of
aesthetic reflective judgments”). The awe and powerlessness felt in the sublime becomes
an experience of the infinite in Nature. Thus Imagination “shakes loose” of its sensible
bounds, seemingly exceeding its power – for no faculty is really capable of representing
something beyond experience, which “the infinite” certainly is. As such, this going
beyond is merely negative. The “presentation of the infinite” does not actually extend
Imagination’s power to intuit things beyond experience. Imagination is simply
reproducing its powerlessness – internally, then externally. The important thing about this
is not just that it gives us one more example of an illusion internal to the faculties.
Deleuze goes on to claim that though the presentation of the infinite is only negative, the
impression it makes on the Imagination “expands the soul”17, which is then felt as “the
indeterminate suprasensible unity of all the faculties” (KCP 75/51). Thus from the feeling
of powerlessness we come to the unity of the faculties. This discordant accord is the
critical genesis of aesthetic common sense.
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Kant uses the German “seelenerhebende”, which literally translates as “soul-elevating”
(CJ §29 “General remark on the exposition of aesthetic reflective judgments”).
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There are several points to emphasize about this reading. First, Deleuze claims
that in this account, at last, the accord of faculties is not simply assumed as a condition
but produced in a genesis. The accord of faculties is produced in the dissention between
Imagination and Reason. The feeling of expansion in the soul produced by this dissention
then unifies the faculties, creating the aesthetic common sense. In the previous accounts
of common sense, critique remained at the level of conditions of representations when it
simply assumed a priori certain hierarchies of relations between faculties (i.e. certain
forms of common sense) as necessary for the very possibility of those representations.
Genetic critique, by contrast, grounds in the singular experience of the sublime a felt
unity of the subject by applying not to assumptions but to the powers immanent within
faculties themselves. Second, the felt unity generated in aesthetic common sense provides
Kant with a principle as source of the accord of faculties in moral and logical common
sense: the soul. The expansion of the soul that follows the violence of the feeling of the
sublime fills in the gaps between the faculties, creating their “indeterminate suprasensible
unity” (KCP 75/51). While this may sound vague, some vagueness should be expected
when explaining anything strictly in terms of feeling. What is important is that this
immanent, critical genesis grounded in feeling explains the connection between faculties
in a way that does not rely on a pre-established harmony. Third, although Deleuze does
not make the point explicitly, it is clear he understands Kant to be suggesting that the
discordant accord of faculties underlies the unity of the subject. According to Deleuze’s
reading, the Kantian subject is a locus of relations of faculties. These faculties are not
units – of possession or otherwise. They are capacities or powers that describe and are
subject to variable relationships. So, according to Deleuze’s reading the Kantian subject
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is a locus of shifting power relations. What guarantees that the discord amongst the
faculties will produce an accord – that is, a unitary subject and stable objects – is not
simply the unity of apperception required for knowledge but on a deeper level the “soul”
from which the “common sense” arises. Fourth, the choice of the word “soul” here is
meaningful. The French word “l’âme”, like the English word “soul”, connotes a vital
force of moral intelligence, associated with the breath. Kant’s term for soul, “Seele”,
shares these connotations but must be distinguished from “Geist” or spirit (CJ §49 “On
the faculties of the mind that constitute genius”). Seele is the totality of all psychic
processes, i.e., it is a comprehensive term that Kant uses to describe an element
containing all the faculties (5:177, 5:197). Geist, in contrast, is an “animating principle”
within the soul, which Kant defines as “the capacity for representing a sublimity in
objects” (CJ “First Introduction: XII Division of the Critique of the Power of Judgment”).
On this understanding, spirit [Geist] is a faculty belonging within the soul [Seele]. This
distinction is important to bear in mind even though Deleuze does not make it explicit
because otherwise it is unclear from Deleuze’s citations of Kant’s work where he gets the
idea to name the soul as what unifies the faculties. Without the distinction between spirit
and soul, it would be tempting to interpret the “expansion” of the soul as exclusively an
“elevation” above the “tyranny of sensible tendencies” (CJ §83). Fifth, the expansion or
elevation of the soul prepares humans “for a sovereignty in which Reason alone shall
have power” (CJ §83). The overwhelming feeling of insignificance that arises from
looking up at the vast and starry night leads to the sensation of infinity, but then that
sense returns you to the mystery of how you, tiny as you are, have the power to
experience your own powerlessness. You begin to wonder at your own wondering, your
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own power of Reason and its difference from and superiority over nature. This is why
Kant writes that the pre-eminence of Reason is only rendered intuitable through the
inadequacy of the Imagination (CJ §23). The experience of the sublime forces humans to
measure themselves against the apparent omnipotence of nature. It forces humans to
accept their own limitation and insufficiency, but at the same time allows us to discover
in our own faculty of Reason a superiority over nature. Human physical powerlessness
reveals a capacity for judging ourselves as independent of and superior to nature.
Ultimately, Kant writes that the experience of the sublime
calls forth our power (which is not part of nature) to regard those things about
which we are concerned (goods, health and life) as trivial, and hence to regard its
power (to which we are, to be sure, subjected in regard to these things) as not the
sort of dominion over ourselves and our authority to which we would have to bow
if it came down to our highest principles and their affirmation or abandonment.
(CJ §28 “On Nature as a Power”)
The sublime calls forth our power (Reason’s power) to rise above inclination for the sake
of our highest principles. Thus it is within this genesis that humans discover their destiny
as moral beings. As Deleuze puts it, “[t]he sense of the sublime is engendered within us
in such a way that it prepares a higher finality and prepares us ourselves for the advent of
the moral law” (KCP 52). To summarize: from a sense of powerlessness comes the
intuition of the infinite, the soul as unifier of the faculties, and the moral destiny of
rational man.
c. Kant’s interest in the moral destiny of rational man
After describing how the sense of the sublime prepares humans for the moral law,
Deleuze’s next sentence is: “This is why the common sense which corresponds to the
feeling of the sublime is inseparable from a ‘culture’ as the movement of its genesis (CJ
§29)” (KCP 75/51-2). To understand what Deleuze means by calling “culture” the
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movement of the genesis of aesthetic common sense through the experience of the
sublime, the first step is clarifying the idea of “culture”. For German thinkers in the late
18th century, the word “culture”18 was closely associated with its roots in the idea of
cultivation – particularly the cultivation of soil. The question of agriculture is how to get
the most out of seeds, and the methods of cultivation increase seed productivity. In an
extension of this idea, the question of “culture” for Kant and his contemporaries was how
to get the most out of humans by developing the mind through education and training.
Philosophy and what we now call the Humanities were believed to be the primary avenue
of the sort of education necessary for cultivating human minds.
If the context of Kant’s writing is an understanding of culture as preparatory
education, the question of what Kant believed humans are being prepared for remains.19
Once we follow Deleuze’s citation of §29 from the Critique of Judgment, we find that,
there, Kant suggests that culture prepares humans for the experience of the sublime:
There are innumerable things in beautiful nature concerning which we
immediately require consensus with our own judgment from everyone else and
can also, without being especially prone to error, expect it; but we cannot promise
ourselves that our judgment concerning the sublime in nature will so readily find
acceptance by others. For a far greater culture, not merely of the aesthetic power
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
18

“Culture” is a translation of both the German words Kultur and Bildung. The late 18th
century in Germany marked a period of heightened interest in the idea of culture, with
particularly heated debate between Kant and Johann Herder surrounding the meaning of the term.
See John Zammito’s chapter “The Aufklarung of the 1760s: ‘Philosophy for the World’ or
Bildung as Emancipation” from Kant, Herder & the Birth of Anthropology for a fine exposition
of the context leading up to this debate. In the standard Cambridge translation of Kant, Kultur is
translated as “culture” while Bildung is translated as “formation” (as in character formation
through education). We follow this convention.
19

The debate between Herder and Kant can be centered on the question of human telos.
While Kant’s understanding of Bildung/Kultur is grounded in a teleology structured toward
practical ends, Herder’s is non-teleological and based in an ever-expanding anthropology where
different forms of culture develop different faculties within humans, none of which are higher or
lower than the others. Like facets of a diamond, for Herder different forms of culture reveal
different capacities of humanity.
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of judgment, but also of the cognitive faculties on which that is based, seems to be
requisite in order to be able to make a judgment about this excellence of the
objects of nature. … In fact, without the development of moral ideas, that which
we, prepared by culture, call sublime will appear merely repellent to the unrefined
person. (§29 CJ)
In his reading of Kant, Deleuze emphasizes how the feeling of the sublime prepares
humans for the moral law, then draws attention to the proportion between one’s level of
cultivation and one’s ability to experience sublimity at all. As Kant says, the uncultivated
are simply repelled by sublimity. The interpretation of the above quoted passage has been
a point of contention in Kantian scholarship. The question is whether Kant considered the
cultivation of taste as the propaedeutic for morality or morality as the basis for taste.
Deleuze’s solution seems to be to understand cultivation as the development of moral
feeling, which is simply the first step to the development of morality itself. So, when
Kant writes that “without the development of moral ideas, that which we, prepared by
culture, call sublime will appear merely repellent to the unrefined person”, Deleuze
understands the preparation of culture to precede the development of moral ideas (§29
CJ). In other words, on Deleuze’s reading, Kant’s position is that culture prepares
humans to experience the sublime in order that they may produce morality (and thereby
become free). When Deleuze writes that culture is the “movement” of the genesis of
aesthetic common sense, he means that as one becomes cultivated, one’s experience of
the sublime is enriched. The feeling of the sublime is what engenders aesthetic common
sense, so cultivation is the starting point and initial impetus of the process.
Another implication of the above-cited passage is that culture is not only
necessary for our individual experience of the sublime – it is also necessary for the
readiness with which we can expect our judgment concerning the sublime to be accepted
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by others. As culture increases, aesthetic common sense about the sublime becomes
established. The feeling of the sublime is a subjective presupposition, “which, however,
[Kant writes] we believe ourselves to be justified in demanding of everyone” that leads us
to acknowledge that there is an a priori principle of moral feeling within human beings
(CJ 29). On Deleuze’s reading of Kant, cultivation is the development of what Kant
alternately calls “moral ideas” or “moral feeling”. Even though moral feeling must be
developed through culture, the a priori principle of moral feeling is the ground for the
necessity of the assent we expect from other people concerning our judgment on the
sublime. Aesthetic common sense is established through the validity of the expectation of
the experience of sublimity being recognizable to everyone, but in order for that
expectation to form, culture must already have developed in people their moral feeling.
However, if culture is required for the moral feeling that makes us capable of
experiencing sublimity, the experience of the sublime is constrained to those who share
the appropriate preparatory cultivation. So, there are actually two questions: the question
of what counts as appropriate preparatory cultivation and the question of whether the
validity of the aesthetic common sense is undermined. After all, aesthetic common sense
is established through the validity of the expectation of the experience of sublimity being
recognizable to everyone, not just to those who share the same culture.
Kant himself worries about the relationship between culture and the genesis of
aesthetic common sense. Kant’s worry is that in requiring culture, the experience of
sublimity may be taken as merely a matter of convention. In §29 of the Critique of
Judgment he tries to clarify that while the experience of the sublime requires culture, it is
not generated by culture.
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But just because the judgment on the sublime in nature requires culture (more so
than that on the beautiful), it is not therefore first generated by culture and so to
speak introduced into society merely as a matter of convention; rather it has its
foundation in human nature, and indeed in that which can be required of everyone
and demanded of him along with healthy understanding, namely in the
predisposition to the feeling for (practical) ideas, i.e., to that which is moral. (§29)
The analogy to seeds introduced above in the explanation of Kant and his
contemporaries’ understanding of “culture” can be helpful in explaining what Kant
means by claiming that culture is required for the experience of the sublime without the
feeling of the sublime thereby becoming a matter of convention. If you sow seeds in the
dust, many will die, some will be carried away to greener fields, and some will put down
roots in the dust, growing stunted and lopsided. If you cultivate the dusty field by
breaking up the hard earth and mixing the dust in with the clay and organic material
buried beneath it, the loamy soil you develop will nourish and support the seeds’ healthy
growth and abundant produce. The analog of loamy soil for humans is the proper form of
cultivation of moral feeling, while the seed is the faculty brought through culture “to
attend purposiveness” and thereby experience the sublime (CJ 5:266 “General remark on
the exposition of the aesthetic reflective judgment”). “Purposiveness” is the word most
English translators use for Kant’s concept of “Zweckmässigkeit”. Kant defines this term
in §10 of the Critique of Judgment, “On Purposiveness in General”, where he claims that
purposiveness is “the causality of a concept with respect to its object” (CJ §10). That is,
“purposiveness” is the quality by virtue of which an object is the end of a concept. The
faculty of attending purposiveness is thus the capacity to see lawfulness in contingency.
What happens in cultivation is that the capacity for attending purposiveness humans
already had within them is developed, just as the dust is developed into loamy soil not by
something extra being added to it but by drawing to the top the rich organic material
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beneath it. What is important for Kant’s defense of the relationship between culture and
common sense is that the faculty of attending purposiveness is not added onto the other
human capacities like fertilizer is added to soil. That faculty lies dormant within humans
until the proper form of cultivation awakens it. As Kant insists, moral feeling is part of
“human nature” just as “healthy understanding” is (CJ §29).
The faculty that attends purposiveness is the faculty of Taste. It is the faculty of
perceiving in sensible nature the imprint of the suprasensible. It judges those conditions
immanent to sensible Nature that establish within sensible Nature the capacity to express
or symbolize something suprasensible. The beauty and sublimity of Nature symbolize the
suprasensible and allow us to imagine a moral author of the world. It is our faculty of
Taste, properly cultivated, that allows us to perceive this symbolism. Thus Deleuze can
write that, “it is within this genesis [of aesthetic common sense] that we discover that
which is fundamental to our destiny.” (KCP 52) Human destiny turns out to be,
unsurprisingly, the development of morality.
In the very short final section of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, “History or
Realization,” Deleuze quickly introduces the ideas of history, “unsocial sociability”, “the
mechanism of forces and the conflict of tendencies” by connecting them to ideas of
culture, Reason’s ends, man’s moral destiny, Society, and “civil constitution” (KCP 745). The idea of “unsocial sociability” is the key to understanding the connection between
all of these ideas. “Unsocial sociability” is Kant’s term for the conflict between human
beings’ natural tendency to associate with others and their natural tendency to resist
living socially. According to Kant’s thinking in The Idea for a Universal History with
Cosmopolitan Intent (1784), the conflict between these tendencies was ordained by
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Nature in order to bring about the cultivation of the faculties. In The Idea for a Universal
History with Cosmopolitan Intent, Kant likens the faculty of Reason to a “seed” planted
in human beings by Nature. Just like plant seeds require cultivation of the soil in order to
grow and become fruitful, the faculty of Reason requires cultivation by “trial, practice,
and instruction in order gradually to progress from one level of insight to another” (IUH
“Second Thesis”). The means Nature uses to cultivate Reason is man’s unsocial
tendency. It is, Kant claims, man’s selfishness, “heartless competitive vanity” and
“insatiable desire to possess and to rule” that “awakens all his powers, brings him to
conquer his inclination to laziness and, propelled by vainglory, lust for power, and
avarice, to achieve a rank among his fellows whom he cannot tolerate but from whom he
cannot withdraw” (IUH “Fourth Thesis”). In other words, humans’ violently unsocial
desire to direct everything according to their own ideas is the force behind the progress of
their Reason. Culture is motivated by violence, vanity, and desire.
This unsocial tendency poses a problem for social order. On the one hand,
freedom is necessary for unsociability to flourish and thus force Reason to progress. On
the other hand, that same unsocial tendency must be subdued by “irresistible force” so
that social order is maintained. Humans require masters, Kant writes, “who will break
[their] will and force [them] to obey” (IUH “Sixth Thesis”). In his essay “What is
Enlightenment?”, also written in 1784, Kant praises the Prussian ruler Frederick II whose
“well-disciplined, numerous army” allows him to say: “Argue as much as you want and
about what you want, but obey!” (¶10). Here, state-sanctioned violence is legitimate
insofar as it is a means to the end of preserving social order – and hence state power. Of
course, in Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent, Kant recognizes the
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problem with his legitimation of state-sanctioned violence. The problem is that the master
(in other words, the state) also needs a master, who in turn needs a master, who in turn
needs a master. The true master and true end of Nature, what Kant calls the most difficult
and final problem to be solved is the creation of a perfectly just “civil constitution” (IUH
5th Proposition). As Deleuze writes, “the formation of a perfect civil constitution…is the
highest object of Culture, the end of history, or the truly terrestrial good sovereign” (KCP
74). Kant’s Reasoning is that only a civil constitution that is perfectly just could inspire
unfailing self-regulation of one’s unsocial tendency.20 What is important is that, for Kant,
the self-regulation of one’s unsocial tendency is equivalent with morality. Morality is
self-legislation insofar as morality is autonomy. And since morality is the highest level of
insight it is possible to cultivate in Reason, morality is the truly final and last end of
Reason and of Nature.21 The perfect civil constitution is the only milieu in which the
moral destiny of man can be complete.
The same structure of conflict that engenders harmony holds at the level of the
relations between faculties. Deleuze writes, “It is by the mechanism of forces and the
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
20

But any such constitution must necessarily be cosmopolitan. In other words, it must not
be restricted to any one country and its inhabitants, but belong to the world at large. Thus, there is
a larger purpose of Nature at play here. The violence and devastation of war are Nature’s means
to teach the human species that they must “institute a cosmopolitan condition to secure the
external safety of each state” (IUH “Seventh Thesis”).
21

Morality is thus also the value responsible for granting legitimacy. Morality grants
legitimacy to the violence of humans’ unsocial tendencies because the end of that violence is
morality. Likewise, state-sanctioned violence is granted legitimacy because it protects social
order, a necessary condition of the progress of Reason toward morality. Of course, when Kant
presents morality as the ultimate value responsible for granting legitimacy, he takes the
responsibility for granting legitimacy away from the state. If, for example, the state were to
violently suppress diversity of religious belief, human beings’ freedom to use their own Reason
would thereby also be suppressed. But since for Kant the freedom to use one’s own Reason is the
single most important factor in Reason’s moral progress, any violence against that freedom would
be unjust, even if it were sanctioned by the state. See also CJ §83.
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conflict of tendencies (c.f. ‘unsocial sociability’) that sensible nature, in man himself,
presides over the establishment of a Society, the only milieu in which a last end can be
realized” (KCP 107/75). Deleuze’s suggestion to compare the conflict of tendencies and
mechanism of forces, as they work through “man himself”, with unsocial sociability calls
the reader to connect the structure of the genesis of common sense with the structure of
historical “progress”. Thus this final section also connects Kant’s account of unsocial
sociability and the discordant accord of faculties within what Deleuze sees as the
organizing principle of the whole of Kant’s critical philosophy: the moral destiny of
rational man.
What I would like to suggest is at the core of Deleuze’s reading of Kant is that –
like the dust that is cultivated by digging within it to a deeper level of organic material –
what Kant takes to be the proper form of cultivation of moral feeling is discovered
through Kantian critique. Moreover, in arguing that Taste is a dormant aspect of human
nature, Kant seems to believe that he has sufficiently addressed worries that the necessity
of culture for the experience of sublimity would render Taste dependent on convention.
Whether or not Kant’s defense of culture is convincing, Deleuze’s reading leads us to
wonder whether Kant’s worry about contingency at the level of culture can be expanded
to cover the critical project itself.
Critique’s aim from the beginning is to realize the higher forms of the faculties of
mind by identifying and ensuring the proper organization of active faculties necessary for
each. What critique seeks to describe are the conditions of harmony emerging between
the faculties, or, the conditions of common sense. But, critique is a process undertaken by
Reason itself. How then, can Reason expect its results to stand up to scrutiny when it acts
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as judge and jury in its own case? Deleuze sees in Kant’s claim that Reason poses for
itself its own ends the key to understanding the entire critical philosophy. He does not
want to describe critique in terms of its adjudicating role. In Deleuze’s mind, critique is
not there primarily to discipline or correct Reason. The central task of immanent critique
is really a self-reflexive examination by Reason of its own ends, which establishes what
Reason’s ends are, its limits or powers and the conditions of its harmonization with the
other faculties.
The general problem is how to achieve Reason's self-knowledge. The answer
comes in Reason’s peculiar condition of granting respect: as Kant writes, “Reason grants
[respect] only to that which has been able to withstand its free and public examination”
(Axi). So, Reason’s self-knowledge can only be legitimated if that knowledge has been
able to “withstand free and public examination.” What this means is that Reason’s selfknowledge (indeed, the legitimacy with which it sets its own ends) is contingent on that
knowledge’s passing the test of public examination. Critique, it seems, still relies on
“common sense” for legitimating Reason’s ends and, ultimately, establishing morality.
Deleuze distances his reading from the danger of Reason’s inner conflict because
he does not see critique as primarily a method for assuring the legitimacy of knowledge
by suppressing Reason’s inner conflict. He does not see critique’s function in terms of the
teleological realization of external ends. What Deleuze emphasizes throughout Kant’s
Critical Philosophy – in a way that is almost clinical in its precision and objectivity – are
not Reason’s dangers (in relation to which one must establish limitations), but the
complex interrelation between Reason’s ends (in relation to which one must establish the
appropriate hierarchy). Finding in the account of the genesis of aesthetic common sense a
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conflict between Reason and itself shows that when Deleuze does talk about Reason’s
internal conflict it is terms of its positivity, not its danger. This is echoed in his
understanding of critique: it is not a corrective to Reason so much as the instrument of the
establishment of the system of Culture. If, as Deleuze writes on the very first page of
Kant’s Critical Philosophy, the “supreme ends of Reason form the system of Culture”
(KCP 5/1) and the ends of Reason “form an organic and hierarchical system, which is
that of the ends of a rational being” (KCP 13/7), what is implied is that Kant’s critical
perspective takes as a principle the organization of the system of Culture according to the
ends of Reason. In other words, Reason’s ends form Culture. Moreover, as Deleuze
writes, “the “illusions of Reason triumph above all, as long as Reason remains in the state
of nature” (KCP 26-27). Traditionally, the state of nature is associated with a state of war
(or, in an extended sense in which it applies to Kant’s perception of Africans: in a state
without culture – or indeed any overarching authority). Deleuze explains that for Kant
“Critique is precisely the establishment of this civil state: like the jurist’s contract, it
implies a renunciation of Reason from the speculative point of view” (KCP 27). This is
structurally analogous to the classic example of the formation of a social contract: you
must give up the freedom to do whatever you can do in exchange for protection of your
life and property. In the context of Kant’s critical philosophy, you must give up your
“freedom” to speculate about noumena in exchange for culture and morality. Thus, by
two routes we come to the conclusion that it is Kantian critique that ultimately establishes
culture and morality.
For Kant, culture is a necessary formative influence pushing humans towards the
perfection of their moral capacities. As a merely instrumental good, Kant values culture
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only insofar as it contributes to the formation of rational moral men. Thus, only certain
kinds of culture – cultures that, in Kant’s words, “prepare him for a sovereignty in which
Reason alone is to dominate” – are valuable (CJ §83). Only particular social, cultural and
political contexts are capable of producing moral perfection. What this means is that not
all cultures are created equal. Certain cultures are more capable of producing rational
moral men than others, and some, problematically, are incapable of forming them at all.
While Kant may believe that he has responded to his worry that Culture is a matter of
convention, what counts as Culture (and therefore what counts as proper cultivation) is
determined by the original decision of what counts as an end of Reason. Critique
establishes what counts as an end of Reason and therefore also what counts as proper
Culture. What Deleuze’s reading thus leaves open is the possibility that what Kant
perceives as the interests of Reason are in reality Kant’s own interests, veiled with a
critical justification.
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3. Deleuze’s differential theory of faculties in Difference & Repetition (1968)
The present chapter orients Deleuze’s philosophy in Difference and Repetition
around his resistance to the “dogmatic Image of thought” he diagnoses in the history of
philosophy. The dogmatic Image of thought is the implicit, subjective presupposition that
all thought is recognition. Deleuze argues that this Image is insufficient for a variety of
reasons, most importantly because it legitimates moral, political and philosophical
conformism by tacitly presupposing “common sense” as the subjective principle of
collaboration between faculties. In response to this problem, Deleuze develops a revised
version of Kantian critique, what he calls “transcendental empiricism”, that describes the
genesis of a “thought without Image” out of the experience of “encounter”. However,
Deleuze’s revised critique and differential theory of faculties is not merely descriptive.
This chapter argues that Difference and Repetition offers more than an ontology – it
offers an ethos. In order for the faculties to transcend their limits up to the point of
generating a thought without Image, a particular form of cultivation is required. This
form of cultivation is determined by the Greek notion of paideia as a “violent training” in
evaluating presuppositions (DR 165). While Deleuze does not make this argument
himself, the dissertation suggests that the necessity of cultivation for experiencing
encounter implies a “critical ethos” at the heart of Deleuze’s conception of philosophy.
a. How faculties function in relation to the subject
Deleuze begins the third chapter of Difference and Repetition, titled “The Image
of Thought”, with a meditation on the problem of beginning in philosophy. The problem,
as Deleuze sees it is that “beginning means eliminating all presuppositions”, but in
philosophy presuppositions can be both objective and subjective (DR 129). While
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objective presuppositions are explicitly linked to concepts and thus easily eliminated,
subjective ones are implicit in our thinking and therefore more difficult to eliminate.
Subjective presuppositions are more tenacious than objective ones because subjective
presuppositions appear intuitive. Their origin is the implicit assumption that there are
things so fundamental to experience that they are universally understood and therefore
beyond both justification and question. Deleuze’s example is Descartes’ subjective
presupposition that everyone knows “independently of concepts, what is meant by self,
thinking, and being” (DR 129).1 But though subjective presuppositions are difficult to
eliminate, they are not difficult to identify. They take the form of “Everybody knows…”
or “No one can deny…” (DR 129, 130).
The primary presupposition Deleuze identifies is the belief that it is simple
common sense that “everybody knows what it means to think and to be” (DR 130). From
Deleuze’s perspective, subjective presuppositions allow our deepest yet least reflected
beliefs to determine the beginnings, trajectory, and potential of our philosophical
systems. This is a worrying situation because, for Deleuze, philosophy’s project is
“breaking with doxa” (DR 134). Moreover, Deleuze does not think the problem of
subjective presuppositions is exclusively Descartes’ or that it is contained to a few
philosophers here and there. Deleuze believes that this problem is pervasive in the history
of philosophy.
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
1

Deleuze contends that this is evidenced in Descartes’ choice to define man as a
“thinking thing” rather than as a rational animal. For Descartes, “rational animal” assumes
familiarity with the notions of both rationality and animality whereas “thinking thing” assumes no
previous knowledge of the world but is self-evident to those who think. So, by defining man as a
thinking thing, Descartes believes he has eluded the difficulty of presuppositions since, insofar as
we all do think, “everyone knows” what it means to think. Deleuze’s point is that while Descartes
has indeed eluded the objective presuppositions, he has not eluded the subjective ones.
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Deleuze’s many and disparate reflections on the history of philosophy in
Difference and Repetition add up to a single diagnosis: “conceptual philosophical thought
has as its implicit presupposition a pre-philosophical and natural Image of thought…[and
we] may call this image of thought a dogmatic, orthodox or moral image” (DR 131). The
“dogmatic Image of thought” is Deleuze’s name for the subjective presuppositions
operating in the background of philosophical thought throughout history. The dogmatic
Image of thought, as the name implies, is a tacit and unquestioned assumption about what
it means to think. The dogmatic Image is complex and multi-faceted, but it borrows its
form from what Deleuze calls “common sense as Cogitatio natura universalis” (DR 131).
Cogitatio natura universalis can be translated as “universal natural thinking.” Deleuze
contends that the Cogitatio natura univeralis is hypothesized throughout the history of
philosophy as a form of naturally occurring collective human reason and that the
dogmatic Image of thought is generated formally from its prior assumption. The result of
this is that under the dogmatic Image of thought what is taken to be “universal” and
“natural” predetermines the implicit and incontestable field in which anything that is to
count as thought must operate.
It is important to understand that what is taken to be “universal” and “natural”
does not just come from the particular cultural idiosyncrasies individual philosophers
have unwittingly incorporated. At its most basic level, the dogmatic Image of thought
portrays thinking simply as a process of recognition or representation.2 Recognition is the
act of perceiving an object on the basis of its similarity to something previously known,
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
2

Deleuze seems to use the terms “recognition” and “representation” synonymously. This
is because “recognition”, which is the process of identifying an object with a category, is in a
relationship of mutual reinforcement with “representation”, which is the process of presenting to
the subject again the manifold of experience after it has been objectified.
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or, identifying an object under a particular category. In order for an object to be
recognized, one faculty must establish that its object is identical to that of another faculty.
For instance, an object is recognized as “sugar” when the white color one’s faculty of
sight sees is connected with the sweetness one’s faculty of taste tastes. The dogmatic
Image of thought is thus “not a particular this or that but the form of representation or
recognition in general” (DR 131). While particular social or cultural prejudices include
things like expectations about proper marital age, gender and racial stereotypes, and
norms of parenting, the dogmatic Image of thought is the assumption that universal,
natural thought is simply recognition. And while it seems like a relatively harmless
observation, Deleuze argues that when the process of recognition is taken as the model
for all thinking the result is anything but harmless.
Deleuze contends that, as a model, understanding thinking in terms of recognition
is deficient. He argues this for several reasons. First: while recognition is indeed a real
and important feature of everyday epistemic relations, by using recognition as the model
for all thought, the dogmatic Image sets the standard of thinking far too low. He writes:
it is apparent acts of recognition exist and occupy a large part of our daily life:
this is a table, this is an apple, this the piece of wax, Good morning Theaetetus.
But who can believe that the destiny of thought is at stake in these acts, and that
when we recognize, we are thinking? (DR 135)
Deleuze is not suggesting that an interest in recognition has no place in philosophy, but
he does want to reserve the term “thinking” for something that is more complex, more
challenging – and more dangerous – than simple recognition. Second: The dogmatic
Image of thought makes an empirical claim about thinking but hides the contingency of
that empirical claim by asserting that it holds in principle. After all, empirical claims can
easily be dismissed if challenged with contradictory facts. That is why the empirical
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claim that thinking is equivalent with recognition must be elevated to the status of a
transcendental form that holds for everyone in principle. It is by taking the “everybody
knows” to hold in principle that the dogmatic Image appears as a “determination of pure
thought” rather than as a presupposed empirical claim (DR 132). Thus is it that
philosophers conceal, even from themselves, their presuppositions. As James Williams
elegantly summarized it, this “false step into the transcendent, supposedly empty, form
gives the impression of avoiding contingent empirical content whilst still carrying it
through” (117). Third: recognition tacitly presupposes a form of identity determined from
the outside, which ultimately predetermines what can count as thought. The form of
identity that recognition presupposes is what Deleuze calls “common sense as concordia
facultatum” (DR 133). The origin of its necessity is as such: when Deleuze defines
recognition as “the harmonious exercise of all the faculties upon a supposed same
object”, asserting that “the same object may be seen, touched, remembered, imagined or
conceived”, the harmony created between faculties cannot come from the faculties
themselves (DR 133). In the above example of the recognition of sugar, the faculties of
taste and sight may actually be operating on the same object (the sugar), but it is not taste
or sight that establishes that sameness. By themselves the two faculties of taste and sight
would be unable to either identify or distinguish the sweetness and the whiteness in the
experience of sugar. It would be as if two different people were experiencing – I the
sweetness and you the whiteness – but neither of us would be able to know whether the
substance to which I was attributing sweetness was actually the same substance to which
you were attributing whiteness. Aristotle uses this same example of sugar to describe the
difficulty of explaining what he calls “the perception of perception” (De Anima bk. III,
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425b12-25). Because harmony does not originate with the faculties themselves, what
Aristotle needs in order to explain the “perception of perception” is a principle of the
harmonious exercise of all the faculties. In other words, Aristotle needs a principle by
which recognition can apply a form of identity to the different faculties. Aristotle’s
conclusion was to hypothesize that there must be a “common potentiality which is
common to all the senses” to unify the faculties such that they themselves constitute “one
thing” (De Anima 426b17).3
From Deleuze’s perspective, Aristotle’s conclusion has been echoed throughout
the history philosophy: the form of identity recognition presupposes is legislated from the
outside by what Deleuze calls “common sense as a concordia facultatum”:
No doubt each faculty – perception, memory, imagination, understanding... – has
its own particular given and its own style, its peculiar ways of acting upon the
given. An object is recognised, however, when one faculty locates it as identical
to that of another, or rather when all the faculties together relate their given and
relate themselves to a form of identity in the object. Recognition thus relies upon
a subjective principle of collaboration of the faculties for “everybody” – in other
words, a common sense as a concordia facultatum. (DR 133)
In order for an object to be recognized, it must be established that one faculty’s object is
identical to that of another faculty. Since however this identification cannot come from
the faculties themselves, recognition (which is identical with thought according to the
dogmatic Image) presupposes “common sense as a concordia facultatum” as the
subjective principle of collaboration or communication between faculties. To follow
Deleuze’s analysis here, it is important to distinguish the two senses of “common sense”
he employs: “Cogitatio natura universalis” (DR 131) and “concordia facultatum” (DR
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
3

Though the idea of the subject was foreign to Greek thought, it is at this point in
Aristotle’s work that many scholars believe he came closest to conceptualizing unitary
subjectivity.
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133). The former operates as a subjective presupposition about what counts as natural and
universal thought, while the latter is the subjective principle of collaboration or
communication between faculties. The sweetness one tastes is identified with the
whiteness one sees as a result of common sense as concordia facultatum. The recognition
of sugar that results from this is taken as the model of all thought through the
presupposition of the common sense as Cogitatio natura universalis. “Common sense” in
either use governs and limits what qualifies as thought insofar as it requires
recognizability of anything that is to count as thought (DR 173). Common sense is not
itself a faculty, however. It is a reflection of another subjective presupposition, indeed,
the subjective presupposition par excellence. Common sense is ultimately derived from
the presupposition that there is a natural unity of the subject that grounds the harmony of
the faculties.
All three of the reasons Deleuze gives for criticizing recognition as a deficient
model for thought rely on a belief about the practical implications of uncritically
accepting the dogmatic Image. The dogmatic Image of thought legitimates the feeling
that what thinking is must be obvious to all because everyone possesses an identical and
natural capacity to think. What should be obvious to any thinker [according to the
dogmatic Image] is that thought is the natural expression of the harmony of all the
faculties and has an “affinity with the true” (DR 131). The dogmatic Image assumes that
thinking is not naturally deceptive but true, reasonable, trustworthy and good.
Recognizability is then used as a gauge by which true, reasonable, trustworthy, and good
thinking can be measured: the more recognizable it is, the truer and better the thinking.4
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
4

And since common sense is an ideal of comparative rational evaluation operating at the
level of subjective presuppositions, what counts as true, reasonable, trustworthy, and good is
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The motive for taking recognition as the model for all thought is gaining a strong
starting-point for establishing unassailable knowledge. Truer and better thinking produces
well-founded and unquestionable knowledge. The dogmatic Image of thought is thus
teleological insofar as its purpose is achieving the pre-established practical goal of
knowledge itself. While it may sound strange to say that knowledge is a practical goal,
Deleuze’s suggestion seems to be the fundamentally Nietzschean contention that
“knowledge” is never pure, abstract, or unconnected to the development of particular
hierarchies and value norms. Deleuze’s contribution is to suggest that perhaps thought is
capable of more than substantiating knowledge claims. Under the dogmatic Image
thought can only compare the new to what is already known – and so it can never move
beyond anything but the recognizable (DR 134). Any thought that cannot be reduced to
what is recognizable and knowable is dismissed as nonsense, i.e. as absurd or
meaningless. Because the dogmatic Image reduces thought to what is already recognized
and recognizable (and known and knowable), Deleuze’s conclusion is that it is deeply
conservative. Deleuze thus believes the practical implication of uncritically accepting the
dogmatic Image is that when thought must conform to the necessities of the genesis of
knowledge it loses its creative freedom and power of change. Thought must think the
same rather than thinking difference. The claim that recognition is thinking at its most
natural and universal is therefore not a harmless observation but a particular
interpretation with an ulterior teleological motive – the conservativeness of which
diminishes and enslaves thought – and thereby us thinkers.

""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
taken to be determined at the level of conditions of experience rather than the level of culturally
particular empirical claims.
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For Deleuze, real thought – thought freed from the constraints of the dogmatic
Image – would be “unrecognizable” insofar as it contains a power of newness that
“remains forever new” (DR 136). But real thought’s power of newness makes it not just
unrecognizable when it is first introduced, as if it simply needed time to become
recognized. Real thought’s power of eternal newness is the power of “beginning and
beginning again” (DR 136). Real thought can never be recognized insofar as it refuses the
conditions of recognizability – it is nonsense from the point of view of recognition.
Milton’s claim in Book One of Paradise Lost that the fires of hell emit “no light, but
darkness visible”, the hedonist paradox that “in seeking happiness, one does not find
happiness”, the wisdom that “I know that I know nothing” and Edward Lear’s “runcible
spoon” are all examples of real thought. The consequence of such a theory of thought is
that even though Deleuze’s goal is to be free of the dogmatic Image that determines
thought to conformity with established norms, he has no hope of achieving this goal if he
merely trades one Image of thought for another. This is why Deleuze is so insistent that
his work is not meant to develop a rival Image of thought, but to discover what he calls
“a thought without Image” (DR 132). ). For example, when Deleuze suggests in the
Preface to the English Edition of Difference and Repetition that he is searching for “[a]
new image of thought – or rather, a liberation of thought from those images which
imprison it” he is emphasizing that his search is not about developing a new Image but
freeing Thought from images that confine it (xvi-xvii). Only a thought free from any
Image would be free from presuppositions and concealed conformity. Deleuze concludes
that real and unrecognizable thought – thought without Image – “must seek its models
among stranger and more compromising adventures” than those of recognition (DR 135).
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The model Deleuze turns to for the creation of a thought without Image is
Immanuel Kant’s discovery of “the prodigious domain of the transcendental” (DR 135).
Kant discovers the domain of the transcendental through his use of critique. I would like
to suggest – and will follow up this suggestion in the third chapter – that in Difference
and Repetition Deleuze’s model for the discovery of thought without Image is Kantian
critique. Kant’s critique can be distinguished from other forms of critique (such as
Descartes’ or Hume’s skeptical critiques) insofar as it is not fundamentally negative.
Rather, Kantian critique examines the structure and limitations of the faculty of Reason
so as to properly distinguish and synthesize conflicting perspectives at the deeper level
marked out by that examination: the level of the transcendental. Traditionally, Kant’s
transcendental is understood as the level of conditions of experience. Deleuze initially
follows this tradition, but emphasizes the importance of a theory of faculties for any
examination of the transcendental.5 Without going into too much detail, Kant’s
contribution to the debate over how to justify subjective beliefs about objective states –
what has come to be known as his “transcendental turn” – was to rephrase this problem in
terms of subjects’ capacities of experiencing. For Kant, what subjects experience is
determined by what they can experience, that is, by their capacities or powers. Kant calls
these powers or capacities “faculties”. Faculties are thus not actual experience, but the
conditions of experience. As conditions of experience, Kant believes that faculties
straddle the line between transcendent objects and subjects’ inner experience of those
objects. This line between – the transcendental level – is the level that Kant believes
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
5

Deleuze’s emphasis on the importance of the theory of faculties is in contrast with much
of Kant scholarship. The notion of “faculty” is ubiquitous in Kant’s work and few readers have
considered systematizing its various uses, despite Kant’s own emphasis on the importance and
consistency of his use of faculties in the First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment.
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makes the relation between transcendent objects and subjects’ inner experience of those
objects possible. It is in this way that Kant transforms the problem of the relationship
between subjects and objects to a problem of the relation between faculties. Faculties are
thus the content of the transcendental domain and the proper objects of critical
examination.
Though Deleuze does not define the notion of faculty in the pages of Difference
and Repetition, it is clear that he follows the Kantian model of conceiving faculties as
relations of power operating at the transcendental level (DR 143-4). Such an
understanding of faculties as relations of power not only complements Deleuze’s
“energetic” ontology (DR 240, 243),6 early in Difference and Repetition he synonymizes
“faculty” with “function” (DR 15) – a word that refers to the activity particular to some
category of things, especially of “the moral and intellectual powers” (OED “function”).
Moreover, it is important to note that in following Kant onto the transcendental level,
Deleuze believes he is following him onto a pre-subjective level. Levi Bryant agrees with
this analysis when he argues in his 2008 book Difference and Givenness that
we might say that faculties do not belong to subjects (if for no other reason than
Deleuze's critique of the subject), but rather subjects are precipitated from
faculties. In fact, granting that Deleuze must indeed reject finitude as a corollary
to his critique of representation, it follows that he cannot treat the subject as a
metaphysically primitive term, but must instead give an account of how subjects
are possible. Consequently, these faculties are none other than the tendencies
characterizing being. They are the differentials or joints of being itself, and not
faculties of a subject's mind. (97)7

""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
6

As Paul Patton explains Deleuze’s ontology: “beyond prepared matter lies an energetic
materiality in continuous variation, and beyond fixed form lie qualitative processes of
deformation and transformation in continuous development” (Deleuze: A Critical Reader
(Oxford, Blackwell 1996) 43.)
7

Levi Bryant, Difference and Givenness (Chicago: Northwestern UP, 2008).
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But we do not have to take Bryant’s word for it. Recall that under the dogmatic Image,
thought is supposed to be naturally true, reasonable, trustworthy, and good because it is
the expression of the harmony of all the faculties under the common sense as concordia
facultatum. In the history of philosophy proceeding from Aristotle, the common sense as
concordia facultatum is derived from the presupposition that there is a natural unity of
the subject that grounds the harmony of the faculties. After all, what is more obvious –
more commonsensical – than that the whiteness the faculty of sight sees becomes
connected to the sweetness the faculty of taste tastes through their both belonging to the
same subject? Kant calls this phenomenon the “unity of apperception” (CPR B127). The
unitary subject establishes the unity of experience. The strategy behind Deleuze’s
emphasis on a theory of faculties is simple: to create real thought freed from the
constraints of the dogmatic Image, we must reveal the real interplay of faculties
constitutive of common sense beneath the supposed unity of the subject. In other words,
to free thought from its subjective presuppositions, we start by conceiving thinking on a
pre-subjective level. In his recent article “Deleuze’s Transcendental Empiricism: Notes
Towards a Transcendental Materialism”, Levi Bryant goes so far as to suggest that
instead of thinking of the faculties as belonging to a transcendental subject, we might
instead consider them as belonging to a ‘transcendental field’ (45). So from another route
we come to the same conclusion: because Deleuze regards the faculties as what underlie
the supposed unity of the subject, faculties must be understood not as mental phenomena
but as the expressions of the dynamic forces underlying mental phenomena. Even without
giving his readers a formal definition, it is clear that rather than conceiving of faculties as
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mental phenomena, in Difference and Repetition Deleuze understands faculties in terms
of the forces or powers they instantiate.8
Deleuze’s description of the difference between “the Kantian and the Cartesian
Cogito” illustrates well the difference between faculties as relations of power and simple
mental phenomena (DR 85). Deleuze begins drawing this difference by suggesting that
we think of Descartes’ Cogito as operating on two poles: the “I think” (or, “the
determination”) and the “I am” (or “the undetermined”). For Descartes the “I think” is so
immediate and spontaneous that it must be the attribute of a substantial being. That is, the
determination (“I think”) directly implies the substantiality of our undetermined existence
(“I am”) because, obviously, in order to think one must exist. Descartes’ Cogito is simply
the expression of the mental phenomenon of the obviousness of thought’s good nature
and immediate relation to existence (i.e. of the dogmatic Image of thought). What Kant
realizes, Deleuze explains, is that it would be impossible for the determination to bear
directly on the undetermined without some kind of mediation that would allow the
undetermined to be determinable. Deleuze is keen on the idea of “the determinable”
because, for him, it is the moment of the discovery of the transcendental. Indeed, Deleuze
writes, the idea of the determinable “amounts to the discovery of Difference” (DR 86).
Kant discovers, Deleuze explains:
a transcendental Difference between the Determination as such and what it
determines; no longer in the form of an external difference which separates, but in
the form of an internal Difference which establishes an a priori relation between
thought and being. (DR 86)
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
8

Deleuze developed his reading of Kant at the same time as he was writing his most
detailed book on Nietzsche: Nietzsche and Philosophy. Nietzsche also understood the Kantian
theory of faculties as a theory of forces, Deleuze implies, when Nietzsche describes the “faculty
of forgetting” as an “active force” (Nietzsche and Philosophy (New York: Columbia UP 1986)
113.)
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The moment of Kant’s realization that thought cannot determine being without the
establishment of an a priori relationship between them is the moment of the inception of
the transcendental as the level of a priori relations. I would like to add that the discovery
of the necessity of a priori determinability between thought and existence is also the
discovery of the idea of faculties as relations of power. The determinable mediates
between the two poles of determination and the undetermined, but it is not itself a pole.
Deleuze writes that the “transcendental principle does not govern any domain but gives
the domain to be governed to a given empirical principle; it accounts for the subjection of
a domain to a principle” (DR 241). Moreover, determinability is the capacity or power
through which the undetermined is able to be determined. The determinable therefore
expresses a relation of power or capacity. Faculties are enumerations of determinability
based on the different sources of different kinds of representations. Faculties understood
in this way are thus a far cry from the Cartesian Cogito’s experience of simple mental
phenomena – however subject to reflection those phenomena may be.
The move from mental phenomena to relations of power has implications for the
theory of subjectivity. Kant acknowledges, Deleuze tells us, that thought implies
something undetermined, but by itself does not imply anything about our being. The
problem is that Descartes does not tell us how the undetermined is determinable by
thought. Kant suggests that the way the undetermined becomes determinable by the
determination is through Time (CPR “Analytic of Concepts”, §25, especially note at
B157-158). Time is the form of the determinable, or rather the form in which the
undetermined is determinable by the determination. What this means is that, for Kant,
Time is the condition of experiencing the self. Kant also calls Time the “form of inner
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sense” because it is the means by which the mind intuits itself (CPR B49). What changes
with Kant, Deleuze suggests, is that the difference between thought and being becomes
interiorized within thought through “the pure and empty form of time.” The “empty form
of Time” thereby “fractures” the “I” into passive and active forces. Hereafter, the
spontaneity and immediacy of self-consciousness that Descartes took for granted must be
replaced with a passive self “which experiences its own thought – its own intelligence,
that by virtue of which it can say I – being exercised in it and upon it but not by it” (DR
86). Between the determination and the undetermined is the determinable and between
the I and being is the self. “Here begins”, Deleuze augurs, “a long and inexhaustible
story: I is an other, or the paradox of inner sense” (DR 86).
Of course, in Kant’s work what Deleuze calls the “fractured I” is merely a passing
moment – one that is covered up too quickly in Deleuze’s estimation. Kant suppresses the
consequences of his introduction of Time into thought with a new form of identity: the
active synthetic identity represented by the unity of apperception’s “I think” (CPR B127).
This new form of identity fills in the fracture of the I and supersedes the passive self with
an active synthesis. From Deleuze’s perspective there are at least two problems with
Kant’s introduction of the active synthetic identity. First: Kant assumes that since
synthesis is active it is a power whereas passivity, as simple receptivity, is powerless. But
perhaps there is a passive synthesis that Kant did not anticipate? Deleuze suggests that if
the Kantian initiative were to be taken up, passivity must be reconceived not only as the
power of experiencing affections but as the power of habituation (or “contemplationcontraction” (DR 87)) – what Deleuze refers to as a “powerlessness which is
indistinguishable from the greatest power” (DR 147). Second: despite Kant’s attempts to
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define it otherwise, Deleuze argues that the active synthetic identity is not a
transcendental principle but an empirical one (CPR B127). This problem of Kant’s lapse
from the transcendental to the empirical is a result of what Deleuze calls “psychologism.”
However, Kant’s “psychologism” is ultimately the result of his unwillingness to put into
question the dogmatic Image of thought. These two problems – of the necessity of
reconceiving passivity and of psychologism – are explained and addressed at length in
the next section on “The differential theory of faculties”.
b. The differential theory of faculties
One of the primary motives behind Deleuze’s conceiving the faculties in terms of
relations of force rather than mental phenomena is his refusal to follow Kant into the
“psychologism” for which his critique has been condemned by generations of scholars.9
“Psychologism”, as Deleuze describes it, is the problem of deriving transcendental
principles from simple empirical examples (DR 135). If – so the criticism goes – what the
transcendental is supposed to mark out are the conditions of experience, Kant’s critique
falls short if he derives those conditions from experience itself. After all, the conditions
of experience may in no way resemble actual experience. Deleuze explains it like this:
of all philosophers, Kant is the one who discovers the prodigious domain of the
transcendental. …. However, what does he do? In the first edition of the Critique
of Pure Reason he describes in detail three syntheses which measure the
respective contributions of the thinking faculties, all culminating in the third, that
of recognition, which is expressed in the form of the unspecified object as
correlate of the “I think” to which all the faculties are related. It is clear that, in
this manner, Kant traces the so-called transcendental structures from the empirical
acts of a psychological consciousness…. In order to hide this all too obvious
procedure, Kant suppressed this text in the second edition. Although it is better
hidden, the tracing method, with all its “psychologism”, nevertheless subsists.
(DR 135)
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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For example, Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp and Michel Foucault all saw
“psychologism” as Kant’s work’s primary weakness.
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Even though Kant discovers the level of the transcendental, he is unable to remain at that
level when he refers the relationship between the transcendental faculties to the
immediacy of recognition on the empirical and psychological level of self-consciousness.
The active synthetic identity of the “I think” Kant relies on to establish a relationship
between the faculties is simply what Deleuze diagnosed as the “common sense as
concordia facultatum” (DR 133). When Kant relies on what he presumes is the empirical
obviousness of the unity of our self-consciousness, Deleuze claims that Kant renounces
his transcendental critique just short of putting into question the most basic of his
presuppositions: common sense itself. As such, Kant’s critique can only go so far as
common sense deems.10 In practical terms, the problem of “psychologism” is that since
the empirical is given under the form of common sense, using empirical experience as the
model from which to draw its conditions would transpose common sense – with all of the
conventions and conservativeness it inherited from requiring recognizability of anything
that is to count as thought – onto the conditions of experience. A transposition of this sort
would not only serve as an in-principle standard by which to impose conformity on
people (by legitimizing only one way of experiencing the world: the way deemed true,
reasonable, trustworthy, and good according to the standard of recognition), it would
impede any appreciation of the real conditions of experience, and likewise the real
conditions of common sense and thought without Image. Thus the problem of
“psychologism” echoes the problem of subjective presuppositions: both operate through a
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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“However, in spite of everything, and at the risk of compromising the conceptual
apparatus of the three Critiques, Kant did not want to renounce the implicit presuppositions.
Thought had to continue to enjoy an upright nature, and philosophy could go no further than - nor
in directions other than those taken by - common sense” (DR 136).
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return to what was already known implicitly at the start and so obstruct venturing into the
unknown.
As we see, in order to uncover the conditions of the creation of a thought without
Image an analysis of what is given in experience is not enough. This is because, as
Deleuze writes, the transcendental is meant to apprehend “that which cannot be grasped
from the point of view of common sense” and common sense determines the way in
which experience is given (DR 143). Somehow, Deleuze must find a way of uncovering
the conditions of the creation of a thought without Image without relying on everyday
experience. However, Deleuze’s solution is not to eschew experience entirely by
adopting a dogmatic rationalist approach that seeks its answers through an analysis of
pure thought. Rather, he determines to avoid Kant’s psychologism by adopting a form of
empiricism that has been subjected to an immanent Kantian critique.11 It is thus that
Deleuze chooses to call his own philosophical approach in Difference and Repetition
“transcendental empiricism” – a name that simultaneously evokes his connection to and
divergence from Kantian critique. But what is “transcendental empiricism”? And in what
sense is it “empiricism” when Deleuze so explicitly rejects the “psychologism” of
deriving transcendental principles from what is given empirically through experience?12
The simple way of describing Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism is to say that it
seeks the genesis of real experience rather than the conditions of possible experience. As
Levi Bryant argues, what Deleuze seeks
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
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The question of whether Deleuze’s “transcendental empiricism” is best understood as a
form of traditional Empiricism or as a form of Rationalism is the subject of debate among
Deleuze scholars.
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Indeed, one of Deleuze’s criticisms of Kant’s transcendental idealism is “too much
empiricism” (DR 170).
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is not the empirical difference characterizing the thing extrinsically in terms of
something else, but the internal difference presiding over the genesis of a world.
Hence the paradoxical term transcendental empiricism. On the one hand, we
cannot anticipate what these differences will be in advance and must thus resort to
a sort of empiricism. On the other hand, these differences are not what is given in
experience, but rather, as Deleuze says elsewhere, that by which the given is
given. (51)
Bryant’s suggestion is that the proper way to understand transcendental empiricism is as
an analysis of the internal differences at the root of the genesis of experience. He reasons
that this counts as a form of empiricism because we cannot anticipate what those
differences will be and so must look for them in experience. Rather than looking for them
in possible experience, however, the transcendental empiricist must look for internal
differences in real experience. But what is the difference between real and possible
experience? And what is the difference between genesis and conditioning? Why would
one be preferable to the other? We will start with the difference between real and possible
experience. Real experience is concrete and present, as opposed to an abstract and futural
possibility. The difference between the real and the possible is like the difference
between a pair of trousers tailored to your specific measurements and a one-size-fits-all
pair of trousers. The tailored trousers fit a real person: you, whereas the one-size-fits-all
trousers meant to fit every possible person likely actually fit no one. Real experience (the
tailored trousers) is preferable to possible experience (the one-size-fits-all trousers)
because it fits the actual situation (you). The difference between genesis and
conditioning, on the other hand, is that while genesis describes the emergence of a
phenomenon, conditions hypothesize facts without which the phenomenon would not
exist. So, a genesis of Bertrand Russell would detail Russell’s development from the
perspective of the powers and problems internal to his growth, whereas a condition of
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Bertrand Russell is simply the fact (external to Russell himself) that he had to have
parents in order to exist at all. While the conditioning account identifies facts external to
the phenomenon at issue, the genetic account offers an internal determination of what
makes a phenomenon what it is. But is there any reason to prefer an internal genetic
account to an external conditioning account of phenomena? To answer that question, we
must understand the importance of what Deleuze calls the problem of “extrinsicism.”
“Extrinsicism” is the problem, first identified by Salomon Maïmon, of positing
the faculties of sensibility and understanding as different in kind – and thus still subject to
a substance dualism that only a pre-established harmony or constant divine intervention
could overcome (DR 180). Kant’s goal had been to overcome the dualism of subject and
object by repositioning the debate at the level of the conditions of experience – what
Deleuze argued in Kant’s Critical Philosophy that Kant identified as the level of
faculties. However, the subject/object dualism was not overcome in this move, merely
pushed back to the level of the relation between the “passive” faculty of sensibility and
the “active” faculties of understanding, reason, and imagination. Deleuze argues that
Kant dealt with this problem in two ways: first by developing an account of a synthesis
carried out by the imagination that applies the understanding’s form of unity to sensations
(thus mediating between the passive and active faculties), then by hypothesizing the
“common sense” as a necessary condition to explain the harmony between all the
faculties (DR 173, CPR A326/B383-4, CPR A669/B697). In Deleuze’s eyes, both
solutions failed: the first because it leaves the question of how the imagination can carry
out a conceptual determination unanswered (imagination and understanding being
different in kind as well), and the second because the idea of “common sense” re-
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introduces the very pre-established harmony Kant meant to avoid. Kant, it seems,
recognized that he had not truly solved the problem of extrinsicism and in the Critique of
Judgment attempted once again to overcome it by going beyond his account of conditions
to a deeper account of the genesis of aesthetic common sense from the way the subrepresentative (indeed, unrepresentable) sensation of sublimity reveals and draws out the
powers immanent within the faculties.13 Only a genetic account of the emergence of
harmony between the faculties can overcome the problem of extrinsicism because an
account based on conditions could never offer anything more than the hypothesis of a
substrate of unity, which smuggles in pre-established harmony. Therefore, genesis, unlike
conditioning, can reveal the emergence of the dogmatic Image of thought rather than
simply assuming it. It is because of the power of this genetic analysis, which Deleuze
sees as the apotheosis of critique, that Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism relies on it for
his model of a differential theory of faculties.
Deleuze is clear here that he does not intend to produce a “doctrine of the
faculties” despite his attestation that such a doctrine is “an entirely necessary component
of the system of philosophy” (DR 186/143). All Deleuze claims to be doing here is
determining “the nature of its requirements” (DR 144). What he outlines as
“requirements” for a doctrine of faculties is what he calls the “differential theory of
faculties” (DR, vii). The difference is that while a doctrine is taken as complete and
unassailable once accepted, since a theory is a hypothesis that owes its acceptance or
rejection to continual experimentation and observation, it is open to revision. The reason
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
13

Kant claims in a letter to Herz from 26 May 1789 that “none of my critics understood
me and the main questions as well as Herr Maïmon does” and in the same letter goes into great
detail discussing Maïmon’s “most subtle investigations” (Immanuel Kant, Correspondence
(Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 2007) 311-12.)
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Deleuze insists on this is to emphasize that the particular list of faculties he isolates
(sensibility, memory, imagination, and thought) may not be comprehensive. In keeping
with his commitment to avoid tracing the transcendental from the empirical, he must not
judge the outcome of research before the research is done.14 And for Deleuze faculties
number as many as there are powers of relating. Since there may be an infinite number of
ways of relating – especially if the future is considered open to generating more ways of
relating – it is not impossible that there are an infinite number of faculties. In addition to
the faculties of sensibility, memory, imagination and thinking, Deleuze mentions
faculties of stupidity, vitality and sociability, amongst others (DR 143, 159). But while
there may be an infinite number of faculties, only faculties capable of attaining their own
unique exercise have a place in Deleuze’s differential theory of faculties. Ultimately, the
differential theory of faculties is meant to explain the genesis of a thought without Image
from the perspective of the relation of our faculties to problems. The organization of
faculties, their superior or transcendent exercise and the account of their communication
belong inextricably to this project and it is these elements that will guide the exegesis.
i. Organization
Deleuze claims that the faculties are organized serially, and in keeping with the
standpoint of empiricism he locates sensibility at the origin.15 However, in privileging
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
14

“For nothing can be said in advance, one cannot prejudge the outcome of research: it
may be that some well-known faculties - too well known - turn out to have no proper limit, no
verbal adjective, because they are imposed and have an exercise only under the form of common
sense. It may turn out, on the other hand, that new faculties arise, faculties which were repressed
by that form of common sense. For a doctrine in general, there is nothing regrettable in this
uncertainty about the outcome of research, this complexity in the study of the particular case of
each faculty: on the contrary, transcendental empiricism is the only way to avoid tracing the
transcendental from the outlines of the empirical” (DR 143-44).
15

“It is true that on the path which leads to that which is to be thought, all begins with
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sensibility Deleuze does not mean to locate the origin of thought in our relation to
everyday empirical experiences, as those are always necessarily given under the form of
common sense. Whereas everyday empirical experiences are already representations,
“sensations” in Deleuze’s sense are “sub-representative” and immediate affects (DR 57).
Like Kant’s manifold of intuition (the forms of sensibility of space and time at CPR
A77/B102), Deleuze’s “sensations” are intuitive yet undergo their own “passive
syntheses” before relating with the active syntheses that make up representational
experience and thought (DR 71-75). Unlike Kant’s manifold of intuition, the passive
syntheses constitutive of Deleuze’s “sensations” are not the forms of space and time, but
the “contractions” of habit that “are not carried out by the mind, but happen in the mind”
(DR 71). The dichotomy of passivity and activity are the terms in which Deleuze
typically chooses to present these syntheses, but there is a case to be made that a more
fruitful way of understanding “passivity” is not as the opposite of “activity” but as an
“unconscious” mechanism. Levi Bryant makes this case when he writes that “[f]or
Deleuze all intuition is productive, and we are led to believe it is passive insofar as most
of the principles governing its production are unconscious” (98). This difference
illuminates something important for understanding Deleuze’s project in general. Whereas
for Kant the transcendental method moves past empiricism by focusing on the forms of
experience rather than experience itself (which ultimately leaves Kant with less of an
ontology and more of an epistemology), Deleuze thinks that transcendental philosophy
must go beyond the conditioning method of identifying forms to achieve a genesis of
experience and, ultimately, of real thought beyond experience. So, rather than locate the
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
sensibility” (DR 144).
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origin of thought in empirical experience or in the forms of that experience, Deleuze
identifies the origin of both thought and sensations in what he calls “Difference” or
“intensity”, which is not best understood in terms of “passivity” but is most certainly
“unconscious” (DR 236-7).
Deleuze’s notions of “Difference” and “intensity” do not specify simple empirical
differences but what make empirical differences possible. While empirical differences are
external to sensations (as well as to faculties and representations) insofar as they serve to
separate sensations from one another, Difference is internal and establishes an a priori
relation between them. For example, this book on my desk is different than that book on
the shelf. They are different in innumerable ways: they have different sizes, different
colors, they were written by different people, etc. All of these differences are simple
empirical differences insofar as the differences marked out are external to the books
themselves. Difference itself, on the other hand, is the basic ontological level of pure
diversity that makes it possible for empirical differences between books to come into
being at all. It would be a mistake to associate Difference with the concept of the
“between”, however, as such a move would prioritize identity in the definition of
Difference – something Deleuze is keen to avoid. Bryant writes that
Insofar as Plato locates difference "between" the two lines of descent, he proves
unable to determine which line should be selected. Hence the difficulty in
determining why fishing ought to belong to arts of acquisition rather than of
production. What is missing here is the reason for placing fishing in one rather
than the other. As a result, models remain external to their copies and we are left
unable to distinguish between copies and simulacra. (27)
For Deleuze, on the other hand, Difference must be understood as that which makes the
diversity of experience be as it is, which produces diversity and allows it to manifest.
That is why Deleuze refers to Difference as internal. It is internal to each book, each tree,
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each person, and each idea, rather than just distinguishing between books, trees, people,
and ideas. Difference is also the origin and limit of sensibility and it is Difference’s
immediate relationship to sensation that explains sensibility’s priority in Deleuze’s
differential theory of faculties. Difference is the origin insofar as it is the intensive level
out of which sensations and even the faculty of sensibility are born. But Difference is also
the limit of sensibility insofar as Difference is “imperceptible” from the point of view of
common sense (DR 140). This is why another of Deleuze’s ways of characterizing it is as
“what can only be sensed”, or even more mysteriously, as an “encounter” (DR 243; 139).
These two figures – “what can only be sensed” and the “encounter” are explained and
discussed in detail in the following section.
ii. Transcendent Exercise
Everyday acts of recognition result from the harmony of the faculties working
under the legislation of common sense, which Deleuze refers to as the faculties’ “natural
exercise” (DR 131). By way of contrast, real thought is necessarily “involuntary”,
“constrained” and “born, illegitimately, of fortuitousness in the world” (DR 139). It is
with a touch of irony that Deleuze reminds his readers that, “‘Everybody’ knows very
well that in fact men think rarely, and more often under the impulse of a shock than in the
excitement of a taste for thinking” (DR 132). For Deleuze, real thought is not an
everyday occurrence nor is it the result of a decision or a desire – it is the result of a
“shock”. Real thought needs such a “shock” in order to awaken it from the dogmatic
“natural stupor” it finds itself living out under the form of common sense (DR 139). The
sort of shock that has the power to awaken thought could only come from via the
sensation of Difference itself as the “original violence inflicted upon thought” (DR
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139).16 While some sensations are taken up in active syntheses to form representations,
there are others that bear within them their origin in Difference and have the power to
contest representation itself. These are what Deleuze calls “encounters” (DR 165). This
word “encounter” is the one Deleuze reserves for the forms of Difference that transmit a
“shock” or “violence” from sensibility to thought. The encounter opposes all recognition
(DR 142). Moreover, the only way to spark real thought is through an encounter. In
Deleuze’s own words:
Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of
recognition but of a fundamental encounter. What is encountered may be
Socrates, a temple or a demon. It may be grasped in a range of affective tones:
wonder, love, hatred, suffering. In whichever tone, its primary characteristic is
that it can only be sensed. (DR 139)
It is tempting to say that the encounter could be anything that forces you to problematize
your habits of thought: Descartes’ Meditations, Hume’s skepticism, a chair mounted
upside down on a wall, a painting of a pipe that declares “This is not a pipe”, even a bit of
gift wrap crumpled in the corner or an anthropomorphized red balloon. But there is at
least one parameter Deleuze sets for encounters: encounters emerge from sensibility.
Indeed, encounters are the purest form of sensibility insofar as they can “only be sensed.”
More accurately, the encounter is the form in which sensibility senses “what can only be
sensed” (DR 57):
The privilege of sensibility as origin appears in the fact that, in an encounter, what
forces sensation and that which can only be sensed are one and the same thing,
whereas in other cases the two instances are distinct. In effect, the intensive or
difference in intensity is at once both the object of the encounter and the object to
which the encounter raises sensibility. (DR 144-45)
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
16

In French, the word “violence” has a broader designation than in English. So, a brutal
act can be “violent”, but so can a particularly bright or jarring color. While Deleuze does not
seem to believe that all forms of violence are the same, his relationship to violence is a legitimate
question being asked by scholars. Anne Murphy and Erinn Gilson, for instance.
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The encounter is the vehicle for the sensation of Difference but it is also the very
sensation that it is meant to produce. In other words, the encounter produces itself in its
sensation. It is able to do this because the encounter is not “given” under the form of
common sense like most experience is. This is the meaning behind Deleuze’s formula
that it is what can only be sensed. The encounter is not available to memory or
imagination or thought, so it cannot be recognized since recognition requires unification
of the object through all of the faculties. What can only be sensed, what Deleuze
elsewhere refers to as “the sentiendum” is, in Deleuze’s words,
the paradoxical existence of a ‘something’ which simultaneously cannot be sensed
(from the point of view of the empirical exercise) and can only be sensed (from
the point of view of the transcendent exercise)” of the faculty of sensibility. (DR
236)
The encounter’s paradoxical nature comes from its simultaneous impossibility and
necessity at the level of sensation. The encounter forces sensibility to the point of the
breakdown of its empirical exercise – but it is precisely at the point of the breakdown of
the empirical exercise of sensibility that sensibility achieves its “transcendent” exercise.
As we will see in the next section, this point of breakdown is both the point of the
faculty’s powerlessness and its greatest power. The transition from powerlessness to
power comes through what the dissertation is calling “internalization of powerlessness”.
To understand this, take as an example the experience of encountering the “Blue
Monochrome” (1961) of Yves Klein.17 Klein’s blue is sharp, ultra-saturated, jarring, even
violent. It is a kind of electric blue that seems to pulsate with its own energy. It is blue,
but it is not blue. It is different from any other blue. The immediate sensation of it is
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
17

Klein, Yves. Blue Monochrome. 1961. New York’s Museum of Modern Art (MoMA)
http://www.moma.org/collection/object.php?object_id=80103. (27 February 2012).
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unexpected, insistent, and utterly unrepresentable. The description offered here is the
shadow of an echo of the piece itself. Indeed, without the piece being immediately in
sight it is impossible to quite remember the exact quality of the blue or even imagine it in
its fullness. We might refer to the gallery label text to help us recognize in the piece the
artist’s intention to produce a utopian vision of “an open window to freedom.” However,
as interesting as that is, it fails to capture the immediate sensation of the piece itself. The
blue of the “Blue Monochrome” cannot be appreciated from the point of view of the
ordinary empirical use (or “exercise”) of the senses. The ordinary empirical use of the
senses requires recognizability and as such would experience the “Blue Monochrome” as
just another shade of bright blue. But the power of the piece is that it does not let the
ordinary empirical use of the senses determine it. The blue of the “Blue Monochrome”
makes you stop and pay attention. It is a sensation that forces you to experience the
blue’s singularity and power at the “transcendental” level where your senses perceive in
this “blue” the intensive essence of blueness. In Deleuze’s vocabulary, the encounter with
Klein’s “Blue Monochrome” forces the sensation of Difference itself as the internal
genetic power responsible for its unique blueness. Of course, the encounter could be of
Klein’s “Blue Monochrome”, of Kundera’s analysis of the gesture in Immortality, of the
first three chords of Wagner’s Tristan und Isolde, or of any number of other experiences
that resist recognition according to the common sense use of the faculties. The important
thing is that at the level of sensation the encounter resists recognizability through a
singularity and power that forces sensation beyond the empirical to the transcendental.
From this starting point, Deleuze proceeds to show that the violence of the
encounter is transmitted from the limit of sensibility to the limit of imagination, the limit
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of memory and the limit of thought. “[F]rom what can only be sensed to what can only be
thought” (DR 243). Thought, therefore, is not the natural exercise of a faculty possessed
of a good will, but its “transcendent” exercise when subjected to the encounter. The main
priority of Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism is identifying the “transcendental” form
of each faculty and how it is achieved. Another way of putting this would be to describe
transcendental empiricism through its function of identifying each faculty’s limits. To
understand Deleuze’s notion of the transcendental we must understand his use of the
concept of the “limit.”
While there are several places in Difference and Repetition where Deleuze
criticizes the concept of the limit, there are also places where he suggests a revised
understand of the limit in terms of the intrinsic power of a faculty. First we will look at
the places where he criticizes the notion of the limit. In the very first chapter of the book,
Deleuze defines limitation as “a type of distribution that divides up the distributed
according to the rules of analogy determined by common sense” (DR 36). This
understanding of limitation as a way of organizing beings according to a pre-given
principle established by common sense is in contrast with “nomadism”, a type of
distribution Deleuze identifies as happening according to “a division among those who
distribute themselves in an open space - a space which is unlimited, or at least without
precise limits” (DR 36). Take two examples of organizing buttons: one way to organize
your buttons is to separate the buttons by size into different compartments of your sewing
box. If you need a certain size button, you just have to look in the designated
compartment. This is the method recommended by common sense. Another way is to put
all the buttons in one big glass jar. If you want a small button, you will look at the bottom

90

of the jar. If you want a big button you will look at the top of the jar. This latter method
relies on the buttons distributing themselves – the smaller falling to the bottom and the
bigger getting pushed to the top. Deleuze repeats this distinction of ways of organizing
with regard to different types of hierarchy: a hierarchy of limits that measures beings
according to a principle, and an “ontological” hierarchy that measures beings according
to their power (DR 37). The distinction in both instances is between a form of
organization of beings that proceeds according to a pre-given principle and one that
proceeds according to the powers and problems internal to the beings themselves. In both
instances the notion of the limit is used to describe the organization of beings that
proceeds according to a pre-given principle. Deleuze connects the notion of limitation
with the notions of resemblance (DR 12), representation (DR 43), negativity (DR 112),
common sense (DR 140), and opposition (DR 266), all terms Deleuze ties to the
dogmatic Image of thought.18 Moreover, as often as Deleuze criticizes the notion of the
limit he honors that of the unlimited (DR 36, 57, 141). However, there is another way of
understanding the notion of the limit present in Deleuze’s thought and that alternative
way of understanding the limit is fundamentally important to an understanding of
Deleuze’s differential theory of faculties.
After introducing the distinction between organizations that happen according to
an external principle and organizations that happen according to each object’s intrinsic
power, Deleuze goes on to explain that for organizations based on power,
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
18

“There is a crucial experience of difference and a corresponding experiment: every
time we find ourselves confronted or bound by & limitation or an opposition, we should ask what
such a situation presupposes. It presupposes a swarm of differences, a pluralism of free, wild or
untamed differences; a properly differential and original space and time; all of which persist
alongside the simplifications of limitation and opposition” (DR 50-51).
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it is not a question of considering absolute degrees of power, but only of knowing
whether a being eventually ‘leaps over’ or transcends its limits in going to the
limit of what it can do, whatever its degree. ‘To the limit’, it will be argued, still
presupposes a limit. Here, limit [peras] no longer refers to what maintains the
thing under a law, nor to what delimits or separates it from other things. On the
contrary, it refers to that on the basis of which it [the thing] is deployed and
deploys all its power;…the smallest becomes equivalent to the largest once it is
not separated from what it can do. (DR 37)
Seemingly incongruously based on his repeated uses of the notion of limitation as an
activity determined by recognition and common sense, Deleuze claims that the analysis
of power proceeds according to an evaluation of limits. However, Deleuze does not think
that by utilizing the notion of limit he is making the mistake of smuggling in the idea of a
pre-given principle he meant to avoid when he criticized the notion of limit. The analysis
of power does not proceed according to the principle of pre-given degrees of power – it
proceeds through an analysis of what a thing “can do”, or, a thing’s potential. Deleuze
believes that a thing’s potential can be evaluated by evaluating its capacity to achieve and
transcend its limits. This is a subtle shift in the way Deleuze reads limitation: no longer in
terms of merely imposing a principle of measurement or a maximum by which to reign in
the faculty’s power, but in terms of identifying the full extent of a faculty’s power and the
basis on which its power is deployed to its fullest. In this new sense, limitation is not
teleological. Rather, it refers to the intrinsic power of a thing or faculty (DR 201).19
There are thus two notions of the limit operating in Deleuze’s work. One that is
inextricably tied to the dogmatic Image of thought and another that “refers to that on the
basis of which it [a thing] is deployed and deploys all its power” (DR 37). This latter idea
of limit refers to the full extent of a faculty’s power and the basis on which its power can
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
19

Intrinsic is distinguished from internal insofar as Deleuze claims that “intrinsic” applies
to the essence (DR 51).
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be fully deployed. Deleuze himself acknowledges that the “significance of the very
notion of limit changes completely” when he writes that the notion of limit “no longer
refers to the limits of finite representation” but “to the womb in which finite
determination never ceases to be born and to disappear” (DR 43). When Deleuze
discusses limitation in the new terms of “that on the basis of which it [the thing] is
deployed and deploys all its power” (DR 37), he means to associate the limit with the
origin of things – that is, the origin of empirical experiences and thought – in Difference
itself. The limit is the point at which things dissolve into and are born again from
Difference, which does not distinguish forms (as would be the object for the method of
conditioning) but the genesis of a thing out of Difference itself. From this perspective,
things are empirical manifestations of Difference’s power of genesis. It is at the level of
faculties that Deleuze thinks we can analyze those powers so as to understand the genesis
of a thought without Image.
When it comes to the theory of faculties, the limit is the primary concept Deleuze
utilizes to describe each faculties’ achievement of its transcendent exercise. A faculty
achieves its superior, transcendent exercise when it is confronted with its own limit
through an encounter with Difference itself. Deleuze writes:
What is most important, however, is that - between sensibility and imagination,
between imagination and memory, between memory and thought - when each
disjointed faculty communicates to another the violence which carries it to its own
limit, every time it is a free form of difference which awakens the faculty, and
awakens it as the different within that difference. (DR 145)
It is the violence of Difference as instantiated in the experience of the encounter that
forces each faculty in turn to its limit or transcendent exercise. While a faculty’s lower
form corresponds to its empirical exercise, its higher form corresponds to its transcendent
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exercise (DR 142). In its lower or empirical form, the faculty grasps what can be grasped
by other faculties: it is subject to the model of recognition. It experiences the same “blue”
in the sky, in the couch, and in the “Blue Monochrome” – that is, “blue” that can be
simultaneously sensed, remembered, imagined, and conceived. In its higher or
transcendental form the faculty grasps what it alone is capable of grasping (DR 140).
Sensation senses the particular, incomparable, and (from the point of view of the
empirical exercise of sensibility) insensible blueness of the “Blue Monochrome”,
imagination produces the image of that which is unimaginable – the image of pure
freedom from the formless and unique intensity of Klein’s new blue, memory remembers
the immemorial – the recollection of a genius and creativity that never happened but is
nonetheless remembered and thereby becomes enmeshed in our unconscious passive
syntheses, and thought thinks the unthinkable – the thought of uniqueness, freedom, and
creation that is not unique, free, or new from the point of view of the empirical use of
thought. From the empirical point of view, such a thought is nonsense. From the
transcendental point of view, however, such a thought is real insofar as it connects
thinking with Difference itself and the internal powers and problems at the root of the
genesis of the “Blue Monochrome” and the root of its power to produce the experience of
intensity, the image of freedom, the memory of creation, and the thought of the
paradoxical impossibility and necessity of each. The superior or transcendent form of a
faculty is characterized by Deleuze as the moment when the faculty grasps that in the
world which concerns it exclusively (what can only be sensed, imagined, remembered or
thought), in other words, its radical difference or specificity. However, by calling the
“superior” exercise of a faculty “transcendent”, Deleuze does not mean to suggest that the
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faculty grasps something outside experience, “but, on the contrary, that it grasps that in
the world which concerns it exclusively and brings it into the world”: Difference (DR
143). It is their grasping of their own difference, precisely at the limit of what they can
do, that is the key to the faculties’ transcendent exercises. When faculties grasp their own
difference they are grasping their limit (understood as their highest power) and their
transcendent exercise is not going beyond existence but grasping that which makes them
exist in their specificity or essence. As we shall see in the next section, it is by
internalizing their powerlessness at the empirical level that they achieve their greatest
power at the transcendental level.
Power and limitation are inextricably bound in the logic of Deleuze’s theory of
faculties because power and powerlessness are inextricably bound together in the theory
of faculties. At the level of faculties what drives the movement from sensibility to
thought can be described in terms of either power or powerlessness. Deleuze associates
powerlessness with “real limits” early in Difference and Repetition (DR 13). Right at the
origin of thought, in the passive syntheses of contraction and habit, Deleuze claims that
there are powers inherent to sensibility but that these powers are unconscious and thus
testify to our powerlessness as much as to our power. Moreover, the superior form of
sensibility, the “very being of the sensible” is revealed in “what can only be sensed” (DR
57). What can only be sensed is the limit and powerlessness of sensibility from the point
of view of its empirical exercise and the limit and the highest power of sensibility from
the point of view of its transcendent exercise. Power and powerlessness refer to the same
thing (as in our example of sensibility’s relation to the blueness of Klein’s “Blue
Monochrome”), but reveal the faculty’s power or its powerlessness depending on the
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point of view. Even the importance of violence in the encounter is conceived in terms of
powerlessness. Under the influence of the encounter, faculties transmit their constraint
(that is, their powerlessness) from one to the other. As Deleuze writes:
Henceforth, thought is also forced to think its central collapse, its fracture, its own
natural “powerlessness” which is indistinguishable from the greatest power - in
other words, from those unformulated forces, the cogitanda, as though from so
many thefts or trespasses in thought. (DR 147)
In this passage Deleuze reconceives “powerlessness” as the “greatest power.” This is
because it is the “power” of the limit that in the case of each faculty connects that faculty
with its superior exercise. The encounter plunges each faculty in its turn into an
involuntary adventure in which the faculty “is borne to the extreme point of its
dissolution” through a triple violence. First, there is the violence of the encounter that
forces sensibility’s exercise. Second is the violence of grasping what that faculty alone
can grasp. Third is the violence of the ungraspable. Each faculty thus discovers its unique
“power” through its limit or powerlessness at the level of its empirical exercise. But it
also discovers its difference and its repetition. For instance, the faculty of thought, when
confronted with what it alone is capable of grasping, finds its difference. But when
thought is confronted with what is unthinkable it instantaneously engenders the repetition
of thinking. The faculty is able to separate and “transcend” its lower, empirical exercise
because of the violence of encountering its limit or powerlessness in the face of
something that exceeds its empirical powers. In Deleuze’s own words:
Each faculty is unhinged, but what are the hinges if not the form of a common
sense which causes all the faculties to function and converge? Each one, in its
own order and on its own account, has broken the form of common sense which
kept it within the empirical element of doxa, in order to attain both its 'nth' power
and the paradoxical element within transcendental exercise. Rather than all the
faculties converging and contributing to a common project of recognising an
object, we see divergent projects in which, with regard to what concerns it
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essentially, each faculty is in the presence of that which is its “own”. Discord of
the faculties, chain of force and fuse along which each confronts its limit,
receiving from (or communicating to) the other only a violence which brings it
face to face with its own element, as though with its disappearance or its
perfection. (DR 141)
Each transcendental form designates the faculty’s powerlessness at the empirical level of
common sense yet its power of transcending that empirical exercise to grasp its unique
object. It is in this sense that powerlessness as instantiated by the limit is understood by
Deleuze as the greatest power. The powerlessness of common sense thought to grasp the
unthinkable forces it to put into question and abandon common sense, which allows it to
achieve its “transcendent” form: a thought without Image. This is what in the next
chapter we call “internalization of powerlessness”. The forms in which this
powerlessness come to thought are
[i]mperatives in the form of questions…[that] point which designates 'the
impossibility of thinking that is thought', that point at which 'powerlesness' is
transmuted into power, that point which develops in the work in the form of a
problem. (DR 199)
We will return to the connection between powerlessness and problems in the next section.
Yet, if a thought without Image is supposed to be thought freed from the form of
common sense, it is puzzling that Deleuze associates its emergence with the production
of a “discord of the faculties” that produces a “discordant harmony” (DR 146). The next
subsection accomplishes two things: it explores the possibility that Deleuze has
inadvertently smuggled the form of common sense into his account of how the faculties
free themselves from common sense and it distinguishes Deleuze’s notion of a
“problematic Idea” from that of the encounter.
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iii. Communication of faculties
The violence of the encounter with intensity is communicated from sensibility to
imagination, from imagination to memory, and from memory to thought, creating a
“discordant harmony” (DR 146). This communication happens the way an epiphany
happens: all of a sudden, completely, and through the inspiration created in one faculty
sparking inspiration in the next. The medium of this communication is what Deleuze
enigmatically refers to as the “dark precursor” (DR 145). He introduces the term by
writing that “The dark precursor is sufficient to enable communication between
difference as such, and to make the different communicate with difference: the dark
precursor is not a friend” (DR 145). With the exception of Levi Bryant’s casual
association of the “dark precursor” with Deleuze’s conception of the “object=x”, the
notion of the dark precursor is ignored in the secondary literature on Deleuze.20 It bears
asking, however, whether the “dark precursor” reintroduces the form of common sense
from which Deleuze meant to free though.
One of the reasons the idea of the dark precursor is so often ignored in Deleuze
scholarship is because Deleuze anticipates the objection that it reintroduces the form of
common sense:
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
20

“In Deleuze's account, the minimal conditions for structure consist of (1) a minimum of
two heterogeneous series in which one is determined as signifying and the other as signified, (2)
each series being constituted by terms which exist only in the relations they maintain with one
another, and (3) these two series being linked together by the paradoxical instance of the object =
x, or what Deleuze calls the "dark precursor" in Difference and Repetition. Now, if the empty
square or object = x is what allows for the actualization of multiple worlds in the form of persons,
this is because the empty square, traversing both series, distributes a set of empty and filled
(structural) positions actualized in each of these worlds. Insofar as the empty and the full can only
be determined on the basis of the "symbolic" structure (where position is to be interpreted as
singularity), we simultaneously get an explanation of how two worlds can communicate and how
they can diverge” (Bryant 252).
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The very principle of communication, even if this should be violence, seems to
maintain the form of a common sense. However, it is nothing of the sort. There is
indeed a serial connection between the faculties and an order in that series. But
neither the order nor the series implies any collaboration with regard to the form
of a supposed same object or to a subjective unity in the nature of an 'I think'. It is
a forced and broken connection which traverses the fragments of a dissolved self
as it does the borders of a fractured I. The transcendental operation of the faculties
is a properly paradoxical operation, opposed to their exercise under the rule of a
common sense. In consequence, the harmony between the faculties can appear
only in the form of a discordant harmony, since each communicates to the other
only the violence which confronts it with its own difference and its divergence
from the others. (DR 145-6)
Though the dark precursor seems to share the form of common sense insofar as it is the
condition that enables the communication of faculties. Deleuze insists that the connection
between the faculties is not the result of the imposition of an hypothesized unity of the
subject or object (as is the case for common sense, which imposes the ideal a particular
mode of representation gleaned from a hypothesized form of natural and universal human
reason). The “subject” of the discordant harmony of faculties is the “dissolved self” or
“fractured I.” Certainly Deleuze does not want to deny that the common sense operation
of the faculties results in the harmonies that give us representations and allow us to
recognize. However, when the faculties attain their transcendent exercise, they are no
longer constrained by the common sense but by the violence of the shock of their own
powerlessness. The “discordant harmony” of faculties operating at the transcendental
level is “paradoxical” rather than recognizable. It is paradoxical in the sense that that the
discordant harmony is impossible from the point of view of the empirical exercise of the
faculties and necessary from the point of view of their transcendent exercise. It is in the
sense of “paradox” that Deleuze describes the dark precursor as a “para-sense” that
expresses the internal violence that forces thinking rather than a “common sense” that
produces recognition through the imposition of an external hypothesized unity (DR 193).
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The dark precursor refers to the origin of experience in intensive Differences that
manifest in ever changing power relations. Yet, in Kant’s Critical Philosophy there is no
sense that a common sense prior to the production of aesthetic common sense was
necessary to make the faculties agree in their discordant way. Kant’s Critical
Philosophy’s “discordant accord” is spontaneous and free. Yet when “discordant
harmony” is produced in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze claims that the “medium” of
the communication of violence from one faculty to the next is the “dark precursor” (DR
145). Though it seems to share the form of common sense, Deleuze insists that the
connection between the faculties is not the result of the imposition of a hypothesized
unity of the subject or object, as is the case for the logical and moral common senses in
his reading of Kant. Yet, the aesthetic common sense is not the medium between
faculties, nor does it enable communication. It is generated from the dissonance between
Imagination and Reason in the experience of the sublime. What is generated
spontaneously from Deleuze’s differential theory of faculties is a thought without Image.
So why does Deleuze feel the need to introduce anything as a medium enabling
communication between faculties? Perhaps this is an intentionally misleading distinction
to draw our attention away from the relation between aesthetic common sense and
thought without Image – or perhaps even more so the connection between the “soul” and
the “fractured-I”? The most likely explanation is that when Deleuze talks about the dark
precursor, he is talking about the “contemplative soul” of his earlier analyses of passive
synthesis (DR 74). Joe Hughes, in his Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition claims that the
“contemplative soul” is equivalent with the spontaneous Imagination.21 From this
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
21

Joe Hughes, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition (New York: Continuum, 2009).
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perspective, one might say that the dark precursor is the passage from one faculty to
another as the drama of the unfolding of powerlessness within power playing itself out.
Deleuze gives to this drama the name “Problematic Ideas.” Our analysis now moves to an
explanation of the place and importance of the notion of “Problematic Ideas” in the
differential theory of faculties.
Problematic ideas are a crucial and difficult notion in Deleuze’s work – they
feature prominently in his theory of faculties, his epistemology, as well as his intensive
ontology. It would be impossible to explain all the complexity of the notion of
Problematic ideas in the present subsection, so this subsection will focus on clarifying
their relation to the differential theory of faculties and the account of the genesis of a
thought without Image. To understand problematic Ideas in these contexts, it is sufficient
to understand their apparently paradoxical place as both the transcendental ground of
thinking and the products of thought. However, to understand this dual role of
problematic Ideas, we should begin with their difference from “encounters,” and from
Kant’s notion of “Problematic ideas”.
Unlike with Kant, for Deleuze the faculty of Reason is not the sole generator of
problematic Ideas. Problematic Ideas are produced by all the faculties and in fact “furnish
the conditions under which the faculties attain their superior exercise” (DR 146). They
are not, however, equivalent with encounters. Though on the surface problematic Ideas
seem to perform the same function as encounters insofar as encounters also “furnish the
conditions under which the faculties attain their superior exercise” (DR 146), problematic
Ideas do not have their origin in sensibility. The question of the origin of problematic
Ideas is tricky for Deleuze. Though he claims that problematic Ideas concern all the
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faculties, they nonetheless “have a very special relationship to pure thought” (DR 194).
As Deleuze explains it, thought attains its transcendent exercise at the extremity of the
“fuse of violence which, from one Idea to another, first sets in motion sensibility and its
sentiendum” and Ideas are born of this extremity (DR 194). Indeed, thought must be
understood in its highest form as the expression or actualization of problematic Ideas.
The difficulty with the initial articulation offered here of the origin of problematic Ideas,
however, is that it makes it appear that problematic Ideas are required for the generation
of problematic Ideas. If, after all, problematic Ideas are what set sensibility in motion but
they are also the products of that motion, they seem to be self-generated. However, this
problem disappears and the real problem emerges when we see that Deleuze associates
the notion of “problematic Ideas” with a knot of other concepts, including “Ideas”,
“problems”, and “questions.” Though Deleuze often uses these terms interchangeably,
there are important distinctions to be made. “Problems” designate an open yet “unitary
and systematic” symbolic “field” that orients experiences so that answers “form precisely
cases of solution” (DR 168). “Questions” are what force faculties to their transcendent
exercise. “Ideas” are generated at the extremity of the violence that questions pose to the
faculties – that is, Ideas are the product of thought at the end of a chain reaction involving
all of the faculties. These Ideas, in turn, form new problematic fields for which new
questions must be generated and new Ideas formed.
Deleuze’s alternative to the dogmatic Image of thought presents problems as the
transcendental ground of thinking, questions as the genetic elements of thought and Ideas
as the products of thought. This explanation has the advantage of reconciling the passages
from Difference and Repetition that suggest problematic Ideas are generated from
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encounters with other passages that suggest that encounter is generated by problematic
Ideas. Both can be the case when problems, questions and Ideas are distinguished. The
apparently paradoxical place of problematic Ideas as both the transcendental ground of
thinking and the products of thought can be explained by these distinctions as well.
The encounter is a violence constituted by pure Difference, and this Difference is
in the form of a problem. At the extremity of the violence of the encounter both thinking
and the Idea are constituted. Ideas problematize each faculty and even themselves in such
a way as to open whatever they touch for the mark of its difference. Like questions that
beget more questions (or Ideas in their wild and untamed state, sparking new Ideas),
thinking is encountering Difference but in a constant confrontation and exchange which
forces thought to “think otherwise.” It is thus that the ontological becomes inseparable
from the moral and practical. Deleuze is clear when late in Difference and Repetition he
writes about the “distortion” of thought brought about by the dogmatic Image that, “if the
truth be told, none of this would amount to much were it not for the moral
presuppositions and practical implications of such a distortion” (DR 268). The final
section of the present chapter details the practical side of Deleuze’s differential theory of
faculties by taking a look at his accounts of learning and culture.
c. Deleuze’s interest in the demoralization of rational man
So far, Deleuze’s account of the formation of a thought without Image in the
differential theory of faculties has been presented as a fundamentally passive process. It
is passive in the sense that the whole adventure of thought waits on the accident of the
encounter, and when the encounter does strike it forces the faculties to their higher forms.
From a practical point of view, the necessity of waiting for something that may or may
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not arrive combined with the imperative it puts the faculties under when it does arrive
seems to valorize a quietistic attitude. That is, it encourages passivity and non-resistance.
As if the encounter’s resistance of recognizability were all that were necessary to really
resist the dogmatic Image of thought and resist its consequence that thought lose its
creative freedom and power of change. Whether we effectively resist or not would
depend more on luck than work. However, the problem with this interpretation – and with
our discussion of Deleuze’s differential theory of faculties up to this point – is that it
ignores Deleuze’s descriptions of philosophy as the double project of generating “the act
of thinking in thought” (DR 139) and “breaking with doxa” (DR 134).22 This language
and much more like it throughout Difference and Repetition does not encourage passivity
and non-resistance. Doing philosophy must on some level contribute to generating
thought and breaking with doxa. Indeed, it is our argument that Deleuze has a particular
conception of doing philosophy that opens thinkers to the experience of the encounter. To
show this, in the final section of Chapter Two the differential theory of faculties is
supplemented by two models: those of learning and culture. Learning operates as a
concrete model for the movement from sensibility to thought that emphasizes activity.
Culture serves as the principle of the genesis of thought without Image insofar as it
prepares thinkers for the experience of encounter. The section is divided into four parts: I.
Learning, II. Culture as paideia, III. The problem of violence, and IV. Deleuze’s ideal of
philosophy as evaluating presuppositions.
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
22

The language of this double project reveals a profound Nietzscheanism at the heart of
Deleuze’s way of understanding philosophy. The project of “breaking with doxa” mirrors
Nietzsche’s “evaluation of values”, while the project of generating “the act of thinking in
thought” (DR 139) mirrors Nietzsche’s “creation of new values” (DR 136). Deleuze makes the
latter connection himself when he writes that “[t]o think is to create - there is no other creation but to create is first of all to engender ‘thinking’ in thought” (DR 147).
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i. Learning
Deleuze’s presentation of the model of “learning” hinges on learning’s distinction
from the model of knowledge. As Deleuze writes, “[w]hereas knowledge designates only
the generality of concepts or the calm possession of a rule enabling solutions”, learning
designates the “subjective acts carried out when one is confronted with…a problem
(Idea)” (DR 164). Learning must therefore not be thought of as a “preparatory
movement” that disappears once knowledge is attained. It is not simply an intermediary
between non-knowledge and knowledge. Learning is the process by which we enter the
encounter, “conjugating” the points of our perception with those of the problem posed by
the encounter. Doing so forms a new problematic field that reorients our perspective and
compels us to take it up again as a new problem. In learning, we experience the unknown
that resists our previous understanding. On the level of sensibility, it is a vertiginous
experience that forces us to imagine differently, to re-remember our memories
differently, and to think differently. Deleuze’s most famous example is learning to swim.
When we learn to swim we encounter the problem of the water, which resists our habitual
ways of moving on land and breathing without thinking. We must imagine a new way of
doing things that does not depend on our previous images of walking, jumping, or
standing. These images force “memories” of what cannot be remembered: “swimming”
in the womb, the flashback through our lives when we fear we may be drowning.
Simultaneously, the experimentation with these images at the level of our bodily
movements forces our memory to produce new memories and new habits. And finally, as
if in moment of epiphany, we realize the “solution” to the problem of the water. The
“solution” is a real thought – a thought that does not rely on the previous images that
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constrained our thoughts – that allows us to start to move through the water and on top of
the water. This thought cannot be analogized to knowledge insofar as it is not universal or
eternal. “Thought” in the example of learning to swim is the swimming itself, which
opens up new problems and new forms of experience, and new ways of living. When
people say that we are always on the threshold between what we know and what we do
not yet understand, what they mean is that learning reorients the way we understand a
problem, thereby opening more problems that require reevaluation, refinement, and even
sometimes complete revision of what we have learned through further learning. What this
model of learning offers is a concrete account of the differential theory of faculties that
emphasizes the activity involved: the leap into the water, the violence of the shock of
being unable to swim and breathe, the rethinking of the usual ways of moving in order to
propose new ones, the experimentation with solutions, and the discovery of new powers
through our internalization of the powerlessness of the old ones. Learning is the model
for how to generate the act of thinking by working through problems. The hidden wisdom
of Socrates’ “I neither know nor think that I know” is its prioritization of learning in an
everlasting exploration of problems (Plato, Apology, trans. Benjamin Jowett).
Yet, the conceptual persona Deleuze offers for the process of learning is not
Socrates but the “Apprentice” (DR 23). For Deleuze, the Apprentice penetrates the
encounter, treating the encounter as a problem. She raises each faculty to its transcendent
exercise, trying to grasp in each faculty what is its alone and transmitting the violence of
the encounter from one faculty to the next. The Apprentice realizes the intrinsic power of
each faculty by taking its limit (the insensible, unimaginable, unrememberable, and
unthinkable) as an object. According to Deleuze, “learning is the true transcendental
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structure that unites difference to difference” (DR 165-7). The Apprentice learns. She
does not know. So, the Apprentice unites difference to difference without an end as either
goal or ideal. What this means is that the Apprentice produces the unity of the faculties –
the Idea – at an unconscious level without relying on “common sense.”
The idea of Apprenticeship seems like it should carry behind it the
complementary idea of a Master with a pedagogical method. Yet for Deleuze, “[t]here is
no more a method for learning than there is a method for finding treasures, but a violent
training, a culture or paideia which affects the entire individual” (DR 165). While
knowledge requires the employment of a method that regulates the collaboration of all
the faculties and presupposes a good will of the thinker, Deleuze argues that thought is
generated from a violent training or “culture” understood in terms of the Greek notion of
paideïa. But what is culture as paideia and why is it described as violent?
ii. Culture as paideia
There are two senses of “culture” in Difference and Repetition: culture as paideïa
and culture as “culture of the times” (DR 158). A “culture of the times” is the “grotesque
image of culture” that calls upon people “to choose according to his or her taste, on
condition that this taste coincides with that of everyone else” (DR 158). This grotesque
image of culture encourages a sort of judgment of taste that seems singular but only
counts as taste if it agrees with everyone else. It represents the pedagogical method of
common sense. The second sense of culture is as “paideia” (DR 165). Paideia is a
transliteration of the ancient Greek !"#$%&", which means “child-rearing”, “training” or
simply “education”. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “paideia” as:
Education, upbringing; spec. an Athenian system of instruction designed to give
pupils a rounded cultural education, esp. with a view to public life. Hence: the
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sum of physical and intellectual achievement to which an individual or
(collectively) a society can aspire; a society's culture
Paideia, in other words, is the general process of acclimatization into a society’s highest
ideals and itself represents those ideals as a full and cohesive system. This definition,
however, seems at odds with Deleuze’s contrast of culture as paideia with methods
dictated by common sense. It seems fair to ask in what sense paideia’s education in
society’s highest ideals is different from method’s determination of thought through the
presupposition of common sense. Both seem to be governed by empirical
presuppositions. Moreover, Deleuze’s suggestion of culture’s superiority over method
seems to imply an elitism of whatever culture Deleuze deems the proper one. Yet, when
Deleuze is talking about culture, he does not mean a particular society’s culture, as he is
clear that this sense of culture is reserved for the “grotesque” image of culture (DR 158).
Rather, Deleuze means a philosophical culture whose ideal is a constant questioning,
problematizing, and creating. The contrast between culture and method is less about the
very existence of presuppositions and more about the contingency, comprehensiveness
and involuntariness of culture and its value as a model for Deleuze’s conception of
learning as the movement from the empirical to the transcendental forms of the faculties.
Indeed, by aligning the movement of learning with that of culture, Deleuze is actually
drawing attention to his own presuppositions – that is, to his ideal of philosophy as the
evaluation of presuppositions. This ideal is not an empirical presupposition taken as an
in-principle feature of human nature but a starting point for philosophy that
acknowledges the necessity of evaluating every starting point – indeed, makes that
evaluation the fundamental condition of philosophizing.
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iii. The problem of violence
Before we reach that discussion, there is one more question that needs to be
addressed: Why does Deleuze describe culture as violent? On the one hand, the term
“violence” has a much broader usage in the French language than it does in English. It
would be an ordinary thing for a particularly bright and jarring color to be described as
“violent” in French. On the other hand, Deleuze connects his use of the word “violence”
with the word “cruauté” [cruelty] – which does not have the same broad application as
“violence” in everyday French – when he writes of culture that it is an involuntary
adventure which “links a sensibility, a memory and then a thought, with all the cruelties
and violence necessary...to ‘provide a training for the mind’” (DR 165/215). The use of
the word “cruelty” immediately calls to mind the work of Antonin Artaud, who Deleuze
refers to frequently in the context of the genesis of thought and whose book, The Theatre
and its Double, famously theorizes a surrealist form of theatre called the Theatre of
Cruelty (DR 114). In The Theatre and its Double Artaud wrote that, “[w]ithout an
element of cruelty at the root of every spectacle, the theatre is not possible. In our present
state of degeneration it is through the skin that metaphysics must be made to re-enter our
minds” (99). Even though “cruauté” is not an everyday word in French, in Artaud’s
usage “cruelty” does not refer to torture or sadistic infliction of pain. Rather, “cruelty” is
defined by physical austerity and determination – as if it were the attempt to make
skepticism felt. “Cruelty” in Artaud’s sense is the condition of true spectacle insofar as
spectators must submit themselves to an attempt at entering a point of view that shatters
their everyday false reality. With Artaud’s perspective as background, Deleuze’s use of
“violence” is contextualized within the necessarily vertiginous experience of evaluating
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one’s deepest presuppositions. However, in the above-quoted passage where Deleuze
writes that culture links the faculties with the violence necessary “to ‘provide a training
for the mind’” he is quoting Nietzsche. In Nietzsche’s work violence does not have the
same valence as it does for other thinkers. In The Gay Science, the structure of culture is
violent insofar as it is an imposition. We see this clearly in Nietzsche’s claim that culture
is a compulsory deformation when he writes that “one is master of one’s own trade at the
price of also being its victim” (Gay Science §366). But what is the goal of this violent
training for Deleuze? We can take a clue from Nietzsche when he wrote that:
[T]he ability to contradict, the acquired good conscience accompanying hostility
towards what is familiar, traditional, hallowed – that is better yet than both those
abilities, and constitutes what is really great, new, and amazing in our culture; it is
the step of all steps of the liberated spirit. (Gay Science §297)
Nietzsche is claiming that the culture of contradiction, or what we above called
“evaluation”, is the biggest step in freeing thought from dogma. This resonates with
Kant’s “Sapere Aude” or “Dare to know”. Kant’s formula valorizes the courage to think
for oneself that one only develops with Humanistic education and in a society that
permits religious and scholarly freedom. The argument here is that Deleuze is making the
same move as Nietzsche and Kant, but with his own conceptual personae. For Deleuze,
culture is a violent training in evaluating presuppositions, but this means training in
becoming what Deleuze calls a “Russian idiot” (DR 130).
iv. Deleuze’s ideal of philosophy as evaluating presuppositions
The persona Deleuze identifies as the “Russian idiot” is someone who denies
what “everybody knows” (DR 130). She denies what “cannot be denied”: that is,
common sense. Idiocy is a sort of modesty, Deleuze claims, that does not want to be
represented or to represent anything. But this denial is also an expression of ill will and
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an inability to think according to the standards set by the “culture of the times”, not a
good will and natural capacity for thought (DR 130). The “idiot” is a dangerous role to
play insofar as her lack of presuppositions is only apparent. The “idiot” does not get
beyond presuppositions – she questions them. That is why we specify the idiot as
“Russian.” Deleuze claims that when the philosopher risks playing the idiot, she should
“do so in the Russian manner”:
that of an underground man who recognises himself no more in the subjective
presuppositions of a natural capacity for thought than in the objective
presuppositions of a culture of the times, and lacks the compass with which to
make a circle. Such a one is the Untimely, neither temporal nor eternal. Ah
Shestov, with the questions he poses, the ill will he manifests, the powerlessness
to think he puts into thought and the double dimension he develops in these
demanding questions concerning at once both the most radical beginning and the
most stubborn repetition. (DR 130)
Deleuze is referring here to Lev Shestov, a fascinating and iconoclastic scholar of
Russian and Jewish descent whose revolutionary ideas led him to a life of wandering as
he clashed with one authority after another. His final work, Athens and Jerusalem, which
is the culmination of his fragmentary and aphoristic interpretations of Tolstoy,
Dostoyevsky, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard, calls for the rejection of reason by philosophy.
By associating Shestov with the “idiot”, Deleuze is suggesting that idiocy means
iconoclasty and determination to question what is considered rational and beyond
question. It is not just a scholarly pursuit, but a way of living philosophy as a struggle
against presuppositions. It is a way of living critically. Deleuze writes that a philosophy:
without any kind of presuppositions…would take as its point of departure a
radical critique of [the dogmatic Image of thought]…a rigorous struggle against
this Image…. As a result, it would discover its authentic repetition in a thought
without Image, even at the cost of the greatest destructions and the greatest
demoralisations, and a philosophical obstinacy with no ally but paradox (130).
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A thought without Image requires a “philosophical obstinacy” even at the cost of the
“greatest destructions” and the “greatest demoralizations.” The Russian idiot expresses
such a philosophical obstinacy. Deleuze claims that only someone who denies common
sense and the presuppositions of a “culture of the times” can “effectively begin and
effectively repeats” (DR 130). We can understand the “violent” training or cultivation in
evaluating presuppositions as training in becoming a “Russian idiot” (DR 130). It is
training in how to break with doxa. What such a training entails is precisely the kind of
training philosophers do: developing interpretation skills, critical skills, and argument
skills. It means making looking at the world with wonder and making always asking why
a habit. It means training in being able to think differently and against the persuasive
initial positions presented by common sense, knowledge, and morality. It is not just
critically evaluating others, but at the deepest level the skill to critically evaluate oneself
and one’s habits of thought. Moreover, the Apprenticeship in Russian idiocy offered by
culture is the principle of the genesis of the experience of the encounter. Without it, the
encounter might arrive while the thinker looks right past it, unable to perceive in it what
is so unique and resistant to recognition. Levi Bryant agrees when he writes that “thought
requires an apprenticeship or training in signs to engender an openness to the encounter,
to prevent it from covering over the difference which manifests itself with the subjects
and objects resulting from the syntheses of habitus” (77). “Openness” to the encounter
means not only the open-mindedness to perceive an encounter, but also the willingness to
go out and look for it for yourself and in your habits to dare to think. Cultivation through
doing philosophy opens thinkers to the experience of the encounter by giving the thinker
tools for generating thought and breaking with doxa.
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In keeping with the perspective that Deleuze’s ideal of philosophy is the
evaluation of presuppositions, it is important that Deleuze does not mean evaluation as an
attempt at attaining a point of view beyond presuppositions. Presuppositions – and
indeed, the entire structure of recognition – are constitutive of any experience and any
situation. As such, it would be meaningless to get rid of them. Without presuppositions,
we would not be conscious at all. Presuppositions are just capacities insofar as they are
the name for what we can do. This includes the set of presuppositions encapsulated by the
dogmatic Image of thought. After all, Images, at a general level, are just the material
form of memory. Like Kant’s “transcendental illusions”, we cannot do without them even
though they lead us into error. That is why beginning in philosophy is such a problem.
Our subjective presuppositions represent the structure of recognition that makes
experience possible. For Kant, as for Deleuze, Images should not be taken for what they
seem to be but there is no way to get definitively beyond them. Deleuze’s solution, which
is argued for more extensively in the next chapter, is to subject the Image to a form of
Kantian critique that evaluates presuppositions not so as to try to avoid presuppositions
but in order to affirm them. Such an affirmation is transformative and operates according
to the same logic of interiorization of powerlessness Deleuze and Kant both discuss in the
context of faculties’ movement “beyond” their limits. This affirmative, active and
transformative critique is the next main subject of development and analysis.
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4. A comparison of Kant’s Critical Philosophy and Difference and Repetition’s accounts
of the faculties
This chapter makes three primary arguments. First, it argues that the similarities
between Deleuze’s account of Kant’s doctrine of faculties in Kant’s Critical Philosophy
and Deleuze’s own differential theory of faculties in Difference and Repetition point to
another similarity at the level of the immanent critical approach itself. Second, it argues
that investigation bears out the claim that the immanent critical approach defining Kant’s
Critical Philosophy is also deeply embedded in Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition.
Third, it argues that Deleuze’s immanent critique in Difference and Repetition has a
practical dimension as an ethos. The correlations drawn between Kant’s Critical
Philosophy and Difference and Repetition allow the dissertation to conclude by raising
important questions about the extent to which Deleuze’s critique breaks with its Kantian
antecedent, particularly as regards its practical commitments. The chapter is thus divided
into three sections: Section I: The “common” doctrine and the differential theory of
faculties, Section II: Deleuze’s Immanent Critique, and Section III: An Ethos of
Evaluation.
a. The “common” doctrine and the differential theory
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze adopts both the structure and logic of the
doctrine of faculties he attributed to Kant five years earlier in Kant’s Critical Philosophy.
This adoption did not happen without Deleuze making modifications, however. What is
interesting about these modifications is that, for the most part, Deleuze did not treat them
as a break from Kant’s critical project but as a profound fidelity to that project. Though
Deleuze repeatedly indicts Kant’s critique, in the background of this indictment is the
idea that critique can be recuperated, as it was on Deleuze’s reading through the work of
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both Maïmon and Nietzsche. In both Nietzsche and Philosophy and Difference and
Repetition, Deleuze makes the case that the critical project can become “total” (NP 1) or
radically transformed (NP 52, DR 132) rather than simply abandoned (DR 153, 173). In
many ways Deleuze’s work in Difference and Repetition could be seen as more loyal to
the immanent project of critique than Kant’s Critiques were. We clarify and explicate
these ways below. However, in the attempt to identify the similarities between the
accounts of faculties from Kant’s Critical Philosophy and Difference and Repetition, it
should not be forgotten that there are several important differences as well. In our first
section the similarities as well as the differences between the doctrine of faculties
developed in Kant’s Critical Philosophy and the differential theory of faculties developed
in Difference and Repetition are laid out in two parts. First they are mapped in a section
on “Structure”, which compares the definitions of faculties, organizations of faculties,
and theories of culture from each account. Second, they are mapped in a section on
“Logic”, which explains each theory’s conception of the relation between activity and
passivity, violence and powerlessness, and immanence and the transcendent “beyond”.
For clarity, the account of faculties Deleuze attributes to Kant in Kant’s Critical
Philosophy is called the “‘common’ doctrine of faculties” while Deleuze’s revised
version of the account in Difference and Repetition is called the “differential theory of
faculties”. The difference in nomenclature reflects the legislative idea Deleuze sees
operating in each account: while what Deleuze calls Kant’s “doctrine of faculties” is
ultimately governed by the external principle of “common sense”, Deleuze’s “differential
theory of faculties” is governed by an internal principle of differentiation.
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i. Structure
1. Definition of Faculties
This section on the “Definition of Faculties” analyzes Deleuze’s way of
understanding Kant’s notion of faculty and how he models his own differential theory on
that understanding. The faculties of Understanding, Reason, Thought, and Sensibility are
each treated in turn – with the ultimate conclusion being that what Deleuze understands
to be the demands of immanence are what determine the modifications he makes to the
“common” doctrine of faculties in the interest of his differential theory of faculties for
Difference and Repetition.
On Deleuze’s reading in Kant’s Critical Philosophy, what makes Kant’s
understanding of faculties unique in the history of Philosophy up to his time is that the
faculties are not “subjective” in the sense of being straightforward psychological features
of the mind. Despite the seeming anthropomorphism implied in Kant’s attribution of
“ends” and “interests” to the faculties, Deleuze argues that Kant’s “transcendental”
faculties are expressions of the dynamic forces underlying the psychological phenomena
we subjectively experience. At the most general level Deleuze understands Kant’s
doctrine of faculties as a system of relations of power [Vermögen] (KCP 14). This is
consistent with Deleuze’s understanding of Kant’s faculties as the subject’s capacities for
experience, and their difficult inter-relation as forming the basis of experience, error,
illusion, faith, and knowledge. It is this sense of faculties as relations of power that
Deleuze adopts in Difference and Repetition.
Yet, while there are two definitions of faculty Deleuze attributes to Kant in Kant’s
Critical Philosophy: “faculties of mind”, which express types of relations between
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representations and their object or subject, and “faculties”, which express the source of
representations, Deleuze seems to adopt only the latter in Difference and Repetition. To
understand why, we must start by understanding that what Deleuze identifies as Kant’s
“faculties of mind” are expressions of particular ends or interests of the faculty of
Reason, not of the faculty of Understanding, Imagination, or any other faculty (KCP 3).
Indeed, according to Deleuze, what defines Philosophy for Kant is the analysis of the
relationship between Reason and its ends. Deleuze admires the immanent perspective
exhibited in this definition, even though for him Philosophy is not defined in terms of
understanding and facilitating Reason’s proper self-relationship but in terms of realizing
thought’s power of breaking with doxa through the achievement of a thought without
Image and the creation of genuinely new Ideas (DR 134). To that end, not only is
Deleuze interested in other faculties than just Reason, Deleuze conceives of the true
“end” of each faculty as the realization of that faculty’s highest internal power. That is
why Deleuze’s critical philosophy is not carried out at the level of conditions of
experience but at the level of the genesis of thinking as it is achieved through each
faculty’s attainment of its own distinctive higher form. Deleuze conceives of this shift
from conditioning to genesis as consistent with the original spirit of Kant’s critical
project, which he considers to have been worked at its most profound level in the
Critique of Judgment when Kant produces a genetic account of the development of
aesthetic common sense. Deleuze’s reading of the failure of the critical project in Kant’s
Critical Philosophy suggests that Kant’s pre-determination of Reason’s interests
smuggles in moral interests. Because the moral interests smuggled into critique are
conceived by Deleuze as subjective presuppositions, there is no way of knowing whether
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Kant was aware of them. This is an important point to make in order to resist the
interpretation that Deleuze’s reading of Kant is itself guilty of psychologism. Deleuze is
not merely charging Kant with psychological predilections or desires that influenced the
way he practiced critique. Deleuze is diagnosing a problem that he sees as endemic to a
particular way of doing philosophy that dogmatically begins by assuming all thought is
recognition. Kant represents a way of thinking that operates at the limits of the dogmatic
approach to philosophy but ultimately does not go far enough. What would be far
enough? From Deleuze’s perspective, the immanent critical evaluation should not start
from pre-determined “ends” at all – but from an examination of the powers and limits of
the faculties. Deleuze’s insistence to understand faculties primarily in terms of the
expression of their power rather than in terms of “ends” separate from that expression can
be understood as an attempt at circumventing the subjective presuppositions Kant
introduced into his Critiques and allowing the faculties to speak for themselves. What
this means is that Deleuze is breaking with doxa by first attending to an analysis of the
faculties on their own terms.
According to the “common” doctrine of faculties, the “faculties of mind” legislate
the proper organizations of Imagination, Understanding, and Reason. Whether the
organization legislated is logical common sense or moral common sense depends on
which faculty of mind is being exercised. In contrast, Deleuze’s “differential theory of
faculties” eschews models that legislate from the outside or in any way break with the
immanent perspective. Yet this does not produce as sharp a break between the accounts
of faculties as one might suppose. Though Deleuze takes up only the second sense of
“faculty” he attributes to Kant in Kant’s Critical Philosophy, he nonetheless uses Kant’s
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model of the third “faculty of mind” (the faculty of the feeling of pleasure and pain) for
the logic of the genesis of the higher form of each faculty. Deleuze does this because the
faculty of the feeling of pleasure and pain is the only faculty of mind that does not
legislate the organization of faculties but allows the faculties to spontaneously achieve
their own organization (KCP 48, DR 146). This is because the higher form of the faculty
of the feeling of pleasure and pain is not autonomous but heautonomous. It legislates over
itself rather than over the other active faculties or over either phenomena or noumena. On
Deleuze’s reading, Kant realizes that any organization of faculties determined by
common sense presupposes that the faculties are capable of a “free and indeterminate”
accord that is not pre-established by common sense but rather creates common sense
(KCP 24; CJ §21-22). It is this level of analysis Deleuze adopts.
Unlike Deleuze’s Kant, for whom the list of faculties is limited to the three or four
types of representations for which they are the source, Deleuze’s own list of faculties is
potentially infinite given that for him faculties number as many as there are powers or
capacities. In addition to the faculties of sensibility, memory, imagination and thinking
Deleuze mentions faculties of stupidity, vitality and sociability, amongst others (DR 143,
159). However, only faculties capable of attaining their own unique exercise – their
superior or transcendental form – have a place in Deleuze’s differential theory of
faculties. That is why the faculty of Understanding that was so important in the
“common” doctrine of faculties is lost in the differential theory of faculties. From
Deleuze’s perspective, Understanding does not have a transcendental exercise. This is
because Understanding’s function of concept formation depends on the faculty of
Sensibility, which means there is nothing that can only be conceived (apart from what is
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properly the object of Imagination, not Understanding). However, while the faculty of
Reason is not referred to by name in Difference and Repetition, unlike Understanding,
Reason does not entirely disappear.
The faculty of Reason does not disappear in the transition from Kant’s Critical
Philosophy to Difference and Repetition. Rather, Deleuze converts it into the faculty of
Thought. In Kant’s Critical Philosophy, Reason is dangerous insofar as Reason
encourages the Understanding to exceed its limits by enticing it with “the illusion of a
positive domain to conquer outside experience” (KCP 25). Yet, Deleuze argues that
Kant’s critical philosophy is organized around the faculty of Reason. This is because, as
Kant himself points out in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, the mystery of
why humans have Reason reveals a practical purpose of Nature.1 Despite its danger,
Reason holds out the promise of bringing knowledge beyond the empirical sphere to
grasp the “unconditioned” – if only its interests can be properly hierarchized and the
powers expressed by the other faculties properly organized and limited. In Deleuze, the
faculty of Thought expresses the same kind of power (and danger) as Reason, but
differently interpreted. Like Kant’s faculty of Reason, Deleuze’s faculty of Thought
fundamentally poses a danger to knowledge (DR 135-6). Thought expresses the power of
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
1

“For as reason is not competent to guide the will with certainty in regard to its objects
and the satisfaction of all our wants (which it to some extent even multiplies), this being an end to
which an implanted instinct would have led with much greater certainty; and since, nevertheless,
reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, i.e., as one which is to have influence on the will,
therefore, admitting that nature generally in the distribution of her capacities has adapted the
means to the end, its true destination must be to produce a will, not merely good as a means to
something else, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary. This will then,
though not indeed the sole and complete good, must be the supreme good and the condition of
every other, even of the desire of happiness.” (Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics
of Morals in Practical Philosophy ed. and trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge, Cambridge UP 1999)
50.)
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newness, of creativity, of contestation and of destruction, though in Difference and
Repetition, unlike in Kant’s Critical Philosophy, Deleuze insists that these powers of
Thought are imposed on Thought and awakened in Thought by the outside forces he calls
“encounters” (DR 139). For Deleuze, the mystery of why humans have Thought reveals
the power of Difference itself – which is not a transcendent “beyond” but an immanent
“beneath” (DR 214). Thought, again like Kant’s Critical Philosophy’s faculty of Reason,
produces Ideas that resist categorization and representation according to knowledge (DR
146-7). For Deleuze, this resistance to representation/categorization helps Thought serve
to form new problematic fields for questioning. And though for Deleuze Thought is not
the only faculty capable of producing Ideas, Ideas have a “special relationship” to Ideas
such that Thought must be understood in its highest form as the expression or
actualization of Ideas (DR 194). Thought thus holds out the promise of breaking with
doxa by internalizing the power of Difference instantiated in the encounter and producing
a Thought without Image – but only if the other faculties realize their highest internal
power through the serial transmission from one to the other of the violence of the
encounter with Difference that forces them to confront and transcend their limits.
The serial movement by which each faculty achieves its transcendent exercise
begins in sensibility. Of course, both Kant’s Critical Philosophy and Difference and
Repetition locate sensibility at the origin of all facultative relations, yet what Deleuze
means by sensibility in Difference and Repetition differs from what he means in Kant’s
Critical Philosophy. In Difference and Repetition, sensibility is not equivalent with
everyday empirical experiences. The empirical is already representational – hence it is
always necessarily pre-determined by doxa since it is “given” under the form of common
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sense. “Sensations” in Difference and Repetition are “sub-representative” and immediate
affects (DR 57). Like Kant’s manifold of intuition, Deleuze’s “sensations” are intuitive
yet undergo their own “passive syntheses” before relating with the active syntheses that
make up representational experience and thought (DR 71-75). The comparison is between
Deleuze’s “passive syntheses” from Difference and Repetition with what Kant calls the a
priori manifold of the forms of sensibility (space and time) in the Critique of Pure
Reason (A77/B102). Unlike Kant’s manifold of intuition, the passive syntheses
constitutive of Deleuze’s “sensations” in Difference and Repetition are not the forms of
space and time, but the “contractions” of habit that “are not carried out by the mind, but
happen in the mind” (DR 71). Sensibility is an unconscious process, yet, as Dan Smith
has argued, for Deleuze, “sensibility itself is intelligible” (I.I. 51). What he means is that
for Deleuze Sensibility is not a pure intuition in Kant’s sense. Sensibility is genuinely
produced in the passive syntheses, allowing Difference and Repetition to conceive of
sensibility not simply on the basis of receptivity, but as spontaneous, productive, and
creative.
This difference between how Deleuze conceives of Sensibility in Difference and
Repetition how he reads Kant’s conception of Sensibility in Kant’s Critical Philosophy
illuminates something important for understanding Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition
project in general. Whereas in Kant’s Critical Philosophy the transcendental method
moves past empiricism by focusing on the forms of experience rather than experience
itself, Deleuze thinks that transcendental philosophy must go beyond the conditioning
method of identifying forms to achieve a genesis of experience and, ultimately, of real
thought beyond experience. While Kant’s Critical Philosophy holds that certain ideal and
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universal structures of mind must be operating as conditions in order for there to be
experience, Difference and Repetition’s suggestion that Sensibility is productive and
intelligible shifts the analysis to the genesis of receptivity, experience, and thought from
Difference itself. This is, once again, a choice to modify the account of faculties from
Kant’s Critical Philosophy in accordance with the ideal of immanence that Deleuze
argues Kant unwittingly abandoned. One of the primary figures Deleuze uses as a vehicle
into this genetic analysis is that of the “encounter.” As we will see in the next section on
the similarities and differences between the differential theory and the “common”
doctrine at the level of their organizations of faculties, Deleuze’s “encounter” is another
point of overlap between them.
2. Organization of faculties
This section on the “Organization of Faculties” analyzes the structural similarities
and differences between the accounts of the movement from the experience of
powerlessness to the “beyond” in Kant’s Critical Philosophy and in Difference and
Repetition. The parallel notions of sublimity and encounter, the accounts of the
transcendental forms of the faculties, and the parallel notions of “discordant harmony”
and “discordant accord” are each treated in turn – with the ultimate conclusion being that
the movement from powerlessness to the “beyond” can be understood in terms of Kant’s
Critical Philosophy and Difference and Repetition’s shared prioritization of the
evaluation of limits.
What Difference and Repetition calls “encounter” and what Kant’s Critical
Philosophy calls “sublime” are remarkably similar ideas. Both emerge from sensibility to
produce a “shock” or “violence” that confronts the faculties with their limits. In Kant’s
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Critique of Judgment, the sublime is the experience you have when faced with either
formlessness or deformity in nature (the immensity of “the wide ocean, enraged by
storms” and the power of nature “in its wildest and most unruly disorder and devastation”
(CJ §23)). Deleuze writes that for Kant the experience of sublimity “is as if the
imagination were confronted with its own limit, forced to strain to its utmost,
experiencing a violence which stretches it to the extremity of its power” (KCP 50). The
sublime is an experience of deformity that forces the Imagination violently to the very
limit of its power, and even beyond it – at least negatively. From Difference and
Repetition’s point of view, the sort of shock that has the power to awaken the faculties to
their highest power could only come from the “original violence” (DR 139) of a sensation
that has the power to contest representation itself. Sensations that have that power are
what Deleuze calls “encounters” (DR 165). The “encounter” transmits a “shock” or
“violence” from Sensibility to Thought by opposing all recognition (DR 142). Moreover,
the only way real Thought can begin is through an encounter. To borrow from Kant’s
vocabulary, Deleuze’s notion of the encounter might be thought of as a “form” of real
thought. On every important point of description – their origin, their power, their object,
and their violence – the “sublime” and the “encounter” echo one another.
However, Deleuze’s insistence in Difference and Repetition that the encounter
can only be generated from Sensibility leads to a point of potential divergence between
the theories of encounter and sublimity. In Kant’s Critical Philosophy Deleuze is careful
to clarify that for Kant while it may seem at first that Imagination experiences the
inadequacy of its power when faced with sublimity in Nature itself, it is actually Reason
that forces the Imagination to attempt comprehending the immensity and power of
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Nature. It is not Nature, but Reason’s Ideas posed as problems or limits beyond the
possibility of experience that push Imagination to the limit of its power, “forcing it to
admit that all its power is nothing in comparison to an Idea” (KCP 51). If Deleuze is right
to say that the experience of the sublime comes from Ideas and not really from Nature, it
seems that the encounter and the sublime are not entirely equivalent notions. After all, in
Kant’s Critical Philosophy the experience of the sublime is generated from Reason’s
imposition of Ideas that exceed the Imagination’s power while in Difference and
Repetition the encounter is produced from certain types of experience that strike
Sensibility as a shock. However, we argue that Deleuze’s account of Ideas as
“Questions” overcomes this apparent divergence. For Deleuze, “Questions” are
problematic Ideas in their function of forcing faculties to their transcendent exercise. In
the example of Klein’s “Blue Monochrome” we used in the previous chapter, “questions”
are what we produce when we are struck by the blueness of the painting. Questions such
as “How is this blue so different?”, “Why can I not look away?”, “Why is this so
fascinating?” “Where did this blue come from?” and “How many other colors have never
been discovered or experienced?” These questions “furnish the conditions under which
the faculties attain their superior exercise” (DR 146). When we ask these questions in
front of the “Blue Monochrome”, we are being forced to experience the blue’s
uniqueness and power – and this is what forces Sensibility to its higher exercise in
sensing the intensity of the blueness that would have been insensible from the lower
empirical use of the faculty. In Kant’s Critical Philosophy, Deleuze does not say that the
sublime does not emerge from experience but that it is the Idea that forces Imagination to
confront its limit. In the sense that “encounter” and (the form of Idea as) “Question” are
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equivalent in Deleuze’s differential theory of faculties, it draws his account of encounter
closer to Kant’s Critical Philosophy’s account of sublimity since they can both be
understood as generated from the experience of Ideas.
Difference and Repetition and Kant’s Critical Philosophy’s accounts of how
faculties achieve their “higher”, “superior” or “transcendent” forms are also remarkably
similar. For both Kant and Deleuze, a faculty’s lower form corresponds to its empirical
exercise, while its higher form corresponds to its transcendent exercise (DR 142).
In Kant’s Critical Philosophy, it is the faculties of mind that are capable of both a
higher and a lower form. In their lower form, the relation expressed by the faculties is one
of dependency. In their higher form, however, the faculties of mind become autonomous.
For Deleuze’s Kant, something is autonomous when it “finds in itself the law of its own
exercise” rather than taking it from something external (KCP 4). In other words, when the
faculty legislates over itself.
In Difference and Repetition, in its lower form the faculty grasps what can be
grasped by other faculties: it is subject to the model of recognition. In its higher or
transcendental form it grasps what it alone is capable of grasping (DR 140). The superior
or transcendent form of a faculty is characterized by Deleuze as the moment when the
faculty grasps that in the world which concerns it exclusively (what can only be sensed,
imagined, remembered or thought), in other words, its radical difference or specificity.
As we see, according to both accounts the lower form is characterized by dependency: in
Kant’s Critical Philosophy it is dependency on empirical content while in Difference and
Repetition it is dependency on the model of recognition (which is ultimately empirically
derived as well). At the level of the higher form, the picture gets a little more
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complicated. It bears suggestion that the notion of “autonomy” in Kant’s Critical
Philosophy becomes the notion of “singularity” in Difference and Repetition. Like
“autonomy”, “singularity” is attained by submission to the law – but it is a submission
that is self-generated and reveals what is most unique. As Deleuze writes in the context of
describing a relation to the law that is both contestation and resignation:
Job is infinite contestation and Abraham infinite resignation, but these are one and
the same thing. Job challenges the law in an ironic manner, refusing all secondhand explanations and dismissing the general in order to reach the most singular
as principle or as universal. Abraham submits humorously to the law, but finds in
that submission precisely the singularity of his only son whom the law
commanded him to sacrifice. (DR 8)
From Deleuze’s perspective, Job’s challenge to the law and Abraham’s submission to the
law are the same thing insofar as both reveal singularity and create singularity insofar as
they are critical attitudes that question limits in order to produce a relationship to them
that acknowledges the impossibility of getting beyond the limits and thereby operates at
the limit. For all Job’s contestation, he is still subject to the law and comes to understand
and will the law. For Abraham, his willingness to submit to the law allows the law to
release him and give him back his son. Like for Kant’s notion of freedom as submission
to the power of the moral law within oneself, the notion of singularity as self-giving of
the law combines in tense union a way of being that is both within the law and beyond
the law. According to this reading, at the level of the higher form of the faculty both
accounts agree as well. In Kant’s Critical Philosophy the higher form is autonomous
insofar as its finds its law within itself while in Difference and Repetition the higher form
is singular insofar as it discovers its own specificity by submission to its own internal law
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or principle, which Deleuze usually expresses by saying it grasps what it alone is capable
of grasping. Moreover, the higher form in both accounts is formal rather than empirical.2
It is important to note at this point that by calling the higher form of a faculty
“transcendent”, Deleuze does not mean to suggest that the faculty grasps something
outside the world, “but, on the contrary, that it grasps that in the world which concerns it
exclusively and brings it into the world”: Difference (DR 143). It is their grasping of their
own difference, precisely at the limit of what they can do, that is the key to the faculties’
transcendent exercises in both Kant’s Critical Philosophy and Difference and Repetition.
As we saw in the exegesis of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, when Imagination is forced to
its limit by the experience of the sublime, it transcends that limit (negatively) when it
internalizes what appears to be an external limitation, thereby discovering its own hidden
power and highest form. When faculties grasp their own difference they are grasping
their limit (understood as their highest power) and their transcendent exercise is not going
beyond existence but grasping that which makes them exist in their specificity or essence.
Both Difference and Repetition’s transcendental empiricism and Kant’s Critical
Philosophy’s critique identify the “transcendental” form of each faculty and how it is
achieved. But another way of putting this would be to describe both books’ approaches
through their shared function of identifying each faculty’s limits. When it comes to their
accounts of faculties, the limit is the primary concept both Difference and Repetition and
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
2

For Kant, there are two types of representations: intuitions and concepts. These two map
onto two types of faculties: Sensibility and Understanding, respectively. While both of these have
an impure, empirical aspect, they both contain a purely formal one as well. For Sensibility, the
formal aspects are the a priori forms of intuition in space and time. They are the condition of the
possibility of any intuition. The formal aspects of the Understanding, on the other hand, are the a
priori forms of concepts in the categories, or, the different ways that the unity of concepts can be
thought. Though Deleuze does not mention this characterization of the faculties’ pure and impure
forms, it neatly fits with Deleuze’s characterization of the faculties’ higher and lower forms.
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Kant’s Critical Philosophy utilize to describe each faculties’ achievement of its
transcendent exercise. A faculty achieves its higher, transcendent exercise when it is
confronted with its own limit through an experience of encounter or sublimity. Each
transcendental form designates the faculty’s powerlessness/limit at the empirical or
impure level yet its power/limit of “transcending” that empirical exercise to achieve its
formal (or pure) exercise.
The notion of the limit is another parallel in Kant’s Critical Philosophy and
Difference and Repetition. In his reading of Kant, Deleuze emphasizes how critique
attempts to identify Reason’s power in relation to each of its ends so as to enforce its
legitimate employment. This means critique attempts to ensure Reason reaches the limit
of its power without going beyond that limit. This is a subtle shift in the way Deleuze
reads limitation: no longer in terms of merely imposing a maximum by which to reign in
Reason’s ambition, but in terms of identifying the full extent of a faculty’s power.
Though critique cannot prevent Reason forming illusions, if Reason is limited to its own
realm and not allowed to attempt legislating over the phenomena of experience, its
danger is contained. This act of limitation seems primarily to impose restrictions on
Reason, but those limitations are what free Reason to pursue its legitimate employment to
the fullest. In Difference and Repetition we see the same sense of limitation at work.
Deleuze’s analyses of power proceed through an analysis of what a thing “can do”, or, a
thing’s potential. Deleuze believes that a thing’s potential can be evaluated by evaluating
its capacity to achieve and transcend its limits. Just like in Kant’s Critical Philosophy,
limitation is no longer conceived in terms of merely imposing a principle of measurement
or a maximum by which to reign in the faculty’s power, but in terms of identifying the
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full extent of a faculty’s power and the basis on which its power is deployed to its fullest.
In this new sense, limitation refers to the intrinsic power of a thing or faculty (DR 201).
Finally, we see the organizational parallel between the “common” doctrine and
the differential theory continued at the level of the (dis)unity of faculties. Deleuze’s
account of “discordant harmony” from Difference and Repetition echoes that of
“discordant accord” he attributed to Kant five years earlier in Kant’s Critical Philosophy.
In Kant’s Critical Philosophy the aesthetic common sense produced from the violent
awakening of each faculty to its power is a “discordant accord”, whereas in Difference
and Repetition the violence of the encounter with intensity is communicated from
sensibility to imagination, from imagination to memory, and from memory to thought,
producing a thought without Image that exists as a “discordant harmony” (DR 146). In
both accounts the violence of the experience of something that exceeds the faculty’s
limits forces it to its limit and transcendent exercise. As we see from the parallel notions
of sublimity and encounter, the accounts of the transcendental forms of the faculties, and
the parallel notions of “discordant harmony” and “discordant accord”, the movement
from powerlessness to the “beyond” can be understood in terms of Kant’s Critical
Philosophy and Difference and Repetition’s shared prioritization of the evaluation of
limits. The next section follows up on one last point of agreement between the “common”
doctrine of faculties and the differential theory of faculties: the notion and place of
“culture.”
3. Culture
This section on “Culture” extends the previous two sections’ work of showing a
clear parallel between the accounts of faculties in Kant’s Critical Philosophy and
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Difference and Repetition to their accounts of “culture.” The “common” doctrine of
faculties and the differential theories of faculties both point to “culture” as the principle
of the genesis of the experience of, in Kant’s Critical Philosophy, the sublime and in
Difference and Repetition, the encounter. Indeed, these books even seem to understand
culture in the same way: as a process of educational training distinct from method and
associated instead with immersive and compulsory training. While the accounts of culture
are not perfectly equivalent, the section is ultimately able to conclude that their shared
sense of “culture” as the principle of the genesis of experiencing sublimity/encounter and
as violent training points to another, even deeper, level of agreement – the practice of
critique itself.
As we saw previously, the question of “culture” for Kant and his contemporaries
was how to get the most out of humans by developing the mind through education and
training. Philosophy and what we now call the Humanities were believed to be the
primary avenue of the sort of education necessary for cultivating human minds. In his
reading of Kant, Deleuze emphasizes how the feeling of the sublime prepares humans for
the moral law, then draws attention to the proportion between one’s level of cultivation
and one’s ability to experience sublimity at all. The uncultivated are simply repelled by
sublimity. Culture, according to Deleuze’s reading of Kant, develops moral feeling. The
sublimity of Nature symbolizes the suprasensible and allows us to imagine a moral author
of the world. It is our faculty of Taste, properly cultivated, that allows us to perceive this
symbolism. Thus Deleuze can write that, “it is within this genesis [of aesthetic common
sense] that we discover that which is fundamental to our destiny” (KCP 52). For Kant,
Deleuze claims, human destiny turns out to be, the development of morality.
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In Difference and Repetition, culture is understood as “paideia”, a transliteration
of the ancient Greek !"#$%&", which means “child-rearing”, “training” or simply
“education” (DR 165). Paideia is the general process of acclimatization into a society’s
highest ideals and itself represents those ideals as a full and cohesive system. Culture,
understood is the sense of paideia, is precisely what Deleuze understands Kant means by
culture as well. What is important to note is that when Deleuze is talking about culture as
paideia, he does not mean a particular society’s culture. As we argued in the previous
chapter, Deleuze means a philosophical culture whose ideal is a constant questioning,
problematizing, and creating. The contrast between culture and method is less about the
very existence of presuppositions and more about the contingency, comprehensiveness
and involuntariness of culture and its value as a model for Deleuze’s conception of
learning as the movement from the empirical to the transcendental forms of the faculties.
Indeed, by aligning the movement of learning with that of culture, Deleuze is actually
drawing attention to his own presuppositions – that is, to his ideal of philosophy as
generating thought and breaking with doxa through the evaluation of presuppositions.
This ideal is not an empirical presupposition taken as an in-principle feature of human
nature but a starting point for philosophy that acknowledges the necessity of evaluating
every starting point – indeed, makes that evaluation the fundamental condition of
philosophizing. While it is true that for Deleuze the adventure of thought is involuntary,
Deleuze does not mean that one would not desire it. Rather, it is not something you can
will to happen at any moment. All you can do is cultivate in yourself an openness, even a
readiness, for thought – and this openness takes the form of training in evaluating
presuppositions. This training in evaluating presuppositions is what Deleuze understands
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culture to offer. This is why it was argued in the previous chapter that the training offered
by culture is the principle of the genesis of the experience of the encounter. Without it,
the encounter might arrive while the thinker looks right past it, unable to perceive in it
what is so unique and resistant to recognition. Thought comes like a “Eureka!” moment
or a sudden revolutionary Idea. But such Ideas only come to those who have cultivated
the openness, understanding, and ingenuity for them. “Culture” develops openness to the
encounter. This means not only the open-mindedness to perceive an encounter, but also
the willingness to go out and look for it for yourself and in your habits. It develops in
people the habit (even the need) to dare to think. Cultivation through doing philosophy
opens thinkers to the experience of the encounter by giving the thinker tools for
generating thought and breaking with doxa.
If our level of culture determines the degree to which we experience sublimity or
encounter, the question we must pose is: What determines the proper culture we should
pursue in order to develop this capacity? While Deleuze does not explicitly answer this
question in Difference and Repetition, the parallels drawn so far between his and Kant’s
theories of faculties suggest understanding the answer best suited to Deleuze’s work as
structurally parallel with Kant’s answer: critique.
At the core of Deleuze’s reading of Kant is that what Kant takes to be the proper
form of cultivation of moral feeling is discovered through critique. According to
Deleuze’s reading, for Kant, Reason’s ends form Culture and since critique is what
determines Reason’s ends, critique is also the instrument of the establishment of the
system of Culture. This is because what counts as Culture (and therefore what counts as
proper cultivation) is determined by the original decision of what counts as an end of
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Reason. The central task of Kant’s critique is a self-reflexive examination by Reason of
its own ends, which establishes what Reason’s ends are, its limits or powers and the
conditions of its harmonization with the other faculties. Since critique establishes what
counts as an end of Reason, it also determines what counts as proper Culture.
To what extent is Deleuze’s answer to the question of what form of culture we
should pursue to develop our capacity to experience encounter parallel with the one we
attribute to Kant? A full argument for this must wait for the next section, but the main
conclusion is that all of the parallels being drawn between the “common” doctrine of
faculties and the differential theory of faculties point to a common practice between
Kant’s Critical Philosophy and Difference and Repetition. That common practice is
critique. As we just saw, for Kant, the system of Culture is determined by Reason’s
highest ends and those ends are determined by Critique since Critique is Reason’s selfevaluation of its own ends. For Deleuze, it makes sense to propose both that the system of
Culture is determined by Thought’s highest power – that is, by a Thought without Image
or by the production of Ideas – and that the highest power of Thought is determined by
critique since critique (as will be argued for more fully in the next section) is what
identifies, evaluates, and determines the means of realizing the highest intrinsic power of
each of the faculties.
While the accounts of culture in Difference and Repetition and Kant’s Critical
Philosophy agree about culture’s definition and place, there is an important difference as
well. In Kant, Deleuze emphasizes how culture prepares humans for the feeling of the
sublime, which in turn prepares humans for the moral law. It is our faculty of Taste,
properly cultivated, that allows us to experience in the sublimity of Nature a symbol of
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the suprasensible. Since the faculty of Taste was always within humans and only needed
to be drawn out by proper cultivation, what this capacity to feel the suprasensible
symbolized in Nature shows is that it is our human destiny to develop morality. In
Difference and Repetition, on the other hand, the system of Culture is determined by
Thought’s highest form, which is in turn determined by critique. Since critique is
immanent, it is not determined by any particular goal or destiny beyond Deleuze’s selfacknowledged definition of philosophy as “breaking with doxa” – in other words, finding
a “way out” by creating something new. So, while Kant’s Critical Philosophy and
Difference and Repetition’s accounts of culture are not perfectly equivalent, their shared
sense of “culture” as the principle of the genesis of experiencing sublimity/encounter and
as philosophical training points to another level of agreement – the practice of critique
itself. This argument is taken up again in the next subsection that outlines the internal
logical parallels between the “common” doctrine of faculties and the differential theory
of faculties.
ii. Logic
The overall argument of the present chapter’s first section on the “The “common”
doctrine and the differential theory is that in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze adopts
both the structure and logic of the doctrine of faculties he attributed to Kant five years
earlier in Kant’s Critical Philosophy. We addressed the structural parallels between these
accounts of faculties in the previous subsection on “Structure”. This subsection on
“Logic” addresses the parallel internal logics operational within both of these accounts of
faculties. These parallels are mapped in three parts: each theory’s conception of the
relation between violence and powerlessness, activity and passivity, and immanence and
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the transcendent “beyond”. It ultimately concludes that that the similarities between
Deleuze’s account of Kant’s doctrine of faculties in Kant’s Critical Philosophy and
Deleuze’s own differential theory of faculties in Difference and Repetition point to
another similarity at the level of the immanent critical approach itself.
1. Violence and Powerlessness
As we have seen, according to Deleuze’s reading in Kant’s Critical Philosophy,
Kantian critique analyzes faculties on the basis of their limits or intrinsic power. What
Deleuze uncovers in his reading of Kant’s critical project is a complex logic by which a
form of violence produces powerlessness that becomes power through a process of
internalization. We see this logic operating at the very inception of Kant’s project. His
description of the development of the critical perspective is a perfect example.
Kant begins with the description of a problem that “awoke” him from his
“dogmatic slumber.” Hume’s skeptical attack on causal reasoning forces Kant to
acknowledge how difficult it is to justify knowledge claims. The attempts up to Kant’s
time to ground the relationship between the subject and object were unsatisfactory.
Kant’s frustration and avowed sense of powerlessness in the face of Hume’s criticism led
him to reverse the terms of the discussion. Instead of supposing that our knowledge must
conform to objects, Kant suggests that we consider how objects might conform to our
knowledge (CPR Bxvi). Knowledge thus depends on the capacities or faculties of the
knower rather than the object itself. The logic of this is that the problem (Hume’s
criticisms) imposes itself violently, forcing Kant to acknowledge his (and indeed all of
our) limitations – yet it is these same limitations that open a new path: knowers are
limited by what they can know, so if we focus on those limitations (i.e. the faculties of
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knowing themselves) we can move “beyond” them to built a foundation for knowledge in
general. The “beyond” Kant derives are his much-contested “synthetic a prioris.”
This same logic is repeated in Kant’s account of the genesis of aesthetic common
sense from the experience of sublimity in the Critique of Judgment. The experience of the
sublime forces humans to measure themselves against the apparent omnipotence of
nature. It forces humans to accept their own limitation and insufficiency, but at the same
time allows them to discover in their own limited and insufficient faculty of Reason a
presentation of the “infinite”, of their own souls as foundations of the aesthetic common
sense and of their own superiority over nature. According to the terms of the “logic”
described above, the sublime is the violent shock that awakens the faculty of Imagination
to its powerlessness – stretching it “to the extremity of its power” (KCP 50) – but that
powerlessness is internalized when it represents “to itself the inaccessibility of the
rational Idea” represented in the sublime and makes this inaccessibility “something which
is present in sensible nature” (KCP 51). Human Imagination thus “exceeds” its own
limits by grasping what is at the very limit of its power.
We find this very same logic reappearing in Deleuze’s differential theory of
faculties in Difference and Repetition. There, the violence of the encounter plunges each
faculty in its turn into an involuntary adventure in which the faculty “is born to the
extreme point of its dissolution” where it confronts what is, for it, ungraspable from the
point of view of its empirical exercise. However, that limitation leads the faculty to its
transcendent exercise where it grasps what that faculty alone can grasp. Each faculty thus
discovers its unique power as its limit or powerlessness at the level of its empirical
exercise. For instance, the faculty of thought, when confronted with what it alone is
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capable of grasping, finds its singularity in grasping the cogitandum. The faculty is able
to separate and “transcend” its lower, empirical exercise because of the violence of facing
its limit or powerlessness in the face of something that exceeds its empirical powers. It is
thus that powerlessness is reconceived by Deleuze as the “greatest power.” This is
because it is the “power” of the limit as the final power of thought that connects it with
the unthinkable in the encounter. The forms in which this powerlessness come to thought
are “[i]mperatives in the form of questions…[that] point which designates 'the
impossibility of thinking that is thought', that point at which 'powerlesness' is transmuted
into power, that point which develops in the work in the form of a problem” (DR 199).
Of course, Deleuze utilizes the notion of limitation rather than power because at
the level of faculties it is not really power that drives the movement from sensibility to
thought, but powerlessness. Deleuze associates powerlessness with “real limits” early in
Difference and Repetition (DR 13). Right at the origin of thought, in passive syntheses,
Deleuze claims that there are powers inherent to sensibility but these powers are passive
powers. That is why the superior form of sensibility, the “very being of the sensible” is
revealed in “what can only be sensed” (DR 57). What can only be sensed is the limit and
highest power of sensibility. But the limit and highest power is indistinguishable from
powerlessness in the sense that each expresses impossibility from the point of view of the
empirical exercise of the faculty. Even the importance of violence in the encounter is
conceived in terms of powerlessness. Under the influence of the encounter, faculties
transmit their constraint (that is, their powerlessness) from one to the other. As Deleuze
writes:
Henceforth, thought is also forced to think its central collapse, its fracture, its own
natural “powerlessness” which is indistinguishable from the greatest power - in
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other words, from those unformulated forces, the cogitanda, as though from so
many thefts or trespasses in thought. (DR 147)
The relationship Deleuze has to Kant can be summarized as such: Deleuze sees in Kant’s
critical perspective something deeply illuminating, but Kant betrayed that perspective,
forcing Deleuze to work against him in the interest of rescuing what Deleuze considers
still valuable. That is why we get a kind of double reading of Kant in Deleuze’s use/abuse
of him that seems so deeply conflicted. This logic recurs in Deleuze’s simultaneous use
of the dynamic between activity and passivity suggested by Kant’s introduction of the
empty form of Time into the I with his attempt to criticize and distance his theory from
what he perceives as a betrayal of that dynamic in Kant’s hard distinction between
passive and active faculties.
2. Activity and Passivity
Deleuze calls the problem to which he is responding the problem of
“extrinsicism.” It is the problem, first identified by Salomon Maïmon, of positing the
passive faculty of sensibility and the active faculty of understanding as different in kind –
and thus still subject to a substance dualism that only a pre-established harmony or
constant divine intervention could overcome (DR 180). Kant’s original goal had been to
overcome the dualism of subject and object by repositioning the problems at the level of
the conditions of experience. This is the move that has Kant bringing the level of analysis
to the faculties in the first place. However, the subject/object dualism was not overcome
in this move, merely pushed back to the level of the relation between the “passive”
faculty of sensibility and the “active” faculties of understanding, reason, and imagination.
While Deleuze acknowledges that Kant attempts to deal with the problem, he argues that
all of his attempts fail until Kant can develop the genetic approach that shows how
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common sense is produced from sensibility.3 While Deleuze does not explicitly state this,
it is clear from what he takes from Kant that he thought the genetic approach as Kant first
articulated it was not sufficient. Kant must supplement the genetic approach with a
deeper understanding of passivity.
As it happens, Deleuze thinks there are resources within Kant for such a deeper
understanding: the relationship of Time to the self. For Kant, Time is the condition of
experiencing the self. Kant also calls Time the “form of inner sense” because it is the
means by which the mind intuits itself (CPR B49). What changes with Kant, Deleuze
explains, is that the difference between thought and being becomes interiorized within
unconscious thought through “the pure and empty form of time.” In the terms he uses to
describe this in the context of Kant’s reading of Descartes, the “I am” (being) and the “I
think” (thought) in the unconscious “self” (DR 86). The empty form of Time thereby
“fractures” the “I” into passive and active forces. Hereafter, the spontaneity and
immediacy of self-consciousness that Descartes took for granted must be replaced with a
passive self “which experiences its own thought – its own intelligence, that by virtue of
which it can say I – being exercised in it and upon it but not by it” (DR 86). “Here
begins”, Deleuze augurs, “a long and inexhaustible story: I is an other, or the paradox of
inner sense” (DR 86). The self is passive and unconscious, and another way of talking
about it is in terms of the “soul” to which Kant attributes the aesthetic common sense, or
even the contemplative soul of Deleuze.
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
3

Kant dealt with this problem in two ways: first by developing an account of a synthesis
carried out by the imagination that applies the understanding’s form of unity to sensations (thus
mediating between the passive and active faculties), then by hypothesizing the “common sense”
as a necessary condition to explain the harmony between all the faculties (DR 173, CPR
A326/B383-4, CPR A669/B697).
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At the end of Deleuze’s analysis of the experience of the sublime, what
guarantees that the discord amongst the faculties will produce an accord – that is, a
unitary subject and stable objects – is not simply the unity of apperception required for
knowledge but on a deeper level the “soul” from which the “common sense” arises. If we
recall from the first chapter, Kant’s term for soul, “Seele”, must be distinguished from
“Geist” or spirit (CJ §49 “On the faculties of the mind that constitute genius”). Seele is
the totality of all psychic processes, i.e., it is a comprehensive term that Kant uses to
describe an element containing all the faculties (5:177, 5:197). Geist is an “animating
principle” within the soul, which Kant defines as “the capacity for representing a
sublimity in objects” (CJ: “First Introduction: XII Division of the Critique of the Power
of Judgment”). That is, spirit is a faculty belonging within the soul while the soul is
ultimately what unifies the faculties. The expansion or elevation of the soul prepares
humans “for a sovereignty in which reason alone shall have power” (CJ §83).
From Deleuze’s perspective there are at least two problems with Kant’s
introduction of the active synthetic identity. First: Kant assumes that since synthesis is
active it is a power whereas passivity, as simple receptivity, is powerless. But perhaps
there is a passive synthesis that Kant did not anticipate? Deleuze suggests that if the
Kantian initiative were to be taken up, passivity must be reconceived not only as the
power of experiencing affections but as the power of habituation (or “contemplationcontraction” (DR 87)) – what Deleuze refers to as a “powerlessness which is
indistinguishable from the greatest power” (DR 147). For Deleuze, rather than
understanding the faculties as the sources of representations, the faculties are sources of
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pre-representational affects: sensation, memory, images, and thoughts (that in fact resist
representation) (DR 71-75).
3. Immanence and the Transcendent “Beyond”
When Deleuze describes a faculty going “beyond” its limits, it is not actually
exceeding its limits but achieving its highest intrinsic power. Kant’s Critical Philosophy
describes it as the faculty going beyond its limit “in a negative fashion” (KCP 51).
Deleuze dismissively refers to Kant’s use of “transcendental” because Deleuze thinks
there is no need to offer a new designation – he believes that the idea of immanence does
the work of the transcendental in the sense that immanence identifies and analyses the
level of faculties. He seems to be substituting the idea of immanence for that of the “socalled transcendental” in his later work in Difference and Repetition.
Once again the similarities between Deleuze’s account of Kant’s doctrine of
faculties in Kant’s Critical Philosophy and Deleuze’s own differential theory of faculties
in Difference and Repetition point to another similarity at the level of the immanent
critical approach itself. Yet, this conclusion must be argued for directly, not just on the
basis of a set of suggestive parallels. The next section on “Deleuze’s Immanent Critique”
gives this argument.
b. Deleuze’s Immanent Critique
Section II of Chapter Three argues that in Difference and Repetition Deleuze
takes up in a modified form the immanent critique he attributes to Kant in Kant’s Critical
Philosophy and that this modified version of immanent critique has an important practical
dimension. The section is thus divided into two primary arguments. First, support is
gathered for the argument that Deleuze uses a form of Kantian immanent critique by
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showing that not only does Deleuze explicitly link the model of transcendental
philosophy to his attempt to produce a thought without Image, but that the way he
describes the problematic animating his discourse is remarkably similar to the way he
describes Kant’s. This argument is developed in the subsection called “Immanent
Critique in Difference and Repetition.” It agues that the critical perspective in both Kant’s
Critical Philosophy and Difference and Repetition is defined by parallel objects and
levels of analysis, a parallel set of practices, as well as a similar internal logic. However,
this section also acknowledges that there is a crucial difference between the Kantian and
Deleuzian forms of critique that has to do with Deleuze’s criticism of Kant’s failure to
put into question the “truths” of morality. Second, support is gathered for the argument
that Deleuze’s way of using critique can be understood as offering an ethos of evaluation
in the subsection titles “Deleuze’s Critique as an Ethos of Evaluation.” This can be
shown through an analysis of the practical dimension of descriptions of philosophy as the
evaluation of presuppositions and of critique as self-evaluative and affirmative, through
situating Deleuze’s use of critique within Foucault’s later association of critique with
ethos in “What is Enlightenment”, and through an interpretation of the figures of the
Russian idiot and Apprentice as practical personae modeling a way of living Deleuze’s
critical philosophy.
i. Immanent Critique in Difference and Repetition
1. Level of Analysis
Deleuze criticizes images of Thought modeled on recognition in Difference and
Repetition because they base their “supposed principle upon extrapolation from certain
facts, particularly insignificant facts such as Recognition, everyday banality in person; as
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though thought should not seek its models among stranger and more compromising
adventures” (DR 135). And in the sentence immediately following this suggestion that
Thought seek its models among “stranger…adventures” than recognition, Deleuze writes
that we should “Take the example of Kant: of all philosophers, Kant is the one who
discovers the prodigious domain of the transcendental” (DR 135). What Deleuze is
suggesting is that we replace the model of recognition, which was determined to
represent all thought by extrapolation from banal empirical observations, with a “stranger
and more compromising” model based on Kant’s transcendental analysis. In Kant’s
Critical Philosophy, the discovery and analysis of the transcendental is the function of
critique. Deleuze sees a valuable tool for the discovery of thought without Image in the
model Kant’s critique provides. When Deleuze suggests Kant’s discovery of “the
prodigious domain of the transcendental” as the model for the discovery of a thought
without Image he is advocating a return to Kantian critique understood as an examination
of the structure and limitations of the faculties (DR 135). Deleuze believes such a critique
can reveal the real interplay of powers beneath the dogmatic Image’s presupposed unity
of the subject and that in so doing the dogmatic Image can be resisted and thought freed
from the necessity of forming a new Image. Not only is the critique a valuable tool for the
discovery of a thought without Image, it is a valuable tool in such a thought’s creation.
Deleuze’s references to his own philosophical practices frequently invoke the
level of the transcendental associated with critique and even the idea of critique itself. He
writes in the Preface to the English edition of Difference & Repetition that, “as long as
the critique has not been carried to the heart of [the dogmatic Image of thought] it is
difficult to conceive of thought…as attaining that which forces us to think” (DR xvi).
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Critique must be a “rigorous struggle against” the dogmatic Image (DR 132). It must
destroy the dogmatic Image of thought in order to liberate thought from the
presuppositions that chain it to repetitions of the same: what is already recognized,
recognizable, known and knowable. These descriptions of critique align it with the
primary goal of Deleuze’s Difference & Repetition: discovering a way of thinking that
does not merely reproduce under new names the old forms of thinking and in addition
resists stagnating into simply another form of thinking. For Deleuze, philosophy means
breaking with doxa. However, Deleuze chooses to call his own philosophical approach in
Difference and Repetition “transcendental empiricism” rather than “critique.” What we
see, however, is that the distinction between critique and transcendental empiricism is
primarily verbal. While Deleuze sees serious flaws in the way Kant deployed critique, he
is unequivocally convinced of the power and value of the immanent critical practice
itself. Before describing the ways in which Deleuze’s understanding of the ideal critique
differs from his understanding of Kant’s actual practice of critique, first the analysis
focuses on Deleuze’s ideal of critique itself and how it is derived from his work on Kant.
First, it is helpful to show how Deleuze’s way of describing the problematic
animating his discourse is remarkably similar to Kant’s. In the first pages of Kant’s
Critical Philosophy, Deleuze shows how Kant’s very definition of philosophy reveals a
“struggle…against empiricism and against dogmatic rationalism” (KCP 1). While it may
seem that empiricism and dogmatic rationalism share little, from Deleuze’s reading of
Kant’s perspective both are predicated on the assumption that reason’s ends are not
determined by reason itself but are determined externally and that therefore they both
require the additional assumption of a pre-established harmony to account for the relation
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of subject and object. The important features of the problem for Kant’s Critical
Philosophy are the assumption of the externality of Reason’s ends and the assumption of
a pre-established harmony to overcome that externality. On the other side, the first pages
of the third chapter of Difference and Repetition begin with a meditation on the problem
of beginning in philosophy. The problem, as Deleuze sees it, is that “beginning means
eliminating all presuppositions”, but the history of philosophy is dogged by a subjective
presupposition that links thinking itself with simple recognition (DR 129). The problem
with using recognition as the model for all thought is that recognition requires the
presupposition of a “common sense” as condition of the harmony of faculties necessary
for recognition to take place. This “common sense” is external to thought but nonetheless
pre-establishes what can count as thought. The important features of the problem are the
externality of “common sense” to Thought yet common sense’s necessary assumption for
pre-establishing both Thought’s equivalence with recognition and the harmony between
faculties recognition represents. What we see from these descriptions is that the Kant of
Kant’s Critical Philosophy and the Deleuze of Difference and Repetition are both
troubled by explanations of our faculties that assume something external to the faculties
and are then forced to assume a pre-established harmony to make the assumption of
externality work. In other words, both books begin their philosophical inquiries by
problematizing transcendence.
What Deleuze gains by describing Kant’s difference from empiricism and
dogmatic rationalism in terms of an opposing account of the source of reason’s ends is a
catalyst to foreground the significance of the ideal of immanence in the critical approach.
And indeed Kant’s Critical Philosophy and Difference and Repetition’s shared
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reservations about transcendence lead them both to adopt a critical point of view defined
by immanence. But that is not all their approaches have in common. Besides the parallel
at the level of analysis, their critiques have parallel objects, sets of practices, and internal
logics.
2. Object of Analysis
In Kant’s Critical Philosophy Deleuze introduces the idea of “immanent critique”
as the “so-called transcendental method” that seeks to determine “the true nature of
reason’s interests or ends” and “the means of realizing these interests” (KCP 3). Deleuze
treats the concepts “immanent” and “transcendental” as equivalent, which explains his
off-handed reference to Kant’s critique as the “so-called” transcendental method. What
makes a critique immanent/transcendental is that it aims at a level between transcendent
objects and the subject’s inner experience of those objects: the level that makes the
relation between those two possible. For Deleuze’s reading of Kant as well as for his own
work in Difference and Repetition, that level is the level of the faculties. How the level of
faculties is attained reveals a move characteristic of immanent critique: what we have
been calling “internalizing” problems. When confronted with a problem, such as that of
subject/object dualism, immanent critique seeks the internal forces that gave rise to the
problem. Those internal forces refer to the faculties as capacities for experience. This
explains why for both thinkers immanent critique’s proper object is the faculties. After
identifying the faculties, immanent critique must explain them in terms that are internal to
the faculties themselves. Thus the faculties are described in terms of their intrinsic power,
which can be determined by identifying each faculty’s limits. Christian Kerslake
anticipated this reading when he wrote that,

147

we are now to understand the goal of critique as the full realization of reason’s
power to problematize. The critique of the ‘natural’ state of reason, which
involves the isolaton of the difference in kind of reason from the other faculties
will thus facilitate the realization of reason. (496)4
What Deleuze points out is that a truly immanent critique condemns not only faculties’
attempts to exceed their limits but also their failures to reach their limits. This reveals
another characteristic of immanent critique: its goal of determining the means of realizing
the faculties’ superior exercise at the limit of what they can do.5
Kant’s Critical Philosophy and Difference and Repetition’s critiques run parallel
at the level of their object since for both the proper object of critique is the faculties. As
we saw in the previous section, however, (and in contrast with Kerslake’s reading as
quoted above) Kant’s faculty of Reason becomes Deleuze’s faculty of Thought. So, while
for Kant the immanent critique seeks to determine the “true nature of reason’s interests or
ends” and “the means of realizing those interests”, for Deleuze immanent critique seeks
to determine the true nature of all of the faculties and the means of realizing each of their
superior exercises. This marks a subtle shift in the definition of critique. Critique, we now
see, is an examination of the structure and limitations of power rather than simply of
Reason. It is only by proceeding through an analysis of how each faculty achieves its
limit or superior exercise that Deleuze can develop an account of Thought without Image
in Difference and Repetition.
3. Sets of practices
Furthermore, there is a parallel between Kant’s Critical Philosophy and
Difference and Repetition’s critical practice. This parallel is evident when each of their
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
4

Christian Kerslake, Deleuze and the Unconcious (New York: Continuum, 2007).

5

It also anticipates one of the practical facets hidden within this theory.
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critiques seeks the genesis of experience rather than the conditions of experience. The
difference between genesis and conditioning is that while genesis describes the
emergence of a phenomenon, conditions hypothesize facts without which the
phenomenon would not exist. In other words, while a conditioning account identifies
facts external to the phenomenon at issue, a genetic account offers an internal
determination of what makes a phenomenon what it is. We saw in the first Chapter how
much of Deleuze’s reading of Kant’s critical project was defined by what Deleuze calls
“conditioning” critique rather than “genetic” critique. While Deleuze claims that Kant did
the immanent internalizing move of shifting the problem of the relation of subject and
object to one of the relation of the subjective faculties of sensibility and understanding,
since the faculties of sensibility and understanding (like all the faculties for Kant) differ
in nature the question of how passive sensibility and active understanding achieve an
accord remained. According to Deleuze, Kant’s attempt to introduce “common sense” as
an inherent “good nature of the faculties” to explain their accord implicitly transposed the
very assumption of pre-established harmony his immanent critique was developed to
reject (KCP 22). On Deleuze’s reading, however, Kant realized this difficulty and
understood that unless he could provide a genetic (not just conditioning) account of
common sense as principle of the accord of faculties the immanence of the critical
perspective would be lost and his entire critical philosophy would fail (KCP 23). Thus
was born, Deleuze suggests, Kant’s account of the genesis of aesthetic common sense
from the experience of sublimity in the Critique of Judgment. It is this account that
Deleuze uses as the model for how Thought realizes its superior exercise by producing a
thought without Image.
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4. Internal logics
Finally, there is also a parallel present between Kant’s Critical Philosophy and
Difference and Repetition’s critiques at the level of their internal logics. In the Critique of
Pure Reason critique is evaluative, limiting, and even destructive. Yet, these apparently
negative activities make something positive possible (CPR Bxxiv-xxv). For Kant,
critique’s limiting of speculative reason frees us to pursue “an absolutely necessary
practical use of pure reason”: realizing moral good in the world (CPR Bxxv). Critique’s
limitations and evaluations are in the service of realizing the interests of the faculty of
Reason. What this means is that critical evaluation, limitation, and destruction are
positive and creative. In Difference and Repetition, critique is the genesis of the
realization of a faculty’s superior exercise through limitation (it is out of limitation that
higher power is created). Destruction and violence in Deleuze are emphasized.
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze admires Kant’s critique for revealing the
transcendental realm (DR 135), for bringing Time into the conditions of experience, for
inaugurating the idea of the passive self (DR 86), for its substitution of the idea of
internal illusions for the concept of error (DR 136), for its simultaneously destructive and
creative capacity (DR 132, 139), and for that brief moment in the Critique of Judgment
when it reveals sublimity engendering aesthetic common sense and thereby rises above
its simple standpoint of conditioning to achieve that of genesis. But while Deleuze argues
that Kant seemed poised to sweep away the dogmatic Image of thought with his critique,
from Deleuze’s perspective Kantian critique ultimately fails. Kant’s critique fails for
several reasons. It elevates simple empirical examples to transcendental models (the
problem of “psychologism”) (DR 135), it does not overcome the dualism of concept and
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intuition, the standpoint of conditioning, or the understanding of problems in terms of
their solvability (the problem of “extrinsicism”). Yet, all of these reasons why critique
failed can be explained by reference to one fatal flaw: Kant’s failure to push his thought
beyond common sense and its moral conformism. This flaw is what Deleuze calls Kant’s
“moralism” (DR 4, 132, 197). It is so fundamental that the dogmatic Image of thought is
synonymously referred to throughout Difference and Repetition as the “moral Image” of
thought (DR 131). Deleuze contests the dogmatic Image of thought in the way that he
claims Kant could not: by treating it to a “radical critique” (DR 132). According to this
radical critique, the Kantian critical model Deleuze has laid out must undergo its own
critique – and submit to a series of radical modifications aimed at the “common sense”
presuppositions Deleuze believes Kant failed to abandon. These “common sense”
presuppositions are knowledge, morality and faith and by refusing to put them into
question, Deleuze suggests that Kant’s critique is ultimately respectful of everything for
which the dogmatic Image of thought stands. And so Deleuze laments that Kant fails to
take his critique far enough – but does not seem to consider this an inherent failure of the
critical project itself. Rather than abandon the project of critique Deleuze attempts to
renew it. Deleuze’s radical critique thus does not begin by overthrowing the original
Kantian initiative (namely, the effort to turn the examination of the relationships and
limits of power inward) but by applying that initiative to a systematic evaluation of the
dogmatic Image of thought and the moral imperative on which it is built (DR 173/132).
Only after producing the radical critique will Deleuze be in a position to offer a new,
differential, theory of faculties and a thought “freed” from any Image. Deleuze writes that
a philosophy without presuppositions:
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would take as its point of departure a radical critique of th[e dogmatic] image and
the ‘postulates’ it implies. It would find its difference or its true beginning, not in
an agreement with the pre-philosophical Image but in a rigorous struggle against
this image, which it would denounce as non-philosophical. (DR 173/132)
For Deleuze, critique must be a “rigorous struggle against” the dogmatic Image (DR
132). It must destroy the dogmatic Image of thought in order to liberate thought from the
presuppositions that chain it to repetitions of the same: what is already recognized,
recognizable, known and knowable. Deleuze writes in the Preface to the English edition
of Difference & Repetition that, “as long as the critique has not been carried to the heart
of [the dogmatic Image of thought] it is difficult to conceive of thought…as attaining that
which forces us to think” (DR xvi). And this, as we saw previously, is the primary goal of
Deleuze’s Difference & Repetition: to discover a way of thinking that does not merely
reproduce under new names the old forms of thinking and in addition resists stagnating
into simply another form of thinking. As the language of destruction implies, radical
critique of the dogmatic Image of thought is violence against what is presupposed as
legitimate. But this “destruction” is not the type that denies difference “so as to conserve
or prolong an established historical order” (DR 53). Destruction “speaks in the name of a
creative power, capable of overturning all orders and representations in order to affirm
Difference in the state of permanent revolution which characterizes eternal return” (DR
53). “The liberation of thought from those Images which imprison it” is the condition for
the discovery of a “thought that can begin to think and continually begin again” (DR
132). Deleuze is looking for no less than a thought without Image that bears within it
resources to resist ever becoming an Image. So, even thought this destruction is carried
out in the name of a thought without Image, since the thought without Image is not a new
Image of thought – it does not establish a new value according to which legitimacy can
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be measured. Deleuze’s critique produces a genetic account of the creation of thought and
Ideas through an evaluation of the power immanent to each faculty. This work is built on
critique understood in its most radical form as an ethos of evaluation and creation.
ii. Deleuze’s Critique as an Ethos of Evaluation
The first part of the present chapter’s second Section on “Immanent Critique in
Difference and Repetition” argued that in Difference and Repetition Deleuze takes up in a
modified form the immanent critique he attributes to Kant in Kant’s Critical Philosophy.
The second part of this Section argues that this modified version of immanent critique has
an important practical dimension as an ethos of evaluation. It does this through
descriptions of the practical dimension of Deleuze’s descriptions of philosophy as the
evaluation of presuppositions and of critique as self-evaluative and affirmative, through
situating Deleuze’s use of critique within Foucault’s later association of Kantian critique
with ethos in “What is Enlightenment” (1984), and through an interpretation of the
figures of the Russian idiot and Apprentice as practical personae modeling a way of
living Deleuze’s critical philosophy.
1. The Practical Dimension of Evaluating Presuppositions
There is a practical dimension to descriptions of philosophy as the evaluation of
presuppositions and of critique as self-evaluation and affirmation. Deleuze’s ideal of
philosophy as the evaluation of presuppositions (breaking with doxa) acknowledges the
necessity of evaluating every starting point – indeed, it makes that evaluation the
fundamental condition of philosophizing. However, it is important that Deleuze does not
mean evaluation as an attempt at attaining a point of view beyond presuppositions.
Presuppositions – and indeed, the entire structure of recognition/representation – are
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constitutive of any experience and any situation. As such, it would be meaningless to get
rid of them. Without presuppositions, we would not be conscious at all. This includes the
set of presuppositions encapsulated by the dogmatic Image of thought. Like Kant’s
“transcendental illusions”, we cannot do without them even though they lead us into
error. If there is no way to get definitively beyond presuppositions, the next best
alternative is adopting a critical attitude toward them. What this means is developing a
critical attitude toward yourself. After all, the nearly paradoxical idea of the self-judging
of reason by reason is what Deleuze identifies as the “essential principle” of an
“immanent critique” (KCP 3). Critique is self-evaluation at the transcendental level of the
faculties. Reason’s inner conflict does play an important role in Deleuze’s reading of
Kant, but not as the motivating force behind the necessity of philosophical inquiry. It
turns out that this conflict is the force of critique. Critique problematizes through its selfevaluations. Though critique cannot get us beyond presuppositions, it can put those
presuppositions in question. That is why critique is not described as a method once
applied and done forever. It has got to be a way of life or it does not work. This is
because there is no “beyond” presuppositions. They must always be evaluated and as they
reform they must be evaluated again. Deleuze is hostile to the notion of method because a
method implies a pre-established goal and a correct path to achieve it. As we have seen,
critique is not associated with method but with culture. That is, with the formative forces
representing the ideals of (for Deleuze) philosophy itself. Critique must be something
lived. It is in this sense that I call critique an ethos. For ethos is a way of living that
represents one’s ideals. The ideal of critical philosophy is to cultivate in yourself an
openness, even a readiness, for encounter and thought.
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What is most interesting about the Deleuzian practice of critique is that it is not a
matter of moving beyond the presuppositions encapsulated by the dogmatic Image of
thought, but of affirming them in their danger. We cannot do without presuppositions
even though they subject us to conformity and rob us of our power of thinking newness.
Deleuze’s solution is to subject the presupposition to a critique that does not try to avoid
presuppositions but to affirm them. Such an affirmation is transformative and I associate
it with the logic of interiorization identified in both Kant’s Critical Philosophy and
Difference and Repetition in the context of faculties’ movement “beyond” their limits.
This affirmative, active and transformative critique is an ethos of evaluation. Though one
cannot get definitively beyond the limits imposed by the subjective presuppositions of the
dogmatic Image of thought, those limits can be affirmed by evaluating them as the grid
through which ones sees the world. This affirmation can then tell us something about our
world at the level of how social forces work through us.
Thus the particular ways in which Deleuze uses critique in Difference and
Repetition as a form of affirmative self-evaluation reveals a practical dimension to his
critical practice. This interpretation finds further (albeit indirect) support by looking at
the similarities between Deleuze’s way of understanding critique and Michel Foucault’s
later association of critique with ethos in his famous essay, “What is Enlightenment?”.6
2. Foucault’s association of Kantian critique with an ethos
In the essay “What is Enlightenment”, Foucault explicitly links Kantian critique
with the Greek notion of ethos. Foucault begins the essay by drawing attention to the
originality of the text’s conception of the present. Foucault argues that Kant conceives of
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
6

Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” in Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow
(New York, Pantheon Books, 1984) 32-50.
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his present, “the Enlightenment”, as a “way out” – both as a process that releases us from
our state of immaturity and as “an act of courage” in which we leave behind the comforts
of authority and put our own Reason to use. For Foucault, the moment when we begin to
reason for ourselves is the moment when critique is most necessary “since its role is that
of defining the conditions under which the use of Reason is legitimate in order to
determine what can be known, what must be done, and what may be hoped.” Once we
have taken the responsibility for using our own Reason to make decisions, critique is
necessary in order to guide our Reason to the best decisions. Critique is the “handbook”
for a “way out.” It is only after the legitimate uses of Reason have been defined that
Foucault claims, “autonomy can be assured” from the Enlightenment perspective. Not
only does Foucault call the Enlightenment the “age of critique”, he suggests reconceiving the Enlightnment as an “attitude” of critique rather than a period of history.
By “attitude” Foucault means
a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain
people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and
behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents
itself as a task. A bit, no doubt, like what the Greeks called an ethos. (39)
In other words, for Foucault the Enlightenment exists as an attitude or ethos that
expresses a relationship to oneself defined by critique. What Foucault believes connects
us to the Enlightenment is a “philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent
critique of our historical era.” Foucault goes on in this essay to claim that the
philosophical ethos he is describing is a “limit-attitude.” We (and our critical ethos)
cannot be for or against the Enlightenment since it is a philosophical ethos that expresses
a permanent critique of our own historical era – indeed, of ourselves as historical artifacts
insofar as it is an evaluation of the limits of Reason. Foucault considers reconceiving of
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critique, of transforming the “critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a
practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression.” What defines our own
present according to Foucault is imagining it otherwise than it is, and transforming it not
by destroying it but by grasping it in what it is. This ethos defined by critique necessitates
a permanent creation of ourselves. It would not be merely descriptive, it would be
practical and it would take its goal to be resisting the forms of experience that constrain
us. As Foucault elegantly puts it:
The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory,
a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it
has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the
critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the
limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going
beyond them (42).
In other words, this ethos of critique that necessitates self-evaluation and creation through
historical analysis of our external as well as internal limits defines a philosophical way of
living that permanently seeks autonomy.
Thought Foucault’s essay was not written until many years after Deleuze’s
Difference and Repetition, it explicitly develops the very point of view this dissertation
argues is operating implicitly in Deleuze’s work. It is well known that Deleuze and
Foucault were intellectual peers and even friends through much of their lives. Though it
would be outside the purview of the present argument to discuss in detail the differences
and similarities between Deleuze and Foucault’s philosophical points of view, it
nonetheless lends credence to this dissertation’s reading of Deleuze’s use of critique as an
ethos that one of his closest and most respected friends explicitly develops an analysis of
critique as ethos after Deleuze implicitly employs it in Difference and Repetition. This
reading is further developed through an interpretation of Deleuze’s figures of the
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“Apprentice” and the “Russian Idiot” as practical personae modeling a way of living
Deleuze’s critical ethos.
3. Russian Idiot and Apprentice as Critical Personae
What has been in the background of this interpretation of Deleuze’s use of
critique in Difference and Repetition are the two ideals Deleuze professes for doing
philosophy: breaking with doxa and generating thought. Critique is both destructive and
creative. Or, more precisely, critique is an evaluation of presuppositions that moves
beyond limits by internalizing them. We might think about these two moments of doing
philosophy as two different faces of the critical practice itself. Such an interpretation
suggests thinking of the production of a thought without Image in two moments. The first
moment is that of the radical critique of the dogmatic Image of thought. The second
moment is a non-teleological critique of faculties. Deleuze gives us two characters to
understand how these two moments are lived: the Russian idiot and the Apprentice. This
subsection argues that the Russian idiot practices radical critique as “culture” and the
Apprentice practices non-teleological critique as learning.
The radical critique of the dogmatic image of thought puts into question all
presuppositions, all ready-made answers, everything that is considered “given.” Deleuze
writes that:
a philosophy which would be without any kind of presuppositions…would take as
its point of departure a radical critique of [the dogmatic Image of thought]…a
rigorous struggle against this Image…. As a result, it would discover its authentic
repetition in a thought without Image, even at the cost of the greatest destructions
and the greatest demoralisations, and a philosophical obstinacy with no ally but
paradox. (DR 132)
The radical critique Deleuze is suggesting obstinately questions everything – even to the
point of demoralization. If what Deleuze is resisting in the dogmatic Image is its origin in
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morality and its consequences for freedom, the idea could be that the radical critique
produces demoralization as its goal. The persona Deleuze identifies as the “Russian idiot”
expresses such a philosophical obstinacy. Indeed, Deleuze even says that the philosopher
“takes the side” of the idiot (DR 130). As we saw in the previous chapter, the Russian
Idiot is someone who denies what “cannot be denied”: that is, common sense (DR 130).7
Idiocy is a sort of modesty, but it is also an expression of ill will and an inability to think
according to the standards set by the “culture of the times” (DR 130). The “violent”
training or cultivation in evaluating presuppositions is training in becoming a “Russian
idiot” (DR 130). It is training in how to break with doxa: developing interpretation skills,
critical skills, and argument skills. It means making looking at the world with wonder and
making always asking why a habit. It means training in being able to think differently and
against the persuasive initial positions presented by common sense, knowledge, and
morality. It is not just critically evaluating others, but at the deepest level the skill to
critically evaluate oneself and one’s habits of thought.
The radical critique of the dogmatic Image begins the process of producing a
thought without Image. It frees the faculties from the burden of having to conform to
common sense. The Russian idiot is the one who practices radical critique against the
dogmatic Image of thought. The Apprentice is the second character Deleuze gives us for
understanding how the creation of a thought without Image occurs. If the Russian idiot
personifies radical critique’s destruction of the dogmatic Image of thought, the
Apprentice personifies non-teleological critique’s production of a thought without Image
that resists becoming a new Image of thought.
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
7

See also DR 114-5.
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When non-teleological critique evaluates each faculty for its intrinsic power, it
describes a movement whereby the violence of a “fundamental encounter” on the level of
sensibility acts as a spark to the fuse of thinking (DR 140-41). The encounter plunges
each faculty in its turn into an involuntary adventure in which the faculty “is born to the
extreme point of its dissolution” through a triple violence. Deleuze offers the model of
the Apprentice to illustrate how such a critique is lived. The Apprentice penetrates the
encounter, treating the encounter as a problem. She raises each faculty to its transcendent
exercise, trying to grasp in each faculty what is its alone and transmitting the violence of
the encounter from one faculty to the next. The Apprentice realizes the intrinsic power of
each faculty by taking its limit (the insensible, unimaginable, unrememberable, and
unthinkable) as an object. Each faculty thus discovers its unique power and limit, but also
its difference and its repetition. For instance, the faculty of thought, when confronted
with what it alone is capable of grasping, finds its difference. But when thought is
confronted with what is unthinkable it instantaneously engenders the repetition of
thinking. Deleuze develops such a non-teleological critique from his reading of Kant that
evaluates intrinsic power independently of how that power could be used legitimately for
some pre-established end. According to Deleuze, “learning is the true transcendental
structure that unites difference to difference” (DR 165-7). The Apprentice learns. She
does not know. So, the Apprentice unites difference to difference without an end as either
goal or ideal. What this means is that the Apprentice produces the unity of the faculties –
the Idea – at an unconscious level without relying on “common sense” by practicing nonteleological critique as the process of learning.
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The Russian idiot resists presuppositions while the Apprentice realizes the
intrinsic power of the faculties, uniting difference through learning. But the pedagogy of
learning is not the master bestowing pre-packaged knowledge or even drilling the
Apprentice to produce the “correct” answer. The pedagogy of learning is culture –
understood as a violent training in evaluating presuppositions through a constant
questioning, problematizing, and creating. Culture and Learning together form a “critical
ethos” that forces constant reevaluation of our learning – that is, a lived Apprenticeship in
getting beyond our limits by identifying, evaluating, and affirming them. It is an
Apprenticeship in Russian idiocy, constantly reevaluating its learning: the eternal
ungrounding of thought by thought, the power of a thought without Image to resist setting
up a new Image of thought. It is thus that the figures of the Russian idiot and Apprentice
can be interpreted as practical personae modeling a way of living Deleuze’s critical
philosophy.
c. An Ethos of Evaluation
In the previous section we argued that the form of Kantian critique Deleuze
adopts in Difference and Repetition is best understood as an ethos. We defined Deleuze’s
critical ethos in terms of a lived Apprenticeship in getting “beyond” the limits imposed
by our presuppositions by identifying, evaluating, and affirming them. Consistent with
Foucault’s suggestion to locate the legacy of Kantian Enlightenment in the ethos defined
by critique, the suggestion of the previous section was that Deleuze’s critique could be
evaluated as a “handbook” for a “way out” of the dogmatic Image of thought and its
practical implications. In this final section, called “An Ethos of Evaluation”, we propose
to begin that evaluation by outlining two areas of future research. In the first, under the
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title “Implications of the place of culture in Deleuze’s critical ethos” we lay out a sketch
for what Deleuze’s ethos of evaluation means concretely by following through with the
analysis of the parallel between how Deleuze understands culture in Difference and
Repetition and how he suggests Kant understands culture in Kant’s Critical Philosophy.
In the second, “The practical significance of critique as ethos of evaluation” we pose a
series of questions about the significance of this parallel and the extent to which
Deleuze’s critique breaks with its Kantian antecedent.
i. Implications of the place of culture in Deleuze’s critical ethos
In our previous discussion of the parallel between the conceptions of culture in
Kant’s Critical Philosophy and Difference and Repetition, we argued that critique is what
determines the ideal of culture. In Kant’s Critical Philosophy, critique establishes the
civil state of Reason through the imposition of culture, but the ideal of culture is
determined by an original decision about what counts as an end of Reason. This original
decision, we argued, is made through an appeal to the test of public examination, that is,
to “common sense.” However, Deleuze’s reading suggests that what Kant presents as the
true interests of Reason are in reality Kant’s own interests – or more precisely those
interests particular to Kant’s social and historical epoch that Kant’s work represents
through its subjective presuppositions. These hidden, contingent interests that determine
culture, Deleuze suggests, are ultimately moral interests. There are several important
consequences if Deleuze is right that Kant’s critique assumes a particular list and
hierarchy of Reason’s ends based on hidden moral interests.
We identify three consequences of Deleuze’s reading of Kant. First, Kant’s moral
teleology would become groundless. If morality is assumed to be the destiny of man from
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the outset, claiming that morality must be conceived as the highest end of Reason is less
convincing. Second, Kant’s conception of culture would be understood as a foundational
anthropology that raises the empirical to the level of the transcendental. As we argued
previously, the only forms of culture that are valued by Kant are those that contribute to
the formation of rational moral men. These are limited to cultures that, in Kant’s words,
prepare men “for a sovereignty in which reason alone is to dominate” (CJ §83). What this
means is that not all cultures are created equal. Certain cultures are more capable of
producing rational moral men than others, and some, problematically, are incapable of
forming them at all. But if Kant’s conception of the proper culture for moral progress
depends on the presupposition of a teleology in which rationality and morality are
virtually co-extensive, his choice of proper culture is developed at the empirical level
rather than the transcendental. Third, for Kant the way in which rational moral men are
produced is necessarily through violence. At the level of faculties as well as at the social
level, it is man’s selfishness, “heartless competitive vanity” and “insatiable desire to
possess and to rule” that “awakens all his powers” (IUH “Fourth Thesis”). Humans’
violently unsocial desire to direct everything according to their own ideas is the force
behind the progress of their Reason as well as the progress of their social institutions. The
assumption of the superiority of the moral end of Reason allows Kant to grant legitimacy
to the violence of humans’ unsocial tendencies because the end of that violence is
morality. Likewise, state violence is preliminarily granted legitimacy because it protects
social order, another necessary condition of the progress of Reason toward morality from
Kant’s perspective. Even the violence of war and the imposition of Kant’s (white, male,
European, tax-paying) models of culture and freedom on subject nations is justified
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insofar as this is necessary for the creation of a perfectly just and cosmopolitan “civil
constitution” (IUH 5th Thesis). Kant’s reasoning for this is that only a civil constitution
that is perfectly just could inspire unfailing self-regulation of one’s unsocial tendency,
that is, unfailing morality. As Deleuze writes, for Kant “the formation of a perfect civil
constitution…is the highest object of Culture, the end of history, or the truly terrestrial
good sovereign” (KCP 74). In summary, Kant’s critical philosophy presupposes
knowledge about the superiority of the moral end of Reason, but this knowledge is
derived from Kant’s historical and philosophical milieu. Deleuze’s reading leads us to
argue that Kant assumes a moral teleology in order to ground his anthropology and his
justification of the necessity of violence for moral and social progress. The practical
consequence of this is a philosophical ethos that limits possibilities of life.
ii. The practical significance of critique as ethos of evaluation
To what extent is Deleuze’s answer to the question of what form of culture we
should pursue to develop our capacity to experience encounter parallel with the one we
attribute to Kant? It should be clear from our interpretation of Difference and Repetition
that Deleuze does not assume a moral teleology. His practice of critique is specifically
aimed at contesting moral teleology and evaluating the subjective presuppositions that
keep our empirical moral intuitions hidden and implicit. Yet, there are still two concerns:
first, whether the use of culture in Deleuze’s differential theory of faculties implies an
appraisal in which certain cultures are more valuable than others, thus undercutting the
power of critique as a transcendental “handbook”, and second, whether the violence at
the heart of culture (and at the heart of Deleuze’s notions of the Idea and the encounter)
undercuts the liberationist ideal of critique as a “way out.”
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Answering these concerns would require a great deal more analysis than can be
done sufficiently here. However, we would like to propose a line of reading to begin that
analysis. As we just saw, for Kant, the system of culture is determined by Reason’s
highest ends and while those ends are ostensibly determined by critique, on the basis of
Deleuze’s reading that determination actually happens through the subjective
presuppositions constitutive of Kant’s historical and philosophical milieu. By way of
parallel, our proposal is that for Deleuze the system of culture is determined by
Thought’s highest power – that is, by the ideal of a thought without Image – and that the
highest power of Thought is determined by critique since critique is what identifies,
evaluates, and determines the means of realizing the highest intrinsic power of each of
the faculties. In contrast with our reading of Kant, Deleuze’s determination of culture
does not presuppose empirical “knowledge” or moral interests. Deleuze’s immanent
critique does not presuppose any particular goal Deleuze may have wanted to impute to it
beyond his self-acknowledged definition of philosophy as “breaking with doxa” (DR
134). If culture is determined through immanent critique’s examination of the faculties’
intrinsic power, without either hierarchizing the faculties or imposing on them a certain
ideal organization based on “rational” constraints, Deleuze is not making an implicit
appraisal in which certain cultures are more valuable than others. Deleuze’s system of
culture requires the development of a critical ethos that persistently seeks a “way out” by
evaluating presuppositions and creating new Ideas – new thoughts without Image – from
the openness and wonder one develops toward experience through one’s evaluation of
one’s own presuppositions – that is, one’s own society, knowledge, and moral values.
Thus since the critical ethos expressing Deleuze’s ontology is built on the constantly
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renewed evaluation of all presuppositions, it does not limit possibilities of life but arouses
life to expand to the very limits of its power.
However, we proposed a second concern as well: whether the violence at the heart
of culture (and at the heart of Deleuze’s notions of the Idea and the encounter) undercuts
the liberationist ideal of critique as a “way out.” We are concerned about this because
violence is so often used for the imposition of ways of thinking and acting that are met
with resistance. Violence is a force for oppression, coersion and bullying more often than
for freedom and dogged self-evaluation. While Deleuze’s own account of culture differs
from his understanding of Kant’s, the justification – even necessity of violence is the
same in both. Real thought is generated from a violent training or culture insofar as such
a culture is the genetic principle of the experience of encounter. Moreover, despite
Deleuze’s changes to the practical implications of the theory of faculties, he
acknowledges that his account does not make history any less bloody. As Deleuze writes:
History progresses not by negation and the negation of negation, but by deciding
problems and affirming differences. It is no less bloody and cruel as a result. Only
the shadows of history live by negation: the good enter into it with all the power
of a posited differential or a difference affirmed; they repel shadows into the
shadows and deny only as the consequence of a primary positivity and
affirmation. For them, as Nietzsche says, affirmation is primary; it affirms
difference, while the negative is only a consequence or a reflection in which
affirmation is doubled. That is why real revolutions have the atmosphere of fetes.
(DR 268)
When Deleuze refers to “negation” and “the negative” here he is referring to one of the
many facets of the dogmatic Image of thought. The main idea is that even when we make
the changes to our practices, live the critical ethos by identifying, evaluating, and
affirming limits, and create a thought without Image, it does not make history less
violent. It does, he suggests, make it more free – and more celebratory. Deleuze’s critical
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ethos is a practical choice that is transformative, but on what basis do we evaluate what
we are transforming into? And what real costs are justified for it?
As we have seen, violence for Deleuze is the necessarily vertiginous experience
of contesting one’s deepest presuppositions, but it is also something that happens to you
without your consent or even your awareness. Much of Deleuze’s talk about violence is
the violence of habituation at the unconscious level. It is not willful, but done to us.
Thought is an involuntary adventure. Culture “links” the faculties with this violence,
which is “necessary” “to ‘provide a training for the mind’” (DR 166). While it is true that
Deleuze’s sense of violence here is quite broad, that culture is violent in the sense that
any imposition is violent, and that the point of this violence as imposed habituation in
evaluation is to act as the practical, lived step in breaking with doxa, we nonetheless
wonder whether the broadness of Deleuze’s sense of violence does not undercut any
meaningful way of distinguishing forms of violence that are justifiable from those that
are not. Moreover, it is worth considering whether the necessity of violence in Deleuze’s
differential theory of faculties also occludes appreciating the power of non-violence, as a
form of affirmation and strength distinct from the everyday understanding of passivity.
While we hope to have outlined an argument that the critical ethos Deleuze develops
from his ideal of philosophy as a constantly renewed evaluation of presuppositions resists
foundational anthropologies and moral teleology, the correlation between Kant’s Critical
Philosophy and Difference and Repetition at the level of culture and the necessity of
violence is more problematic. We hope to pursue this inquiry in future work, for the
resources Deleuze’s immanent critical ethos offers have the potential to ground a new
ethical theory – a theory that embraces freedom – and even responsibility – for the
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unconscious, that emphasizes a critical and wondering attitude, that resists the
presuppositions that serve to oppress people, and that encourages an attitude of openness,
affirmation and celebration for living life to the fullest.
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5. Conclusion
The Conclusion includes a brief review of the dissertation’s general argument, the
results of each chapter, as well as a restatement of its most significant claims. On the
basis of this review, the Conclusion presents the dissertation’s distinctive contributions to
contemporary scholarship on Deleuze’s relation to Kant and the potential for a Deleuzian
ethics. It ends with an outline of the avenues of future research the dissertation opens.
a. Review of argument and significant claims
At the most general level, the main argument of the dissertation is two-fold. It
argues first that by comparing the doctrine of faculties from Kant’s Critical Philosophy
with the differential theory of faculties from Difference and Repetition it can reveal an
“immanent” form of Kantian critique implicit in Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition.
This allows the dissertation to argue, second, that Deleuze’s critique is best understood as
a “cultural” practice that models an ethos of evaluation and creation. These two
arguments oblige the dissertation to end by raising questions about the extent to which
Deleuze’s critique breaks with its Kantian antecedent, particularly as regards its practical
commitments.
At the level of the articulation of these arguments in the individual chapters, in the
first and second chapters, the dissertation structures the exegeses of Kant’s Critical
Philosophy and Difference and Repetition according to a parallel problem and set of
solutions. The problem in Kant’s Critical Philosophy is the externality of the ends of
Reason assumed by both empiricism and dogmatic rationalism. In Difference and
Repetition it is the problem of subjective presuppositions, i.e. the “dogmatic Image of
Thought”, that defines Thought by reference to the external standards of “common sense”
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as Cogitatio natura universalis and concordia facultatum. In the Critique of Pure Reason,
Kant is straightforward that the real motive for the transcendental turn that rejects both
empiricism and rationalism is the practical goal of making “room for faith” in “God,
freedom and immortality” (Bxxx). In Difference and Repetition Deleuze explicitly sets
the stakes of this problem in a practical framework rather than a theoretical one when he
writes “if the truth be told, none of this would amount to much were it not for the moral
presuppositions and practical implications of such a distortion” (DR 268). The
“distortion” Deleuze mentions is that under the dogmatic Image, Thought can only
compare the new to what is already known – and so it can never move beyond anything
but the recognizable (DR 134). Because of this, Deleuze concludes that the dogmatic
Image of Thought is deeply conservative and that its uncritical acceptance robs Thought
of its creative freedom and power of change, diminishing and enslaving Thought – and
thereby us thinkers. According to this formulation, freedom is the value common to both
Deleuze and Kant.
The set of solutions structuring the exegeses of Kant’s Critical Philosophy and
Difference and Repetition can be summarized in terms of a shared methodological
commitment to the ideal of immanence. As Kant explains it, “We shall entitle the
principles whose application is confined entirely within the limits of possible experience,
immanent; and those, on the other hand, which profess to pass beyond these limits,
transcendent’ (CPR A295–6/B352). Deleuze, however, conceives of immanence as the
principle of a critique that seeks the genesis of experience and thought in a theory of
faculties understood as relations of power. While Deleuze is clear that he believes Kant
ultimately betrayed the standard of immanence his critique required, Deleuze also shows
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that in the Critique of Judgment Kant developed a truly genetic account of the emergence
of aesthetic common sense from the experience of the violence of the sublime and the
paradoxical way Imagination shakes free from its limits by internalizing its
powerlessness to comprehend the Ideas of Reason. Deleuze utilizes this “doctrine of
faculties” he articulates in Kant as a model for his own explication of a “differential
theory of faculties” in Difference and Repetition. The genesis of a thought without Image
begins for Deleuze in the experience of the violence of an encounter, which forces each
faculty to its limit by presenting it with what exceeds its power from the perspective of its
empirical exercise. The faculty internalizes that limit, we argue, in going “beyond” it to
its superior transcendental exercise. In both Kant’s Critical Philosophy and Difference
and Repetition, the notion of the limit is no longer conceived in terms of merely imposing
a maximum by which to reign in a faculty’s ambitions, but in terms of identifying the full
extent of a faculty’s power and the basis on which its power is deployed to its fullest. In
this new sense, limitation is not teleological. Rather, it refers to the intrinsic power of a
thing or faculty (DR 201).
The parallel between the problems and sets of solution constitutive of Kant’s
Critical Philosophy and Difference and Repetition allow us to argue for a further parallel
at the level of the genesis of the experience of both sublimity and encounter. In Kant’s
Critical Philosophy Deleuze is clear that he understands “culture” as the “movement of
the genesis” of the feeling of the sublime and the aesthetic common sense that
corresponds to that feeling (KCP 75/51-2). Following the reference Deleuze makes in this
passage to section 29 of the Critique of Judgment, we show that in Kant the problem of
culture is the problem of preparing human minds for the experience of the sublime and,
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ultimately, for the attainment of morality and freedom. Based on this, we sought a
parallel “cultural” genesis of experience of encounter operating in Deleuze’s differential
theory of faculties. In Difference and Repetition, we argued, “culture” is conceived as a
“violent training” at the unconscious level of faculties that allows the movement of each
faculty from its empirical to its transcendent exercise insofar as it prepares the
unconscious mind to perceive encounter and Ideas through its idealization of a constant
questioning, exploring, and problematizing (DR 165). This reading depends on
connecting what Deleuze means by “culture” to a conception of philosophy as the dual
process of contesting presuppositions and creating thought without Image. The exegeses
of Kant’s Critical Philosophy and Difference and Repetition conclude with the
suggestion that for Deleuze cultivating an unconscious openness to and fertile ground for
encounter/Ideas is also the path to the attainment of freedom.
In our final chapter we begin by juxtaposing and analyzing the “doctrine of
faculties” from Kant’s Critical Philosophy with the “differential theory of faculties” from
Difference and Repetition. The comparison of the parallel structure and logic of these
theories of faculties allowed us to argue that Kantian critique is what is really going on in
Deleuze’s “methodology” of Difference and Repetition. The particular way Deleuze has
of understanding critique – as immanent evaluation of faculties’ limits and the means of
realizing them - in conjunction with the connection between critique and culture leads us
to argue that the practical understanding of critique as an ethos of evaluation and creation
is the real “methodology” underpinning Difference and Repetition. In our last section we
attempt to explicate what a critique as ethos of evaluation and creation means in terms of
the logic of the differential theory of faculties it prepares. Affirmation is understood as
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selective and creative, and it is understood as creative insofar as critique itself models the
logic of internalization/going beyond we see in the faculties movement from their
empirical to their transcendent exercise. We end with an outline for an argument that the
critical ethos Deleuze develops from his ideal of philosophy as a constantly renewed
evaluation of presuppositions resists foundational anthropologies and moral teleology.
However, we acknowledge that the correlation between Kant’s Critical Philosophy and
Difference and Repetition at the level of culture and the necessity of violence is more
problematic. The problematic place of violence in culture makes its examination even
more pressing, as Deleuze’s critical ethos has the potential to offer a fascinating new
ethical perspective.
b. Current scholarship on Deleuze’s relationship to Kant
Scholarship on Deleuze’s relationship to Kant has lagged behind scholarship on
Deleuze’s relationship to Nietzsche, Bergson, Leibniz, Spinoza, and even Hegel.
However, there has been a surge in interest in Deleuze’s relationship to Kant among
Deleuze scholars in the last five years, with a handful of volumes devoted to collecting
essays on the relation and another handful devoting detailed study to the ways in which
Deleuze both criticizes Kant and uses Kant as a conceptual resource.
One theme amongst these readings is that Deleuze’s relation to Kant is conceived
as primarily critical. Kant is the “enemy”, the thinker of common sense, analogy, and
reflection. This is not necessarily the wrong way to characterize Deleuze’s assessment of
Kant, but the readiness with which scholars of Deleuze dismiss Deleuze’s debt to Kant
misses something important for understanding Deleuze. For example, in Patricia Farrell’s
“The Philosopher-Monkey: Learning and the Discordant Harmony of the Faculties”,
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Farrell acknowledges Deleuze’s ambivalence about Kant and even asks if there is a way
of “catching Kant before he involves philosophy in the game of analogy” (Farrell 23).
Yet, when she describes the relationship of faculties, Difference and Repetition’s
differential theory is described as a “discordant harmony” whereas Kant’s Critical
Philosophy’s doctrine of faculties is described as a “harmonious accord” (Farrell 22),
despite Deleuze’s description of the relation in Kant’s Critical Philosophy as “discordant
– accord” (KCP 51). This sets up a too-severe distinction between the organizations of
faculties as they are described in these books, making it harder for Farrell to see their
connection. So, even though she claims an interest in locating the point at which Kant’s
work can be caught before his critique is disavowed, Farrell overlooks a potentially
fruitful way of locating that point because of the ease with which she assumes Deleuze’s
relationship to Kant is merely critical and straightforwardly reversal.
Another theme we see in scholarship on Deleuze’s relationship to Kant is the
willingness to unproblematically connect Kant to a theory of “transcendentalism” based
on the subject, which is therefore really transcendent and not “transcendental” at all.
Miguel de Beistegui, for example, argues that “Deleuzian empiricism opposes the two
traditions of transcendental idealism represented by Kant and Husserl”, both of which
depend on the account of objects for-us and so irredeemably fail to eliminate
consciousness (de Beistegui 14). Rather than seeing in Kant, as Deleuze does, the
“propitious moment” of the move past the subject to immanence and genesis, de
Besteigui chooses to emphasize Kant’s ultimate disavowal of this moment (DR 29-30).
De Beistegui and other scholars who do this are not wrong, of course. But there is an
important issue of the choice of emphasis when dealing with ambivalence like Deleuze
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has toward Kant and the overall attitude of the current scholarship seems to lean toward
emphasizing Deleuze’s criticisms rather than his debt.
This choice of emphasis would only present itself as a problem in those instances
when the assumption of mere criticism and reversal blinded a thinker to an interesting
connection. Moreover, there are scholars who emphasize Deleuze’s debt to Kant. In the
1981 book Modern French Philosophy that introduced many English-speaking
philosophers to Deleuze, Vincent Descombes introduces Deleuze as “above all a postKantian” (152). Christian Kerslake’s work emphasizes the continuity of Deleuze’s
project with Kant’s, but he approaches Deleuze through Kant and Kant’s conceptual
vocabulary rather than on Deleuze’s own terms. Alberto Toscano emphasizes the
importance of Kant over Bergson, Maimon, Spinoza, and Nietzsche for the development
of Deleuze’s ontology, though he too adds the caveat that for Deleuze the Kantian legacy
in the development of his ontology is distinct from the tradition that took from Kant the
transcendental argument. Dan Smith argues that,
Deleuze’s real confrontation, even in his early books, was with Kant….The
strategy of Deleuze’s early work was to return to Kant himself, take up again the
problems that generated the post-Kantian tradition (as formulated by Maimon),
but to develop solutions to those problems that were very different from the
solutions that led to Hegel. (I.I. 44).
However, even among those scholars who emphasize Deleuze’s debt to Kant, none (of
whom I am aware) focus on the parallel between the differential theory of faculties and
the “doctrine” of faculties in order to develop a reading of the importance of the practice
of immanent critique in Difference and Repetition and the implications of that parallel at
the level of culture.
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Yet, one thing almost every scholar can agree on is that there is something
connecting Deleuze’s approach in Difference and Repetition with Kant’s methodology,
though none (of whom we are aware) map it out in detail. Dan Smith, for example,
claims that from the point of view of the theory of Ideas, Difference and Repetition is
Deleuze’s Critique of Pure Reason (Smith I.I. 45). Joe Hughes gets more specific when
he suggests that “Difference and Repetition is Deleuze’s transcendental aesthetic”
(Hughes 153). And Edward Willatt goes so far as to say that Deleuze is a post-Kantian at
Kant’s “critical moment” (Willatt 1). Miguel De Beistegui, in his characteristically
careful way, argues that “If, in a way, Difference and Repetition constitutes Deleuze’s
critique of pure reason, in which the transcendental and the empirical are united in a
‘transcendental empiricism’, or a ‘superior form of empiricism’, Anti-Oedipus
corresponds to his critique of practical reason” (de Beistegui 120). As this is a centrally
important connection for the rest of de Beistegui’s work on Anti-Oedipus, he seems to
agree that Difference and Repetition is Deleuze’s Critique of Pure Reason, but puts his
point in the hypothetical in order to acknowledge that there has been no developed work
to substantiate that claim. Thus our argument that Deleuze is using a form of Kantian
critique to structure Difference and Repetition is an important contribution to the
conversation among Deleuze scholars, especially since there are so many who seem to
point in the direction of the argument without making it explicit. Our more specific
claims that Deleuze connects critique to “culture” and that it thus works less as a method
and more as an ethos are not anticipated in any of the Deleuze scholarship we have
encountered, despite the healthy number of scholarly pieces mining the connection
between Deleuze and Foucault.
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Another theme is that of the faculties. Many scholars talk about the theory of
faculties and some even connect it with Kant rather than Proust. There is even a
burgeoning debate about Deleuze’s relationship to phenomenology that hinges in part on
whether we understand his theory of faculties as subjectivist. Joe Hughes argues that
Deleuze is a phenomenologist on the grounds that he is following in the footsteps of
Husserl’s late theorization of a “genetic phenomenology” in which the reduction attains
an almost pre-intentional level of analysis. Transcendental empiricism, like Husserl’s
genetic phenomenology, Hughes argues, begins in experience and the description of the
transcendental. Moreover, it is Husserl’s reduction that ultimately keeps transcendental
empiricism from tracing the transcendental from the empirical. Hughes’ argument is
interesting insofar as he claims that it is Deleuze’s subtle criticisms of the ways the
natural attitude creeps back in to Husserl’s work that show that Deleuze affirms the need
for a reduction and seeks to give one himself (Hughes 117). Alberto Toscano, however,
believes, like the majority of Deleuze scholars, that Deleuze avoided phenomenology
precisely because he did not think it ever attained a pre-intentional point of view. In
connection with this, there has been a great deal of interest among Deleuze scholars in
Deleuze’s account of the productivity of sensation as a response to Kant’s dualism of
concept/intuition. The stakes of this debate, it seems, is in whether to understand Deleuze
as a “hyper-rationalist” (Bryant), an empiricist (Patton, Smith, de Besteigui), or a
materialist (Toscano).
There is, of course, a rapidly increasing body of literature on Deleuze’s
relationship to Ethics. One of the general questions we sought here to address is that of
the relative priority of ontology and ethics in Deleuze’s thought. Levi Bryant has claimed
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that for Deleuze (and we gather he thinks this is – or should be – the case in all
philosophy), ontology precedes ethics. Bryant starts out his virtuosic book Difference and
Givenness by arguing that he emphasizes Deleuze’s metaphysics and rationalism because
he thinks undue focus has been paid to Deleuze’s experimentalism and empiricism and
that this undue focus occludes the metaphysical problems Deleuze is really primarily
addressing. Bryant prioritizes ontology, he writes, because “Deleuze’s ethics and politics
follow – rightly – from his ontology, not the reverse” (Bryant x). Indeed, he even goes so
far as to argue four things that this dissertation explicitly resists. First, he argues that:
There is no inherent or a priori reason why being unconventional should be
preferred to being conventional. Rather, by ‘conventional’ I mean a set of
conventions, practices, or beliefs resulting from a history and arising within a
particular culture such that they are themselves arbitrary. (16)
Second, that:
Although Deleuze criticizes the moral Image of thought for being based on moral
presuppositions and for being politically conservative, the proximal justification
for Deleuze's criticism is not its moral character, but rather the inability of the
Image of thought to properly account for the phenomenon of thought and to break
with doxa. (80)
Third, that:
It is not because Kant is a state thinker, or because Hegel is a thinker who
shackles everything to totalities, that Deleuze rejects Kant and Hegel, but rather
because they trace the transcendental from the empirical and assume an external
model of difference. Kant and Hegel do not assert the primacy of recognition
because they are state thinkers bent on justifying only established values; rather,
they assert the primacy of established values because they begin with the model
of recognition. (101)
And finally, that:
Being creates, we are part of that creation. Being is not, for Deleuze, our creation.
This is why ethically Deleuze tends to advocate a sort of fatalistic stoicism that is
highly tolerant and democratic. (12)
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However, this dissertation argues that there is a reason to prefer being unconventional to
being conventional. Freedom, the “way out”, can only be attained through the critical
attitude that specifically seeks to evaluate presuppositions. Breaking with doxa, Bryant
himself acknowledges, is the “proximal justification” for Deleuze’s criticism of the moral
Image of thought. Of course, not only does Deleuze explicitly write that none of his
concerns about properly describing the phenomenon of Thought would amount to much
if not for the practical implications of improperly describing it (DR 268), Dan Smith
argues that in Deleuze, “the determinations of the Ideas are practical from the start (hence
the importance of such questions as: how?, where?, when?, how many?, from what
viewpoint?, and so on)” (I.I. 56). One of the important implications of understanding an
ethos of critique at the basis of Deleuze’s thought is its resistance to interpreting
Deleuze’s ethical stance as a fatalistic stoicism. Moreover, if Deleuze is not thinking
about the ethical as ineliminably connected to the ontological he is much more likely to
fall into the same mistakes he claims Kant made. Bryant, strangely, works against his
own arguments in an article written three years after his book when he writes that
“despite the maddening difficulty of trying to extract a coherent ethical philosophy from
Deleuze’s thought, it is impossible, after reading him from start to finish, to escape the
impression that some sort of ethics winds its way through his thought like a thin red line”
(Bryant, “The Ethics of the Event: Deleuze and Ethics without Arche,” 30).
Finally, though our claim that there is a form of critique as ethos informing
Deleuze’s work in Difference and Repetition may be new, there are people who have
done work on an ethos in Deleuze. Erinn Gilson’s work on an “ethos of responsiveness”
is the prime example. And though she does not expound on it, Patricia Farrell connects
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the notion of ethos to Deleuze’s understanding of faculties’ individual internal principles
(Farrell 21) and claims that “[l]earning constitutes itself as a way of being (an ethos)”
(Farrell 25).
c. Future Research
Future avenues of research the dissertation opens are extensive. One of the first
projects would have to be thoroughly working out the meaning of the Deleuzian critical
ethos we argue for and its possible applications to ethical problems. Connecting the
critical ethos to the method of dramatization Deleuze describes in Nietzsche could be
helpful, as would be connecting the Kantian notion of schema to dramatization as
presentation without representation. However none of this work would be possible
without a more thorough look at the notion of “culture” in Deleuze. There is the potential
to connect Deleuze’s ethos to the multiculturalism debate. Another potential avenue of
future research surrounds the perspective of “transcendentalism”. It would be fruitful to
write about how Deleuze’s revision of the transcendental method does not lead
necessarily to phenomenology, in contrast to Charles Taylor’s argument. It might also be
interesting to follow up on the idea that Deleuze is not best understood as a materialist or
a rationalist or an empiricist, but as a transcendental philosopher. More research needs to
be devoted to the dark precursor and its connection to the soul and vitalism in Deleuze.
Our research would be strengthened by extending our reading through Deleuze’s
later writings. De Beistegui’s association of schizoanalysis with Kantian critique would
be nice way to do this in the context of a reading of Anti-Oedipus (de Beistegui 144),
where research into the stakes of the change in terminology from faculties to machinic
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parts is necessary. Research on the relation between Deleuze and Foucault, especially on
critique, ethos, immanence, and freedom would be valuable as well.
Finally, it will be both necessary and interesting to connect Deleuze’s reading of
Kant to Kantian scholarship. This would be nice not only as a way of asking seriously
whether Deleuze’s interpretation is a fair reading of Kant, but also because it is the
necessary first step to any argument that Deleuze’s reading could bring some important
new insights to contemporary Kant scholarship, especially into the importance of
understanding Kant’s use of faculties in any interpretation of his work and the possibility
of a non-subjective reading of the transcendental argument.
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